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THESIS ABSTRACT
Reasonable Agreement:
A Contractualist Political Theory
The thesis is a defence of contractualism in liberal political 
theory. My aim is to show that contractualism can play a crucial 
role in the political theory of liberalism if it applies to the 
meta-ethical level rather than the ethical level. In particular, 1 
will argue that the contractualist concept of 'reasonable 
agreement' provides the foundation for a new comprehensive liberal 
political theory. The basic intuition behind the idea of reasonable 
agreement is that all principles and rules must be capable of being 
justified to everyone: these are principles and rules on which
everyone could reach agreement, where the agreement is defined in 
terms of what no one could reasonably reject.
The first introductory chapter will attempt to establish that 
contractualism reflects the ethical core of liberalism, and that 
the contractualist theory of reasonable agreement gives the best 
account of egalitarianism. This will be followed by six chapters, 
divided in two parts, and a brief conclusion. Part 1 presents the 
case for contractualism from a theoretical angle, providing a
3conceptual analysis of reasonable agreement. Part II examines 
reasonable agreement from a political angle, providing an analysis 
of three key questions in political liberalism.
The three chapters making up Part I deal with the theories of 
Rawls and Scanlon, the two major figures responsible for reviving 
the interest in contractualism in general, and 'reasonable 
agreement' in particular. Chapter 2 critically evaluates Rawls's 
contractualism, while Chapter 3 focuses on the moral theory of 
Scanlon. Chapter 4 attempts to build on the efforts of Rawls and 
Scanlon by further exploring and hopefully improving on their 
theory of reasonable agreement. I believe that the strength of 
reasonable agreement lies in its effort to raise contractualism 
from the ethical to the meta-ethical level, thus the three chapters 
in Part I evaluate two notions central to reasonable agreement: the 
idea of agreement and the concept of reasonableness.
This brings us to the second part of the thesis, where the 
relationship between 'reasonable agreement' and political 
liberalism is investigated. Political liberalism is concerned with 
the political concepts that form the basis of a liberal society, 
namely, political obligation, social justice, and neutrality. 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 examine how the egalitarian proposal of
reasonable agreement applies respectively to these three liberal 
questions.
The concluding chapter will provide a summary of the main 
arguments presented in the thesis.
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INTRODUCTION
In a review article of Charles Beitz's Political Equality. 
Russell Hardin makes the following claim: "Reasonable Agreement.
These words are the 'open sesame' of much of contemporary political 
theory" (Hardin 1991, p.667). A reader not familiar with recent 
developments in moral and political philosophy will find Hardin's 
claim both surprising and puzzling. The reaction is understandable. 
Considering that the discipline of political theory in the western 
world spans over twenty-five centuries, the recent debate on the 
idea of reasonable agreement may appear insufficient to justify 
such bold claim from Professor Hardin. Yet 1 believe Hardin's 
affirmation ought to be taken seriously: his assertion is an
acknowledgement of the recent widespread interest in the concept of 
reasonable agreement, and the belief that the concept of reasonable 
agreement has the power to shake liberal political theory at its 
very foundation.
1 share Hardin's conviction (minus his irony) that reasonable 
agreement is where the future of political theory lies. 1 should
7also add that Hardin and I are not the only members of this club. 
Recently a growing number of influential political theorists^ have 
explicitly or implicitly stated their adherence to the idea of 
reasonable agreement.
The aim of this thesis is to argue that the contractualist 
theory of reasonable agreement provides the best defence of the 
liberal project. By 'the liberal project' I am specifically 
referring to liberalism as a normative political philosophy, where 
political institutions are evaluated on moral grounds. It follows 
that saying that reasonable agreement gives the best defence of 
liberalism means that it gives the best moral evaluation of 
political institutions.
While it will take all eight chapters to show that reasonable 
agreement can provide the moral foundations for a new comprehensive 
liberal political theory, the purpose of this introduction is to 
set out the strategy I will adopt in order to achieve my aim.
The first step will be to locate the contractualist theory of 
reasonable agreement in the larger political and philosophical 
context of liberalism. Liberalism has hitherto been concerned with 
the problem of reconciling diversity with peaceful coexistence, and 
as we enter the 21th century, this problem defines the challenge 
facing liberalism. The first chapter comprises a detailed account 
of the challenge facing liberalism, as well as a brief account of 
why the theory of reasonable agreement is capable of dealing with
 ^ - Barry (1939b); Beitz (1989); De Marneffe (1990); Freeman 
(1990 & 1991), Nagel (1991), Scanlon (1982 & 1988a).
8this challenge. I will also argue that the challenge facing 
liberalism can only be met by a theory which embraces the concept 
of scepticism, and reasonable agreement is such theory.
Following this first chapter, the thesis will be divided in 
two parts. The three chapters making up Part I will explore the 
theoretical dimension of reasonable agreement. It hardly needs to 
be said that reasonable agreement is a member of the vast family of 
concepts stemming from the idea of a social contract, in particular 
the sort of contractualism advanced by Rawls in 1971. Thus the 
undisputed protagonist of Chapters 2, 3 and 4 will be the concept 
of contractualism.
Chapter 2 critically evaluates Rawls's contractualism. 
Although Rawls is the major influence in the recent revival of 
contractualism, I believe there is a major weakness with his 
contractualism; namely, Rawls fails to apply contractualism to the 
meta-ethical level, where fundamental questions of moral intuitions 
and moral judgments are dealt with. Operating at the ethical level, 
where the rightness and wrongness of actions and practices is 
established, we find that Rawls's contractualism is constituted by 
the forced marriage of two conflicting social contract traditions: 
Hobbesian and Kantian. This defect has serious repercussions in 
Rawls's theory, thus Rawls's original position fails to capture the 
moral intuitions underpinning Rawls's theory of justice, 
furthermore it has led some liberal philosophers to doubt the 
validity of contractualism.
Some of the problems with Rawls's social contract theory have
9been highlighted by Thomas Scanlon in 1982 in his influential 
article "Contractualism and Utilitarianism". Scanlon's attempt to 
overcome the problems inherent in Rawls's theory represents the 
birth of reasonable agreement as an original interpretation of 
contractualism. Scanlon's contractualism is the subject of Chapter
3.
Although Scanlon is the single most important reason behind 
the emergence of reasonable agreement as a comprehensive political 
theory, and arguably the most influential ambassador of the 
philosophical project started by Rawls in 1971, I believe there are 
still some problematic knots obstructing his neo-contractualist 
political theory. For example, Scanlon's idea of moral motivations 
are too dependant on the psychological faculty of 'desires'. 
Furthermore, the logic of Scanlon's contractualist argument is 
predisposed to circularity.
I believe the source of these complications lies in Scanlon's 
hesitation to define the concept of reasonableness, therefore 
Chapter 4 will be devoted to a detailed analysis of this concept. 
After exploring the relationship between the concept of 
reasonableness and the idea of agreement, I will argue that the 
concept of reasonableness should not be considered an agent- 
relative concept which defines our moral psychology, instead 
reasonableness is an agent-neutral concept which has the role of 
illuminating our moral intuitions.
This brings us to the second part of the thesis, where the 
relationship between reasonable agreement and political liberalism
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is explored. In fact if reasonable agreement is to be considered a 
comprehensive political theory, it is necessary to move beyond mere 
definitions of concepts, and see what this theory tells us about 
some key political questions.
Political liberalism is concerned with the political questions 
which form the basis of liberal society. In particular political 
liberalism deals with three political questions: political
obligation, social justice, and neutrality. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 
examine how the egalitarian proposal of reasonable agreement as 
defined in Chapter 4 translates respectively onto these three 
liberal questions.
Chapter 5 will show that a theory of reasonable agreement 
provides us with an original interpretation of political 
obligation. I believe that as a theory of political obligation, 
reasonable agreement overcomes two major hurdles: justifying an
obligation towards a state which provides both presumptive and 
discretionary goods, and explaining why a citizen may have a duty 
to obey a just state while at the same time preserving a right to 
disobey unjust laws upheld by a just state. I believe that while 
these two hurdles are problematic for the theories of political 
obligation favoured by other liberals (George Klosko and Jeremy 
Waldron), they are successfully cleared by the concept of 
reasonable agreement.
Chapter 6 looks at the implications of reasonable agreement on 
theories of social justice. A theory of justice must be able to 
reconcile two opposing but intrinsically valid principles, namely.
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the principles of responsibility and compensation. I will argue 
that the theory of justice that derives from the contractualist 
theory of reasonable agreement vindicates a criterion of 
distribution that reconciles these two principles. I believe that 
such criterion of distribution finds confirmation in Rawls's theory 
of justice as fairness, indeed I will attempt to show that 
notwithstanding Rawls's rejection of desert, there are irrefutable 
elements of both principles of responsibility and compensation in 
his famous theory of justice.
Chapter 7 analyzes the concept of neutrality. The term 
'neutrality' has come under extensive criticism lately, indeed 
today not many liberals openly defend neutrality as a cornerstone 
of liberal political theory. Thus we find that Rawls (1988) 
explicitly avoids using this term altogether, opting instead for 
the idea of the 'priority of right over the good'. I believe that 
at the root of the controversy we find a misconception of 
neutrality. As a result, the critics of neutrality have succeeded 
in defeating a straw-man, since no advocate of neutrality will ever 
support the kind of consequentialist neutrality critics associate 
with the concept.
In this chapter I will defend a principled or substantive 
conception of neutrality, whereby neutrality concerns a system of 
rules that as a whole is justified by a set of values that no one 
could reasonably reject. The moral and political values which 
define the system of rules as a whole are derived from the 
contractualist idea of a reasonable agreement. Furthermore, the
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conceptualization of neutrality along the lines of reasonable 
agreement will demonstrate that neutrality plays a fundamental role 
in the liberal project, namely, providing the indispensable link 
between political legitimacy and social justice.
The concluding chapter will summarize the main arguments of 
this thesis, focusing in particular on the claim that the 
contractualist theory of reasonable agreement is equipped to 
confront the challenge facing liberalism.
In writing this thesis, I have incurred many debts to a number 
of people. My greatest debt is to my supervisor, Prof. Brian Barry, 
who has patiently and extensively commented on all my attempts to 
come to terms with contemporary political philosophy.
Considering the vast amount of literature generated by Rawls's 
theory over the last two decades, writing on Rawlsian themes would 
be a daunting task for anyone, not least for a novice as myself. 
Over the last four years 1 was fortunate to be guided along the way 
by Professor Brian Barry. In many ways Prof. Barry was for me what 
Virgil was for Dante during the latter's exploration of the 
Inferno: "11 savio mio maestro" (Inf. VIII 86) and "La mia guida" 
(Purg. XXVII 19). Unfortunately the analogy ends here, as 1 am no 
Dante of contemporary political philosophy, and this thesis is 
certainly no equivalent of the Divine Comedv.
1 am also thankful to the Economic & Social Research Council 
(ESRC) and the British Academy for their financial support over two 
years, and to all those who read or commented on parts of my
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thesis, in particular Russ Bentley, Simon Caney, John Charvet, 
Subbu Garimella, Percy Lehning, Margaret Moore, Mike Saward and 
Federico Varese. Finally, I would not have finished this work 
without the support of Shari Garmise, whose presence has made the 
difference.
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1. THE CHALLENGE FACING LIBERALISM
It is becoming fashionable among some political circles to 
claim that there is not one liberalism but many liberalisms. This 
proposition has been forcefully defended recently by John Gray 
(1989), arguably the most engaging advocate of this theory. In what 
follows, Gray's assertion that there are many liberalisms will be 
refuted.
In I.I., I will argue that a pivotal question has challenged 
the liberal mind for centuries: how to reconcile diversity with 
peaceful coexistence. This question defines the very spirit of 
liberalism, indeed it brings unity to the many different liberal 
theories. I will refer to this question as the challenge facing 
liberalism.
In l.II and l.III, I will argue that of all the different 
liberal approaches, the contractualist theory of reasonable 
agreement can give the most persuasive response to the challenge 
facing liberalism. What makes reasonable agreement different from 
other liberal theories is that it embraces the concept of 
scepticism. I will argue in fact that scepticism characterises the 
ethical doctrine of liberalism and therefore the challenge it 
faces, hence a liberal theory must necessarily assume scepticism in
15
order to confront the challenge facing liberalism.
In l.IV, I will critically assess and reject three different 
ways in which the concept of scepticism has been disapprovingly 
described by liberal philosophers, arguing instead for a fourth 
definition of scepticism along the lines of a desire to justify or 
give reasons to others for one's own beliefs.
In l.V, I will argue that this definition of scepticism is 
intrinsic to the contractualist theory of reasonable agreement, 
hence reasonable agreement is the one theory able to confront and 
overcome the challenge facing liberalism.
l.I. The Challenge Facing Liberalism.
In Liberalisms. John Gray (1989) argues that it is impossible 
to ground liberalism in a comprehensive moral theory, and therefore 
that it is an illusion to think of liberalism as a long and 
cohesive intellectual tradition: "The liberalism of Locke has
little in common with that of Mill and it is an error to see the 
two liberalisms as moments in a continuous historical process" 
(Gray 1989, p.262). Since there are many liberalisms. Gray 
concludes that a liberal political ideology is an impossibility.
Contrary to the views expressed by Gray, in what follows I 
will argue that there is only one liberalism, with one coherent 
political morality and one historical tradition. First of all, 
Gray's conclusion is weaken by his conception of ideology, in fact
16
we find that by ideology Gray understands a set of principles by 
the application of which ideal or good government may be realized. 
This conception of ideology is, to say the least, trivial, indeed 
it reflects a phobia of marxism which is senseless and, in this 
case, out of placed I believe that Gray's idea of the search for 
a set of principles which ought to bring about ideal or good 
government is better conferred by the idea of systematic theories 
of justice rather than ideology^.
Leaving aside Gray's understanding of ideology, it seems to me 
that there is little validity in Gray's argument that there is not 
one liberalism but many liberalisms. Instead, I believe that all 
forms of liberalism, qua liberalism, share one historical tradition 
and, more importantly, one ethical core. What makes liberalism a 
single, coherent theory of political morality is the fact that over 
the centuries all liberal thinkers have been looking for an answer 
to the same fundamental question, namely, how to reconcile 
diversity with peaceful coexistence. It is this very question that 
has come to the forefront of the political agenda recently, indeed 
as the increasing trend of migration from less advantaged regions 
of the globe will lead to greater cultural and religious diversity,
 ^- For an account of (non-marxist) ideology see Roger Eatwell 
(1993). Eatwell argues that "An ideology must possess a certain set 
of attributes; in particular an ideology has an overt or implicit 
set of empirical and normative views about (i) human nature; (ii) 
the process of history; (iii) the socio-political structure" 
(Eatwell 1993, p.7). I find his account of ideology more useful 
than Gray's. See also B. Goodwin (1992), Ch.2.
 ^ - For an account of systematic justice, see J. Fishkin 
(1992), Part 1.
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there is little doubt that ensuring peaceful cohabitation between 
different people, with diverse beliefs and conceptions of the good 
life, will be one of the most pressing questions confronting 
liberalism over the next few decades.
It is this fundamental question that has challenged liberal 
minds for many centuries, and that gives coherence and continuity 
to the liberal tradition. In order to appreciate the complexity of 
the challenge facing liberalism it will be necessary to briefly 
investigate the historical and ethical dimensions of liberalism, 
since the challenge facing liberalism is an ethical challenge, and 
the ethical doctrine of liberalism cannot be dissociated from its 
history.
Brian Barry (1990b) points out that modern liberal 
institutions developed from three historical features that defined 
liberal states as they emerged in the 17th and 18th centuries: 
religious toleration, freedom of the press and the abolition of 
servile civil status. Modern liberal institutions may be seen as 
extensions of each of these features. Thus religious toleration led 
to the 'harm principle', freedom of the press led to freedom of 
expression of all kinds, and the abolition of servile civil status 
led to the concept of equal citizenship rights. The reason why it 
is instructive to start an analysis of liberalism from the 
historical perspective is because this approach gives us a glimpse 
of the ethical core of liberalism. In fact we find that the three 
key modern liberal institutions mentioned by Barry have the 
normative function of preserving the freedom and autonomy of the
18
individual.
The doctrine of ethical liberalism has been defined by 
Norberto Bobbio as follows: "[ethical liberalism is] the doctrine 
which accords pride of place in the scale of moral values to the 
individual, and hence individual freedom in the dual sense of 
negative and positive freedom" (Bobbio 1987, p.106). I share 
Bobbio's view that the ethics of individualism is at the heart of 
the liberal tradition. Ethical liberalism is the precondition for 
the other doctrines of liberalism, such as economic and political 
liberalism: as an economic theory liberalism is the upholder of the 
market system, while as a political theory liberalism upholds a 
theory of the state which retains the legitimate monopoly of 
coercive force. The point to emphasize here is that the economic 
and political doctrines of liberalism assume the ethical priority 
of the individual. Specific economic and political conditions 
promote the moral development of each individual, as well as the 
harmonious cohabitation amongst individuals who differ in 
aspirations, desires, needs and values. The close correlation 
between the ethical, economic and political dimension of liberalism 
reflects a crucial aspect of Bobbio's theory, namely, the belief 
that ethics and politics are two sides of the same coin.
While there is nothing original in this account of the liberal 
tradition, it was necessary to discern the ethical core of 
liberalism since it provides the setting for understanding the 
challenge facing liberalism. Once again, I believe Bobbio has 
pinpointed with sufficient precision this aspect of liberalism.
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According to Bobbio, although individual freedom has pride of place 
in the scale of moral values, one person's assertion of freedom 
always results in the restriction of someone else's freedom. In the 
words of Bobbio:
[T]he problem which liberalism is called upon to resolve as an 
economic and political doctrine is how to make it possible for 
various freedoms to coexist without encroaching on each other. 
(Bobbio 1987, p.106)
This is the crucial question liberals are confronted with: how to 
overcome the conflict between individuals without undermining their 
autonomy.
So far I have argued that liberalism has an ethical core. If 
this assertion is correct, then the challenge facing liberalism is 
essentially an ethical challenge. It follows that the response to 
this challenge must be sought in the ethical dimension of 
liberalism. Although the ethical doctrine of liberalism is 
concerned with individual freedom, it would be a mistake to jump to 
the conclusion that the challenge can be overcome by focusing on 
the concept of freedom. Since the key to the challenge facing 
liberalism is the idea of "coexistence", not the concept of 
freedom, it follows that the answer to the challenge facing 
liberalism lies in the idea of egalitarianism, which is a 
precondition of harmonious coexistence, and not in the concept of 
freedom.
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The above assertion can be justified by the following 
argument; if different individual freedoms are to coexist, without 
one violating the other, then it is necessary for all individuals 
taking part to share the same egalitarian plateau. In other words 
equality is a pre-condition for coexistence. A coexistence that is 
bearable, or at least unforced, must necessarily presuppose equal 
concern and respect for all individuals and their respective 
freedom. The ultimate test for liberal theory is therefore 
providing an adequate conception of equality, or to put the same 
idea in another way, the key to the challenge facing liberalism is 
in providing an adequate interpretation of the concept of equality. 
Equality is the basis of harmonious coexistence, and thus of 
freedom.
In claiming that equality precedes freedom I am echoing the 
conclusion reached by Tocqueville (1840) in his study of Democracy 
in America. In an attempt to argue that democratic nations show a 
more ardent and enduring love of equality than of liberty*, 
Tocqueville claims that in a democracy men are perfectly free 
because they are all entirely equal, and they are perfectly equal 
because they are entirely free. This does mean that freedom and 
equality are undistinguishable; Tocqueville explicitly says that 
the taste which men have for liberty and that which they feel for 
equality are, in fact, two different things. Yet in democratic ages 
the ruling passion of men is the love of equality:
- See A. Tocqueville (1840), Vol.II, 2nd Book, Ch.l.
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Among most modern nations, and especially among all those of 
the continent of Europe, the taste and the idea of freedom 
began to exist and to be developed only at the time when 
social conditions were tending to equality and as a 
consequence of that very equality. (Tocqueville 1840, p.97; 
emphasis added)
While I share Tocqueville's belief that equality precedes 
freedom, the unqualified notion of equality per se is too vague to 
be of any use. For example it may apply to outcomes, procedures or 
opportunity, giving rise in each case to radically different 
results and being justified by radically different motivations. By 
egalitarianism I am simply referring to the idea that all 
individuals ought to be treated 'as equals'; in the words of 
Kymlicka, an egalitarian theory attempts to "define the social, 
economic, and political condition under which the members of the 
community are treated as equals" (Kymlicka 1990a, p.5).
Over the last few years, the idea of treating people as 
equals, or with equal concern and respect, has increasingly become 
associated with the concept of impartiality, or the belief that the 
well-being of all moral beings matters intrinsically. It follows 
that the ability to justify and promote the idea of impartiality is 
the key to the challenge facing liberalism.
So far I have argued that liberalism has an ethical core, but 
that the doctrine of ethical liberalism raises a fundamental 
challenge to the liberal tradition. In order to overcome this
22
challenge what is required is a political theory that gives a 
convincing interpretation of the egalitarian idea. In what follows 
I will argue that contractualism is the only adequate foundation 
for a liberal political theory, since the idea of an hypothetical 
agreement embraces the conditions of impartiality.
l.II. Confronting the Challenge.
For the greater part of the 20th century, it was a widely held 
belief that utilitarianism could provide the most convincing 
response to the challenge facing liberalism; its combination of an 
objective principle (maximizing average utility) blended with an 
egalitarian formula (every one counts as one, no one more than one) 
provided an impartial standpoint that seemed to provide a valid 
response to the challenge facing liberalism.
It is a well documented fact that John Rawls's A Theorv of 
Justice was generally recognised as the single most important 
reason behind the recent contestation of utilitarianism, and the 
revival of the social contract tradition as an alternative to 
utilitarianism. According to Rawls, the major weakness of 
utilitarianism lies precisely in its egalitarian formula "every one 
counts as one, no one more than one".
This formula is inadequate for two main reasons. First, 
because not all preferences or conceptions of the good life should 
be considered on a par. For example, your desire to stage a Nazi
23
demonstration chanting racist or anti-semitic slogans, and acting 
in a threatening fashion, cannot be judged on the same level as 
another person's freedom to pursue his or hers religious or 
cultural inclinations without harming others^.
Alternatively, the utilitarian formula that every one counts 
as one and no one more than on is inadequate because some people, 
due to misfortunes which are beyond their responsibility, require 
greater resources in order to cope with the obstacles of everyday 
life. In other words some of us, for example those who are 
physically disabled, should count more than one. Kymlicka refers to 
the former criticism as a failure to exclude illegitimate 
preferences, and the latter as a failure to recognize special 
relationships*.
Following Rawls, a growing number of liberal philosophers have 
accepted that the problems that undermine the utilitarian project 
may be overcome by contractualism. To put it briefly, 
contractualism looks for equality in the conditions of impartiality 
characterizing an hypothetical agreement which ought to be 
recognized as unanimously acceptable as a basis for cooperation. In 
other words the egalitarian character of contractualism lies in the 
terms of agreement which reflect impartiality and universality, 
therefore justifying unanimous acceptance.
 ^ - For a more detailed discussion and evaluation of this 
example, see Chapter 7 "On Liberal Neutrality".
* - See W. Kymlicka (1990a), pp.18-44. For a detailed account 
of why utilitarianism gives an inadequate account of 
egalitarianism, and of the emergence of a non-utilitarian 
conception of impartiality, see Appendix 'A'.
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Many liberal political theorists today believe that 
contractualism can give the best interpretation of egalitarianism, 
and therefore the best response to the challenge facing liberalism. 
As Hamlin and Pettit point out, the social contract tradition has 
been the subject of a recent renaissance: "Contractarianism in one 
form or another is perhaps the dominant contemporary approach to 
normative political theory" (Hamlin & Pettit 1989, p.11)^ .
Of course even if we accept that contractual ism, in its 
general form, may give a better answer to the challenge facing 
liberalism compared to utilitarianism, this is still not 
sufficient. Contractualism is not a homogeneous approach, instead 
there are many different theories of contractualism, which cover 
the full spectrum of political ideologies*. In order to understand 
why there is today a plethora of neo-contractualist political 
theories, it is instructive to look at the source of neo- 
contractualism: Rawls's A Theorv of Justice.
Rawls's idea of the social contract was embodied in the 
(in)famous original position*, the most discussed and criticised 
aspect of Rawls's theory of justice. In Rawls's original position 
each person is asked to choose principles of justice, following
 ^ - Hamlin and Pettit's edited volume The Good Politv is a 
collection of essays by young, upcoming scholars. It is indicative 
that B. Barry's review article of this edited volume bears the 
title "The Contractarian Generation"; see B. Barry (1990a).
* - This is what Hamlin and Pettit mean when they refer to 
contractualism "in one form or other".
* - Rawls's original position will be discussed in more detail 
in Chapter 2 "Rawls's Two Social Contracts".
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their own rational self-interest, without knowledge of their 
personal situation, thus excluding knowledge of their gender, race, 
social class etc; in other words the original position embodies the 
idea of rational choice from behind a veil of ignorance. Twenty 
years after the publication of A Theorv of Justice, a curious 
paradox has developed. In fact those who always rejected Rawls's 
egalitarian intuitions have endorsed some key elements of his 
original position and have become strong advocates of 
contractualism. Thus we find that contractualism has been endorsed 
in order to prescribe principles of justice which from an ethical 
point of view oppose everything Rawls's theory stood for. I am 
referring here to David Gauthier, who argues in Morals bv Agreement 
that the only true foundation of ethics is rationality, that the 
agreement is a form of rational bargaining, and that there is 
nothing wrong, from an ethical point of view, with inequalities 
resulting from bargaining advantages.
On the other hand those who were sympathetic to Rawls's basic 
moral intuitions, such as the sense of justice and the validity of 
fairness, have since abandoned Rawls's original position, claiming 
that this is at best useless and at worse counter-intuitive. While 
not rejecting contractualism^, this school of thought argues that 
Gauthier's idea of an original agreement based on conditions of 
bargaining and rational motivations can be replaced with another 
type of agreement, namely, reasonable agreement. The term
- This is true generally, although there are some notable 
exceptions, as in the case of Ronald Dworkin and Will Kymlicka who 
refute contractualism tout court.
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'reasonable agreement' is generally associated with the Harvard 
philosopher Thomas Scanlon (1982), who argues that an agreement is 
reasonable if it embodies the conditions and motivation of 
impartiality, where such motivation is defined as the desire to 
justify one's actions to others on grounds they could not 
reasonably reject.
The theories of Gauthier and Scanlon stand at the two opposing 
poles in the spectrum of neo-contractualist theories of moral and 
political philosophy, where the former is based on rational 
agreement and the latter on reasonable agreement.
When I say that contractualism is the best response to the 
challenge facing liberalism, I don't mean that all types of 
contractualism are equally valid. To put it briefly, I believe that 
of the two recent neo-contractualist approaches above mentioned, 
namely Gauthier's agreement as rational bargaining and Scanlon's 
reasonable agreement, only the latter fully embraces the ethical 
spirit of liberalism and thus is in a position to respond to the 
challenge it is facing. One important difference between Gauthier's 
and Scanlon's contractualism is that unlike the idea of agreement 
as rational bargaining, reasonable agreement is capable of 
embracing scepticism, and scepticism is an essential component of 
the ethical doctrine of liberalism.
l.III. Scepticism and the Challenge Facing Liberalism.
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What distinguishes liberalism from other political ideologies 
is the tolerance of conflict, and the belief that disagreements 
will induce to a better state of affairs. For example, it is not a 
coincidence that as an economic doctrine liberalism endorses the 
market system. The philosophy behind the market system is that 
conflict (i.e. competition) will lead to efficiency and fair 
distribution. Whether this is in fact the case or not is 
irrelevant. The point is that the market system, which is 
historically associated with the emergence of liberalism, is imbued 
in conflict.
The three key modern liberal institutions emphasised by Brian 
Barry in his account of the historical core of liberalism (the 
'harm principle', freedom of expression, and equal citizenship 
rights) all assume that individuals will come into conflict with 
one another, and that the scope of a liberal political theory is to 
resolve such conflicts. At the same time a liberal political theory 
must not suppress the conditions for individual disagreements, 
instead the possibility of disagreeing with one another must be 
preserved, since such disagreements (within certain limits) are the 
measure of a healthy liberal democracy.
This view is usually associate with J.S. Mill's liberalism,
who warns us in On Libertv against the tyranny of the majority, and
the importance of dissenting views. According to J.S. Mill, 
diversity of opinion is a sine qua non condition for the
preservation of liberty and the moral development of all
individuals, indeed J.S. Mill felt that we have an obligation to
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challenge our beliefs, even if there was no opposition to it;
If resistance waits till life is reduced nearly to one uniform 
type, all deviations from that type will come to be considered 
impious, immoral, even monstrous and contrary to nature. 
Mankind speedily becomes unable to conceive diversity, when 
they have been for some time unaccustomed to see it. (J.S. 
Mill 1972, p.142; emphasis in original)
Isaiah Berlin (1969) rightly points out that at the root of 
J.S. Mill's argument there is an epistemological position, namely, 
"[T]hat human knowledge was in principle never complete, and always 
fallible; that there was no single, universally visible, truth" 
(Berlin 1969, p.188). Thus diversity of opinion is not upheld by 
J.S. Mill because of its instrumental value, that is to say because 
it takes us a step closer to the single truth, but instead 
diversity of opinion is desirable for its own sake” . It is, in a 
sense, what liberal morality is all about.
Diversity of opinion is, according to J.S. Mill, a founding 
stone of liberal democracy. Indeed the acceptance of reasonable 
conflict is the essence of a liberal world. Not surprisingly we 
find a similar message to that of J.S. Mill in the work of Stuart 
Hampshire (1983):
[M]orality and conflict are inseparable: conflict between
” - See I. Berlin (1969) p. 189-190.
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different admirable ways of life and between different 
defensible moral ideals, conflict of obligations, conflict 
between essential, but incompatible, interests. I believe now 
that the subject-matter of morality is misrepresented, and 
finally disappears from view, when a moralist concludes with 
a picture of the ideal human life and of a possible harmony of 
essential human interests, as Aristotle and Spinoza both did. 
I suggest reasons to disbelieve that there can be any such 
single ideal and any such ultimate harmony. (Hampshire 1983, 
p.l)
If we accept the above characterization of liberal political 
theory as imbued in conflict, it follows that the challenge facing 
liberalism, far from being inimical to the liberal project, is 
intrinsic to the liberal tradition, indeed it reflects the very 
spirit of liberalism: the ethical core of liberalism and the
ethical challenge facing liberalism cannot be separated.
Earlier I defined this challenge in terms of how to make it 
possible for various freedoms to coexist without encroaching on 
each other. The assumption here is that individual freedoms will 
come into conflict, and therefore a solution to this challenge must 
resolve such conflicts. Yet it is important to emphasize that such 
conflicts must be reconciled without destroying the preconditions 
of conflict. In other words, without undermining the conditions of 
diversity, since without diversity there would be no liberalism. 
Another way of expressing the same point is by saying that
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liberalism must overcome but tolerate reasonable disagreements.
I hope to have shown why the challenge facing liberalism 
(indeed the ethical spirit of liberalism) and the idea of conflict 
are correlated. If we accept this premise, then we must also accept 
the idea that liberalism must necessarily rest upon a commitment to 
scepticism, since scepticism is the precondition for accepting 
diversity. It ought to be emphasized that we cannot have 
impartiality unless we endorse a form of scepticism. If by 
impartiality we understand the belief that the well-being of all 
moral beings matters intrinsically, hence that all interests ought 
to be given equal weight, then scepticism is a necessary condition 
of impartiality.
Scepticism here does not refer to our judgment of the views 
held by others, instead it refers to the way we see our own beliefs 
and preferences. It is only by endorsing a sceptical frame of mind 
that the motivation of impartially is fulfilled. Unless a liberal 
theory embraces scepticism, it is doubtful that it will able to 
promote impartiality as the basic criterion of moral motivation, 
hence give the best response to the challenge facing liberalism. Of 
all recent neo-contractualist theories, only reasonable agreement 
is in a position to embrace the conditions of scepticism, therefore 
only reasonable agreement is in a position to respond to the 
challenge facing liberalism.
While it will take the entire thesis to show why reasonable 
agreement gives the most persuasive reply to the challenge facing 
liberalism, in the remaining pages of this chapter I want to argue
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that any liberal political theory must first demonstrate that it 
has the quality of accepting the conditions of scepticism. As I 
will argue shortly, a sceptical frame of mind is a condition on 
which disagreement and reasonable conflict necessarily count on, 
hence scepticism is intrinsic to the spirit of liberalism as an 
ethical doctrine.
In what follows I will first analyze the unhappy relationship 
between the majority of contemporary liberals and the doctrine of 
scepticism, followed by an account of the type of scepticism which 
I feel liberalism ought to be committed to. Finally, I will show 
why reasonable agreement endorses scepticism, and its implications 
for the challenge facing liberalism.
l.IV. Four Accounts of Scepticism.
The concept of scepticism is one of the oldest concepts in the 
Western culture. Scepticism was a hot topic in ancient Greece, 
being explored by both Plato and Aristotle in the course of their 
lives. In the first century BC scepticism became recognised as a 
formal school of thought, indeed it came complete with a guru 
figure (Pyrrho of Ellis), disciples (Sextus Empiricus) and a 
manifesto (Outlines of Pyrrhonism).
Since then scepticism has been at the forefront of 
philosophical debates, and all the great western philosophers 
inevitably felt compelled to confront this issue. Descartes devoted
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his life to fight it; while David Hume attempted to overcome the 
challenge of scepticism while acknowledging its validity; Kant felt 
he had to dealt with it. In our century many distinguished 
philosophers have been intrigued by it, thus Bertrand Russell wrote 
a series of essays entitled Sceptical Essavs; Moore felt the need 
to quell scepticism; and Wittgenstein in his late works On 
Certaintv was unsure whether scepticism could ever be defeated. 
This array of philosophers ought to be sufficient to ensure that 
scepticism remains one of the key questions in political 
philosophers, although it must be said that many contemporary 
liberals have treated scepticism with little respect.
It is not my intention to present a short history of 
scepticism. The point is that any concept that withstands the test 
of time is a powerful concept, and must be taken seriously: 
scepticism is such concept. The power of scepticism can be seen by 
two examples which reflect the immense impact the concept of 
scepticism had on history.
The first example argues that the political implications of 
scepticism lie in the direction of a radical egalitarianism. This 
argument has been defended by Aryeh Botwinick (1990), who claims 
that endorsing scepticism goes a long way towards justifying the 
expansion of political participation:
If skepticism in some of its different guises states that none 
of us is in a position to affirm the rational superiority of 
its views or values over those of his fellows, then the
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appropriate political response is to have as many members of 
society as possible participate in the numerous collective 
decisions affecting our lives. Skepticism delegitimizes the 
formation of any permanent hierarchies in society and provides 
a continually renewing impetus for the expansion of political 
participation. (Botwinick 1990, p.7)
The above argument finds support in the events of the French 
Revolution, indeed one can say that scepticism played a crucial 
role in shaping the course of European history. At the end of the 
18th century, scepticism was invoked by the political 'Left' in 
France to undermine the despotic regimes clinging to the status quo 
and finding legitimacy in the idea of divine right to rule. In this 
context endorsing scepticism meant raising doubts on the rule of 
the social, economic and political elites, doubts on the legitimacy 
of despotic monarchies, doubts on the conduct of the Church. All 
these doubts were transformed, with time, into challenges: first 
intellectual challenges and then physical challenges.
It is a long-enduring controversy whether there was a causal 
relationship between the philosophy of the Enlightenment and the 
French revolution. I don't know what the answer to this question 
is, yet I believe that it can be affirmed with some degree of 
certainty that the French revolution would not have taken place if 
it was not for a fair dose of scepticism. To cut a long story 
short, we must recognise scepticism as a progressive and 
revolutionary force; scepticism was the epistemological foundations
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behind the fight against all kinds of dogmas, and thus behind the 
birth of liberal democracies.
Consider now the second example. Scepticism has been adopted 
by the political 'Right' in the realm of international relations to 
justify the status quo. In the discipline of international 
relations those who call themselves 'realists' appeal to moral 
scepticism to justify three inter-related claims: (1) the image of 
a Hobbesian global state of nature, where all nations are moved 
exclusively by self-interest; in fact it is claimed that a ruler 
has an obligation to follow the interest of its nation; (2) the 
absence of moral norms governing relations between states and, 
dulcis in fundo; (3) the claim that might makes right. 
'International moral scepticism' refers to the idea that there is 
no room for morality in international matters. Scepticism is thus 
used in this second case to inflict doubt, or even denial, 
concerning the validity of moral arguments. Scepticism justifies 
the present amoral status quo in international relations^.
These two apparently contradictory examples are an indication 
of the impact of scepticism on our lives. Analysing the impact of 
the concept of scepticism on French revolution or international 
relations would require another thesis, and I cannot hope to do 
justice to either argument here. Instead, the only conclusion I 
want to draw from these two examples is that scepticism is a 
powerful concept, which deserves to be taken seriously.
Notwithstanding the impact of scepticism on our history, it is
- See Charles Beitz (1979), especially Part I.
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surprising to find that many liberal thinkers have felt the 
necessity to distance themselves from this doctrine, denying any 
sort of affinity between liberalism and scepticism. In what will at 
first appear a hopeless attempt to swim upstream, I will argue that 
scepticism is one of the founding pillars of the liberal tradition. 
That is to say, I don't simply believe that there is no 
contradiction between liberalism and scepticism, but that one can 
only endorse liberalism to the extent that one endorses scepticism; 
in other words, embracing scepticism is a sine qua non condition 
for embracing liberalism^. In what follows I will investigate the 
meaning of this concept and its turbulent relationship with the 
liberal tradition.
It is sufficient to take a brief overlook at the literature on 
scepticism and liberalism to understand why scepticism has been 
considered by many advocates of liberalism to be the weak link in 
the liberal chain; namely, because scepticism has been unfairly 
misconceived. Liberal conceptions of scepticism can be listed under 
four headings: (1) scepticism as denial of truth; (2) scepticism as 
rejection of absolutes; (3) functional scepticism; (4) scepticism 
as an invitation to justify beliefs. Of the above four definitions 
of scepticism, I will argue that only the fourth one has any 
validity, the other three being straw-man formulations needed to 
make the target of certain critiques easy to centre.
By supplying this short list of liberal conceptions of
- Although the opposite is not always true, that is to say, 
one can endorse scepticism without endorsing liberalism.
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scepticism I am not claiming to have exhausted all the possible 
shades of meaning attributed to scepticism, or that there are no 
other ways in which scepticism can be defined. Nevertheless I do 
believe the four positions I have picked out cover the greater 
range of possible definitions, and other definitions can be traced 
back to one of these four conceptions.
(1) Scepticism as Denial of Truth.
It is a widely held view that scepticism implies the negation 
of objectivity, indeed this view is shared by Ronald Dworkin, one 
of the most influential contemporary liberals philosophers.
Dworkin discusses scepticism as part of his critique of 
Ackerman's conception of liberal neutrality. The concept of 
scepticism is central to Dworkin's argument, indeed his rejection 
of Ackerman's notion of liberalism as neutrality rests on the fact 
that neutrality makes a fatal opening to scepticism, and scepticism 
is inimical to liberalism. In the words of Dworkin, Ackerman is 
wrong to ground liberalism on neutrality "because it makes 
liberalism much more vulnerable to the familiar charge that it 
rests on moral scepticism or nihilism" (Dworkin 1983a, p.47).
It is not clear if, by using the conjunction "or" between the 
terms "moral scepticism" and "nihilism" in the above quotation, 
Dworkin understands moral scepticism and nihilism to be synonymous. 
If this is the case, he is quite simply wrong; even though there 
may have been an overlap in the history of these two ideas, no
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modern advocate of scepticism would call himself a nihilist, 
furthermore it is important to distinguish between a political 
doctrine (nihilism) and an epistemological doctrine (scepticism).
Leaving aside the question of scepticism and nihilism, I want 
to concentrate on Dworkin's account of scepticism. I believe that 
by scepticism Dworkin understands some extreme form of 
subjectivism, indeed Dworkin defines scepticism as follows: 
"scepticism ... argues that beliefs about how people should live 
are merely 'subjective' and have no 'objective' validity" (Dworkin 
1983a, p.47). It follows that there are two reasons why Dworkin 
rejects scepticism. Firstly because he believes that scepticism may 
open the door to indifference; here Dworkin seems to agree with 
Rawls, who rejects the claim that the idea of an overlapping 
consensus on a political conception of justice "implies 
indifference or scepticism as to whether a political conception of 
justice is true" (Rawls 1987, p.12). Secondly, and more 
importantly, Dworkin is afraid that scepticism denies him the right 
to stand up to those who hold views which he feels are obviously 
wrong:
Liberalism cannot be based on skepticism. Its constitutive 
morality provides that human beings must be treated as equals 
by their government, not because there is no right and wrong 
in political morality, but because that is what is right.
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(Dworkin 1985, p.203)"
In order to strengthen his argument, Dworkin mentions the case 
of the moral majority which believes that heterosexuality is right 
and homosexuality wrong. Dworkin feels that by endorsing 
scepticism, liberalism gives up the possibility of challenging the 
majority on the grounds that its views are wrong. While I 
sympathize with Dworkin's conclusions, it seems to me that his 
attack on scepticism is out of place. Dworkin is objecting to an 
historical conception of scepticism, which few sceptics would 
uphold anyway. Rejecting extreme forms of subjectivism does not 
entail rejecting scepticism tout court, but only its ancient 
(Pyrrhonist) conception.
Equating scepticism with nihilism, indifference or denial of 
truth is like denying scepticism any conceptual development since 
its Pyrrhonist golden days in the first century AD. Dworkin does 
not seem aware of the fact that scepticism has changed radically 
since the days of Pyrrho of Ellis or Sextus Empiricus, indeed no- 
one should be surprised by this development nor hold it against the 
doctrine of scepticism. After all the concept of democracy also 
stems from Ancient Greek roots, yet no modern-day champion of 
democracy would claim to be pursuing the kind of democracy 
advocated by our Hellenic predecessors, nor would anyone criticise
" - Dworkin also claims that grounding liberalism on some form 
of moral scepticism makes liberalism vulnerable to the charge that 
it is a negative theory for uncommitted people, furthermore it 
offers no effective argument against justifications for economic 
inequality. See Dworkin 1983b.
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modern democracy on the grounds that its Hellenic ancestor was 
undesirable; yet this is what Dworkin's objection to scepticism 
amounts to.
I will have more to say about the difference between ancient 
and modern scepticism later on in this chapter (definition no.4), 
for the time being let it suffice to say that equating scepticism 
with denial of objectivity or even nihilism reflects a very narrow 
understanding of the concept of scepticism. Scepticism is more 
sophisticated than Dworkin seems to believe, indeed far from 
undermining the doctrine of scepticism, abandoning the Pyrrhonist 
legacy can only be beneficial to its modern version.
(2) Scepticism as Rejection of Absolutes.
The second type of scepticism in our list takes the form of 
the rejection of absolutes. This interpretation is considered by H. 
Richardson (1990), who goes on to argue that this particular 
sceptical stance is distinguished by its self-defeating nature. In 
order to highlight the incoherent nature of the sceptical argument, 
Richardson considers the problem of how liberals ought to treat the 
militantly intolerant:
[I]f the liberal refuses to own up to such strong normative 
assumptions [i.e. that rule out giving full political sway to 
the conceptions of the good of its illiberal citizens; V.B.], 
and instead rests on a sceptical rejection of 'absolutes'.
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then on what reasonable grounds are illiberal conceptions of 
the good held to be false? (Richardson 1990, p.4)
Richardson's critique of scepticism is that the concept of 
scepticism itself is an absolute (i.e. intolerant) belief, hence if 
scepticism is a rejection of absolutes, paradoxically it is also a 
rejection of scepticism. Richardson concludes by claiming that 
scepticism has a self-defeating nature, since it fails to clear the 
most basic logical fence: coherence. A similar critique of
scepticism to Richardson's can be found in Hilary Putnam (1981), 
who claims that extreme forms of scepticism and relativism are 
self-refuting suppositions, where a self-refuting supposition is 
one whose truth implies its own falsity:
For example, consider the thesis that all general statements 
are false. This is a general statement. So if it is true, then 
it must be false. Hence, it is false. (Putnam 1981, p.7)
My impression is that Richardson's critique of scepticism is 
based on a caricature of the concept. The only way for Richardson's 
critique of scepticism to have any validity is for scepticism to 
somehow imply the denial of beliefs, since by logical implications 
the doctrine of scepticism itself would not pass its own test. My 
objection to Richardson's account of scepticism echoes what I said 
earlier about Dworkin's critique, namely, it fails to distinguish
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ancient from modern scepticism^.
Modern scepticism is a doctrine which questions the 
epistemological foundations of our beliefs, it does not deny the 
validity of our beliefs. In other words while 'denial' was the key 
concept in Pyrrho's doctrine, 'questioning' is the key concept in 
modern scepticism. It follows that the assumptions of Richardson's 
critique are invalid. Scepticism cannot and does not distinguish 
between extreme and non-extreme beliefs, or in the language of 
Richardson between 'absolutes' and, I assume, 'moderate' beliefs. 
Modern scepticism does not discriminate between beliefs, instead 
its only function is to question all beliefs qua beliefs.
(3) Functional Scepticism.
The third type of scepticism I will call functional 
scepticism. This version of scepticism was attributed to Bruce 
Ackerman by Simon Caney (1991), who rests his critique of 
Ackerman's defence of neutrality on the unpersuasive nature of 
functional scepticism. In what follows I will argue that Ackerman 
did not advocate functional scepticism, and that functional 
scepticism is not a correct reading of scepticism.
In his "Consequentialist Defences of Liberal Neutrality" Caney
- My critique of Richardson does not extend to Putnam. Since 
Putnam does not consider more moderate forms of scepticism, but 
only the extreme scepticism of Sextus Empiricus, it would be wrong 
to conclude that Putnam does not distinguish modern from ancient 
scepticism. There is nothing in Putnam's book to suggest that all 
forms of scepticism, even non-extreme scepticism, are self-refuting 
suppositions.
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argues that, in contrast with what advocates of liberal neutrality 
want to believe, the neutral state does not have better 
consequences than a perfectionist state. In order to persuade us of 
his thesis, Caney examines a variety of arguments supportive of 
liberal neutrality, showing how each one is incoherent, unrealistic 
or, more simply, unappealing. One of the issues he discusses is the 
"importance of doubt" argument advocated by Ackerman; the basic 
idea behind this argument is to ground neutrality on the idea of 
scepticism.
According to Caney, the way Ackerman defends neutrality is on 
the grounds that a worthwhile life involves the availability of 
worthless options:
A life can only go well, he [Ackerman] claims, if individuals 
have the possibility of making mistakes and this requires in 
turn that the state does not ban unworthy forms of life. 
(Caney 1991, p.468)
It follows from this argument that the importance of doubt, or 
scepticism, is related to the choice of worthy options:
Similarly, Ackerman argues, genuine ethical worth requires 
that one is open to doubt and that one therefore chooses 
worthy options for the right reason. This requires in turn 
that the state desist from banning worthless options - hence 
neutrality is justified. No form of the good life should be
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banned on the grounds that it is unworthy because even 
unworthy conceptions of the good serve a role. Thus the state 
should be neutral between conceptions of the good. (Caney 
1991, p.468)
My reading of Ackerman is different from Caney's. The 
importance of doubt is not that it allows people to choose a worthy 
option for the right reason, i.e. because they can compare it with 
unworthy options. Instead doubt is important because it pushes us 
to question our beliefs, thus developing a critical perspective. 
Doubt is what provokes dialectical engagement and response: "in 
short, rather than fearing rigorous dialectical self-examination, 
the liberal's last, best, hope lies in the encouragement of 
philosophical reflection" (Ackerman 1983, p.388). If my reading of 
Ackerman is correct, the importance of doubt in Ackerman's 
liberalism may be compared to Rawls's views on the importance of 
being able to revise our conception of the good^ ®.
I labelled Caney's interpretation of Ackerman functional 
scepticism. By using the term 'functional' I am referring to the 
idea that doubt introduces unworthy options, and unworthy options 
have the function of providing us with the reasons for choosing 
worthy options. As I said, I don't think that this is what Ackerman 
had in mind when he was talking about doubt, but for the sake of 
the argument let us assume that Caney is right in his 
interpretation of Ackerman, that is to say, the role of 'doubt' in
- See also Kymlicka (1989a), pp. 15-19 and 51-61.
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Ackerman's liberalism is purely functional.
If this is the case, then I have no problem rejecting 
Ackerman's functional approach to scepticism for being quite simply 
wrong. Scepticism and functional explanations cannot go hand-in- 
hand, for the simple reason that scepticism is a epistemological 
doctrine, that is to say, a doctrine that questions the firmness of 
our beliefs, while functional explanation is, by definition, an 
explanation. Scepticism is a prescriptive doctrine, and as such it 
is not concerned with explanations. For this reason scepticism 
cannot have the functional role it was attributed by Caney. If 
scepticism has any function it is simply to induce us to question 
our beliefs so that we can revise and improve on them; nothing 
more.
(4) Scepticism as an Invitation to Justify Beliefs.
So far I have assessed three criticisms of the concept of 
scepticism all stemming from weak and unrealistic interpretations 
of the concept. I rejected the idea of scepticism as denial of 
truths on the grounds that it refers to an archaic (pyrrhonist) 
conception of scepticism. I have rejected the idea of scepticism as 
rejection of absolutes on the grounds that scepticism does not 
discriminate between beliefs on the basis of their degree of 
extremism, instead it questions the foundation of all beliefs qua 
beliefs. Finally I have rejected the idea of functional scepticism 
on the grounds that scepticism is an epistemological (prescriptive)
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doctrine, not a form of explanation. So what is the correct reading 
of scepticism?
I believe that modern scepticism is a doctrine which simply 
challenges us to provide justification for our beliefs. The point 
to stress here is that, contrary to what is generally believed, 
scepticism is not a claim: it does not claim that we don't know 
anything, nor that we cannot know anything, or that truth doesn't 
exist. Scepticism does not provide answers, it only raises 
questions.
To define scepticism in terms of an invitation to justify 
beliefs has some notable strengths. Its best asset is that it holds 
a wide consensus among both its advocates and its adversaries in 
philosophical circles^. For example Christopher Hookway (1990) 
argues that the challenge for justification is the most striking 
distinguishing mark between ancient and modern scepticism. As I 
showed earlier, this distinction was overlooked by some critics:
[A]ncient scepticism differs from its modern versions. Where 
twentieth-century philosophers interpret scepticism as the 
doctrine that none of our beliefs are justified, or that none 
of them count as knowledge, ancient scepticism seems more
- To say that it holds a wide consensus does not mean that 
it holds unanimous approval. It will suffice to provide one 
example: James Franklin (1991) argues that scepticism is about the 
impossibility to distinguish the true from the false, and the best 
argument for scepticism is that from symmetry. There may well be 
other arguments for scepticism, although for the purpose of this 
chapter it is not necessary to list them all; I am only interested 
in justifying scepticism defined as an invitation to justify 
beliefs.
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radical. The Pyrrhonist attacks the possibility of belief: his 
argument is directed towards persuading us to suspend judgment 
on all things. (Hookway 1990, p.2)
A.C. Grayling (1985 & 1991), who is far from being sympathetic 
towards scepticism, also accepts a similar definition.
But the most troublesome scepticism claims nothing: it merely 
challenges us to provide justifications. The sceptical 
arguments are designed to show why a defence of justification 
is needed, not to prove a negative thesis. (Grayling 1991, 
p.24)
Apart from being the most accurate interpretation of modern 
scepticism, the definition of scepticism as a challenge to justify 
our beliefs has the advantage of being more appropriate to the 
context of political philosophy rather than epistemology. After all 
the reason for the present discussion of scepticism is not 
motivated by a desire to discuss epistemological questions, instead 
it originates from the attempt to argue that scepticism is integral 
to a political concept of liberalism; it is not a coincidence that 
my critique of adversaries of scepticism were all political 
theorists.
Defining scepticism in terms of a challenge to justify one's 
beliefs has a second important characteristic, namely, it applies 
to first or primary order beliefs, not to second order beliefs.
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This is the fundamental difference between the concept of 
scepticism, as I have defined it, and the concept of fallibilism. 
In a recent article, Raz (1989) criticizes the view that scepticism 
provides the moral foundation for respecting individual liberty. 
What is interesting to note is that Raz distinguishes scepticism 
from fallibility^: scepticism implies that no knowledge can be
gained on any moral value or on certain particular issues, while 
fallibilism is the realization that our beliefs may be mistaken. I 
think this distinction is important, although my definition of 
scepticism is different from Raz's.
Acting on first-order beliefs, scepticism does not tell us 
whether our beliefs are indeed right or wrong, instead it questions 
the way we come to hold certain beliefs. For example, I hold the 
belief that whites and blacks are equal, hence they ought to have 
the same rights. Fallibilism would questions the belief that in 
fact people of different races are equal, while scepticism (as I 
have defined it) questions the reasons why I believe that whites 
and blacks are equal. The advantage of distinguishing between 
scepticism and fallibilism is that once I justify my first-order 
beliefs, I do not need to worry about charges of fallibilism. This 
is important since it indicates that moral scepticism does not lead 
to moral relativism. On the contrary, our moral beliefs are 
strengthened by the process of being challenged to justify our 
beliefs to others.
18 _ "The realization that our beliefs may be mistaken should 
not, however, be confused with skepticism" (Raz 1989, pp.763-764).
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To summarize my argument so far, I have argued that the best 
definition of scepticism is the following: scepticism is the
doctrine which challenges us to justify our beliefs. My next step 
is to show that this conception of scepticism is pertinent to 
liberal political theory, indeed that there is a strong correlation 
between scepticism and the idea of reasonable agreement.
l.V. Scepticism and Reasonable Agreement.
Before I proceed it may be useful to recall why I have entered 
into this digression on scepticism. Briefly, it is because I 
believe scepticism is a condition for the fostering of impartiality 
as a moral motivation, or in other words, scepticism is the 
epistemological assumption behind the ethical doctrine of 
liberalism. It follows that acknowledging the condition of 
scepticism is a prerequisite for any liberal political theory to 
successfully respond to the challenge facing liberalism. In what 
follows I will first try to spell out why I feel scepticism, 
defined as a challenge to justify our beliefs, plays a central role 
in the liberal project. This will be followed by an account of why 
of all neo-contractualist political theories, only reasonable 
agreement is capable of embracing the condition of scepticism.
Earlier I have concentrated on arguments by liberal thinkers 
that denounce the correlation between liberalism and scepticism. 
What I didn't say is that there are some liberals who swim against
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the current. The liberalism of Bruce Ackerman (1980) is arguably 
the best known case of an attempted marriage between liberalism and 
scepticism, indeed Ackerman needs to endorse scepticism as part of
his attempt to show that neutrality is the central concept in a
liberal theory.
It seems to me that there is a problem of circularity in 
Ackerman's position, concerning the relationship between scepticism 
and the concept of neutrality. That is to say, his defense of 
scepticism is based on his conception of liberal neutrality, and 
his defense of liberal neutrality is based on his conception of
scepticism. In other words, instead of deducing a theory of
liberalism from the assumption of scepticism, by the time Ackerman 
introduces the argument for scepticism, his theory of liberal 
neutrality is all but complete.
Contra Ackerman, I want to argue that scepticism precedes 
liberalism. Among contemporary liberals, I believe Peter Jones 
(1989a) comes closest to endorsing a similar position, indeed Jones 
argues that reasonable doubt may have a significant role to play in 
liberal argument. Jones sees freedom of belief as the central 
feature of the liberal argument, and he argues that each individual 
has an interest in having his or her beliefs respected simply 
because those are his or her own beliefs. According to Jones, this 
concept of freedom of belief can be found in the deontological 
liberalism of Rawls and Dworkin, as well as in the perfectionist 
liberalism of Haksar and Raz, although these two types of 
liberalism are more plausible against a background of reasonable
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doubt and reasonable disagreement.
While I agree with Jones's general line of argument, my views 
differ from his to the extent that I am taking a more extremist 
position. Although Jones is making an argument for reasonable doubt 
and liberalism, he is also very careful to emphasize that he is not 
arguing that liberalism necessarily entails scepticism, or that 
scepticism must issue in liberalism. In the closing paragraph of 
his paper Jones writes:
However, I have not argued that the claim that there is scope 
for reasonable doubt and reasonable disagreement must, of 
itself, translate into an assertion of liberalism. Much less 
have I argued that liberalism either requires or must itself 
issue from a more general and more profound scepticism. (Jones 
1989a, p.69)
I don't see what Jones is gaining by making such disclaimers 
on his theory. With the risk of drawing heavy criticisms, my 
approach to the question of scepticism and liberalism will be more 
extreme. I will attempt to argue that, to the extent that it 
fosters diversity and emphasizes the reality of the challenge 
facing liberalism, scepticism is a founding pillar of the liberal 
project.
I have argued before that the toleration of conflict and 
disagreements is what distinguishes liberalism from other political 
ideologies, indeed the toleration of conflict and disagreement
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reflects the very spirit of liberalism. I have also argued that the 
challenge of liberalism is to resolve such conflicts without 
suppressing the conditions for individual disagreements; diversity 
of opinion is, in a sense, what liberal morality is all about.
It is exactly because liberalism must find solutions for 
(while tolerating) reasonable disagreements that I believe it must 
necessarily rest upon a commitment to scepticism. If liberalism 
endorses the toleration of disagreements and conflict, then it must 
also imply a need for diversity of conceptions of the good: in
other words, if there is no diversity, there is no disagreement. I 
believe that endorsing scepticism is what makes it possible for 
diversity of views to develop, and for liberalism to flourish. It 
is only after we accept that our views can be challenged, and that 
our conceptions of the good require a justification, that we accept 
the possibility that there may be disagreement and conflict.
The most common way of understanding the challenge to justify 
our beliefs is that our views are challenged from outside (i.e. my 
view 'A' is challenged by your view 'B'). I find this conception 
unnecessarily narrow, in fact before outsiders have any impact on 
us we must first endorse a frame of mind that makes us open to 
challenges. It is this frame of mind that encompasses what I have 
called scepticism, and which is the basis of our moral motivations. 
Consider the following example: Adolf, a person who displays an 
illiberal stance, differs from Beth, a liberal person, on the 
grounds that Adolf will refuse to dialogue with his adversaries, or 
will do so only out of politeness rather than with the potential
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prospect of altering his views. To the extent that Beth believes 
that her views require justification, hence they are open to 
challenges, Beth is endorsing scepticism. It is Beth's scepticism 
of her own position (that is to say, the assumption that her 
beliefs need to be justified) that determines her liberal nature.
So far I have argued that scepticism and liberalism are 
closely related. My next step is to argue that the contractualist 
theory of reasonable agreement is endowed with the sort of 
scepticism I have endorsed in this chapter, hence it has all the 
credentials to provide a response to the challenge facing 
liberalism. I will also argue that other contractualist theories, 
such as Gauthier's, do not endorse this concept of scepticism, 
hence it fails to give an adequate answer to the challenge facing 
liberalism.
Once we accept the definition of scepticism as the doctrine 
which challenges us to justify our beliefs, then the correlation 
between scepticism and reasonable agreement should become apparent, 
since both scepticism and reasonable agreement share a commitment 
to the justification of our beliefs.
You will recall in fact that following Scanlon I argued that 
the contractarian theory of reasonable agreement is based on an 
impartial moral motivation, where one is moved by a desire to 
justify one's actions or beliefs to others on grounds those others 
could not reasonably reject. I want to focus for a moment on the 
idea of 'justification', which I believe is central to the moral 
motivation championed by Scanlon.
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The only way we can explain the desire to justify our actions 
is if we first swallow a large dose of scepticism, more 
specifically the sort of scepticism that I have been defending 
throughout this chapter: as a challenge to justify our beliefs. Of 
course there is more to Scanlon's idea of reasonable agreement than 
the endorsement of scepticism, since according to Scanlon we don't 
want simply to justify our actions as best we can, but we want to 
do so on grounds that others could not reasonably reject. I will 
discuss Scanlon's contractualism in more detail in Chapter 3, where 
the focus will be on the idea of reasonableness and reasonable 
refutability. The point I want to stress here is that Scanlon's 
idea of contractualism as reasonable agreement is compatible with 
scepticism: it is the idea of 'justification' that is common to
scepticism and to the contractualist theory of reasonable 
agreement.
I believe this is an important point since it is this element 
of scepticism that forms a conceptual bridge between the challenge 
facing liberalism and reasonable agreement as a response to this 
challenge. Furthermore the other major neo-contractualist political 
theory, Gauthier's agreement as rational bargaining, fails to 
endorse the sort of scepticism that I have been defending, namely, 
the doctrine which challenges us to justify our beliefs.
Gauthier's agreement echoes Hobbes's theory to the extent that 
the parties at this stage are not moved by moral inclinations, but 
merely by a rational desire to pursue their ends as best they can. 
The agreement itself is characterised by bargaining, where everyone
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brings to the bargaining table their natural talents. The process 
of bargaining of course may at first appear as a materialization of 
what I have been referring to as the challenge facing liberalism; 
if conflict is at the heart of ethical liberalism, then Gauthier's 
contractarianism would seem to be in line with such doctrine, since 
conflict is also at the heart of Gauthier's idea of agreement. Yet 
often first appearances are deceiving, and the case of Gauthier is 
not an exception. The difference between ethical liberalism and 
Gauthier's contractualism is that while the conflict evoked by 
ethical liberalism acts upon our moral motivations by forcing us to 
justify our moral intuitions to others, hence pushing us towards 
the view that all interests matter intrinsically, the conflict in 
Gauthier's agreement is devoid of an ethical dimension hence it is 
nothing more than a show of muscle.
There is no reason why the parties in Gauthier's agreement 
should endorse the scepticism I have been defending, in fact they 
could hold any set of beliefs, even the most dogmatic and 
intolerant. That is to say, the parties in Gauthier's agreement are 
not challenged to justify their beliefs, no matter how offensive or 
illiberal these may be. The only type of challenge present in 
Gauthier's contractualism is between different points of views, 
where each participant will try to enforce his or her perspective 
on others. In Gauthier's contract, the parties around the 
bargaining table are not required to justify their conceptions of 
the good, instead 'Might is Right' is the natural conclusion of 
Gauthier's contractualism, even if I suspect Gauthier would never
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acknowledge this.
Gauthier's only possible response to the accusation that his 
theory is reducible to the slogan 'Might is Right' is to invoke a 
set of individual rights which are not open to bargaining, hence 
putting limits on someone else's bargaining powers. In the words of 
Gauthier: "Rights provide the starting point for, and not the
outcome of, agreement" (Gauthier 1986, p.222). I don't think this 
idea of primordial rights can rescue Gauthier, instead as Percy 
Lehning (1993) points out, it raises the question of whether 
Gauthier's theory is in fact contractarian. From a contractarian 
point of view, Gauthier's operation is illegitimate, since the 
appeal to arbitrary rights is unjustified unless they are also the 
product of the agreement. Yet this is not the case with Gauthier, 
since the set of rights he appeals to are formulated prior to the 
agreement, instead of being the subject of contractarian agreement.
l.VI. Conclusion.
In this chapter I have argued that liberalism is a distinctive 
theory of political morality. Liberalism has a tradition which 
links all liberal thinkers over the centuries, indeed what Locke, 
Mill, Rawls etc. all have in common is the fact that their theories 
are an attempt to address one central question: how can individual 
liberties coexist without violating one another. I have referred to 
this question as the challenge facing liberalism.
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There are two things worth pointing out about the challenge 
facing liberalism. First, that the answer to this challenge must be 
sought in the idea of egalitarianism, since a precondition for any 
solution must be that all parties taking part in the liberal 
enterprise consider the freedom of others to be worthy of equal 
concern and respect.
Secondly, it is important to point out that although I have 
called the fundamental liberal question the 'challenge facing 
liberalism', the term challenge should not be interpreted as a 
threat, as for example when a boxer challenging the WBC champion is 
a threat to the letter's title. Instead by challenge here I have in 
mind a pursuit for something highly valued, the way in which 
climbing a mountain or writing a doctorate thesis is a challenge. 
According to this latter understanding of the term, a challenge 
cannot be divorced from the enterprise of the activity. Thus if I 
could pay for my Ph.D. degree, or fly an helicopter to the peak of 
the mountain, I would be undermining the very reason why I choose 
to undertake these projects.
The reason why it is important to point out the meaning of the 
term 'challenge' in the context of a discussion of the challenge 
facing liberalism, is because the conflict between freedoms that 
liberals ought to be addressing, far from being a threat to 
liberalism, is its very essence: the political morality of
liberalism thrives on conflict. One of the pillars on which 
liberalism was founded is the belief that disagreements will induce 
to a better state of affairs.
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If we accept these assumptions concerning liberalism as valid, 
I believe we must also acknowledge that scepticism plays a crucial 
role in the liberal project. In this chapter I have defined 
scepticism as the challenge to justify our beliefs, and I have 
argued that this conception of scepticism is intrinsic to the 
liberal project. In fact it seems to me that we cannot endorse 
conflict and disagreement unless we take on board this condition of 
scepticism. The point is that there is a correlation between the 
challenge to justify our beliefs, and the challenge facing 
liberalism; it is only after we accept that our beliefs can be 
challenged, and therefore require justification, that the 
conditions for diversity and potential disagreements (the challenge 
facing liberalism) are set. Thus the challenge facing liberalism, 
far from being a threat to liberalism, is what liberal morality is 
all about.
If follows that in order to address the challenge facing 
liberalism, we must subscribe to a theory which has two features: 
it must have an adequate conception of egalitarianism, and it must 
be compatible with scepticism. I believe the first conditions rules 
out utilitarianism and libertarianism^, while leaving 
contractualism as a possible solution. Of course there are many
- While utilitarianism has a conception of equality, as I 
argue in Appendix 'A' this is inadequate. On the other hand, 
whether libertarianism endorses a conception of equality is 
debatable. Kymlicka claims that "the more basic notion of equality 
[i.e. the idea of treating people 'as equals'] is found in Nozick's 
libertarianism as much as in Marx's communism" (Kymlicka 1990a, 
p.4), yet for an alternative view of libertarianism which strongly 
opposes equality, see Letwin (1983) and Minogue (1989).
58
different theories of contractualism, hence we need a criterion to 
distinguish between different types of contractualisms; this is 
where I think the second condition (scepticism) becomes important. 
In fact I believe that Scanlon's theory of reasonable agreement 
encompasses the idea of scepticism as defined above, while 
Gauthier's contractualism does not.
Of course everything I have said in this chapter was not meant 
to be a conclusive argument, but was only intended as a general 
introduction to the arguments I will be defending in the course of 
this thesis: in the chapters that follow I will address in more 
detail the concept of reasonable agreement, attempting to show how 
this can be built into a comprehensive political theory capable of 
addressing the challenge facing liberalism.
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PART I  - REASONABLE AGREEMENT IN  THEORY
Thomas Nagel maintains that "It is difficult to argue for the 
intrinsic social value of equality without begging the question" 
(Nagel 1979, p.106). While this claim has some appeal, it fails to 
explain why 'equality' remains one of the most debated concepts in 
contemporary political theory, especially among those who accept 
the egalitarian ideal. It appears therefore that it is not 
sufficient to come down on the side of equality; it is also 
necessary to specify what kind of equality one has in mind. As 
Kymlicka explains: "If each theory shares the same 'egalitarian
plateau' . . . [then] the fundamental argument is not whether to 
accept equality, but how best to interpret it" (Kymlicka 1990a, 
p.5) .
In the previous chapter I argued that acknowledging the 
equality between social agents is a precondition for solving the 
challenge facing liberalism, that is, for establishing the 
conditions for an harmonious coexistence of freedoms. It follows 
that any liberal political theory must necessarily shed some light 
on the concept of 'equality'. The contractualist theory of 
reasonable agreement, which I endorse in this thesis, is not the 
first theory to respond to the liberal challenge, nor does it
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present the only interpretation of equality. For example 
utilitarianism, by proposing the egalitarian principle 'everyone 
counts as one, no one more than one', provides a strong response to 
the liberal challenge.
If reasonable agreement is to legitimately dethrone 
utilitarianism it will be necessary to show that it promotes a more 
attractive egalitarian principle than utilitarianism, hence a 
better response to the liberal challenge. I believe the concept of 
impartiality is the essence of the egalitarian principle behind 
reasonable agreement, and that by endorsing impartiality the theory 
of reasonable agreement responds to the challenge facing
liberalism.
The three chapters in Part I will explore the concept of 
impartiality championed by reasonable agreement. I believe two 
ideas form the basis of this egalitarian principle: the idea of 
agreement and the concept of reasonableness. Indeed these two ideas 
combine to give a different and more attractive response to the 
liberal challenge compared to utilitarianism.
It is widely acknowledged that Rawls's A Theorv of Justice is 
the single most important fact behind the revival of the social
contract tradition. Reasonable agreement emerges from the recent 
neo-contractualist body of literature, hence it is indebted to 
Rawls's political theory in general and his contractualism in 
particular. The merits and limits of Rawls's social contract will 
be discussed in Chapter 2; more specifically, this chapter will 
argue that Rawls's contractualism is marred by an internal
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contradiction, which threatens to undermine the coherence of his 
theory of justice. This contradiction is caused by the fact that 
Rawls endorses conceptual elements from two separate and 
conflicting social contract traditions: Kant's and Hobbes's social 
contract theories.
It seems to me that the type of contractualism put forward by 
Thomas Scanlon (1982) is the best attempt so far to overcome the 
limits of Rawls's theory while working within the contractarian 
parameters set-up by Rawls. It is as part of Scanlon's social 
contract that reasonable agreement makes its debut. The 
achievements (and shortcomings) of Scanlon's theory will be 
discussed in Chapter 3.
Notwithstanding the prominence of Scanlon in the literature on 
reasonable agreement, I believe there are some unresolved problems 
in Scanlon's theory; failure to solve these problems is the biggest 
hindrance on reasonable agreement to develop into a comprehensive 
political theory strong enough to challenge utilitarianism. In 
particular, I believe Scanlon's theory is not specific enough on 
the relationship between the two concepts which form the backbone 
to the theory of reasonable agreement, namely, the idea of 
agreement and the concept of reasonableness. The way in which the 
concept of reasonableness combines with the idea of agreement will 
be the subject of Chapter 4.
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2. RAWLS’S TWO SOCIAL CONTRACTS
Writing on Rawls's political philosophy in general, and his 
contractualism in particular, twenty years (and several million 
words of commentary) after the publication of A Theorv of Justice, 
demands an explanation, if not an apology. The reason for embarking 
on the present analysis of Rawls's contractualism stems from the 
presentiment that as scholars increase their pile of published 
material based on Rawls's theory of justice, there is a risk that 
we gradually loose sight of Rawls's original intention.
I believe that Rawls is partially to blame for this 
unfortunate state of affairs. The continual reassessment of his 
theory to accommodate the many critics coming from all sorts of 
angles, has meant that Rawls has conceded so much ground to his 
challengers that from where we stand today it is becoming 
increasingly difficult to recall why Rawls made such an impact on 
political theory, and what his initial intentions were^. The 
publication of Political Liberalism and his Amnesty Lecture in 1993 
is further evidence that Rawls is now operating on a different
- Jeffrie G. Murphy rightly points out that "Even John 
Rawls, with each new essay, appears more relativist ic in his 
account of morality and of law to the degree that law depends upon 
or enshrines morality" Murphy (1988), p.240.
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wavelength than in 1971, hence in attempting to give the best 
interpretation of Rawls's political theory we must do without the 
benefit of Rawls's later insights.
On the question of Rawls's 'intended project'^ there are two 
schools of thought. On one side there are those who argue that 
Rawls was interested in deducing principles of justice from non- 
moral premises. I will refer to this first camp as the 
'rationalist' camp^. Its supporters focus on Rawls's "original 
position", in particular the use of rational choice theory and 
maximin rule, and they tend to see Rawls as a hard-core 
rationalist. The other camp focuses on those parts of Rawls's work 
that portray the author's preoccupation with moral intuitions, as 
embodied in the concepts of "a sense of justice", "reflective 
equilibrium" or "the well-ordered society", while neglecting 
Rawls's experiment with rational choice theory. I will refer to 
this other camp as 'moral-intuitionist'^.
My impression is that both camps are tapping into real aspects 
of Rawls's theory, indeed in Rawls's theory we find both rational 
choice theory and an appeal to our sense of justice, both the 
original position and reflective equilibrium. It is because of this 
irreducible tension between Rawls's idea of morality (the sense of
- Throughout this chapter by Rawls's intended project I will 
refer to his original intentions and aspirations in writing A 
Theorv of Justice.
- The best known exponent of this camp is D. Gauthier
(1986).
^ - This camp includes, among others, R. Dworkin (1978) , W. 
Kymlicka (1990a), M. Sandel (1982).
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justice) and the moral decision procedure he set up to justify it 
(the original position) that there is still much confusion 
concerning Rawls's intended project.
In this chapter I will argue that the analytical key to 
Rawls's intended project, and to its intrinsic tension in 
particular, lies in Rawls's contractualism. In fact although it 
cannot be disputed that one of Rawls's major contributions to 
contemporary political philosophy was to revive social contract 
theory as an alternative to utilitarianism^, it can also be shown 
that the confusion regarding Rawls's intended project can be traced 
back to the inadequate nature of his contractualism. The inadequacy 
lies in the fact that Rawls's contractualism, at the heart of his 
intended project, is an uncomfortable and unworkable compromise 
between two incompatible positions in the social contract 
tradition: the Kantian and Hobbesian social contracts. Indeed
Rawls's moral-intuitions (the sense of justice) reveals an affinity 
with Kant's social contract, while his moral decision procedure 
(original position) reveals an affinity with a Hobbes's social 
contract.
In order to see the double nature of Rawls's contractualism, 
I suggest we start by exploring where Rawls's contractualism fits 
in relation to classical accounts of the social contract. In 2.1, 
the general idea of a social contract will be introduced, while in 
2.II the different types of social contract argument will be 
outlined along a continuum line with Kant and Hobbes at the two
24 - See N. Daniels (1975), and C.Kukathas & P. Pettit (1990).
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opposing extremes.
Parts 2.Ill and 2.IV will explore Rawls's account of two key 
concepts in any social contract theory, namely, social cooperation 
and agreement. From this account of Rawls's contractualism it will 
emerge that his approach combines aspects taken from both the 
Kantian and Hobbesian social contract. Yet the social contract 
theories of Kant and Hobbes portray mutually exclusive views of 
morality. The views of Kant and Hobbes on social cooperation and 
agreement defy reconciliation, with the result that Rawls's 
contractualism, by attempting such reconciliation, is consumed by 
an internal contradiction which threatens to jeopardise his 
intended project.
Echoing Brian Barry's (1989b) claim that we can extrapolate 
two theories of justice from Rawls's work, a theory of justice as 
impartiality and a theory of justice as mutual advantage. Part 2.V 
will show that there are two separate and opposing social contract 
theories in Rawls's work, and therefore two opposing theories of 
justice.
In the concluding part of this paper (2. VI) 1 want to 
recommend a way in which the tension in Rawls's intended project 
can be solved, and suggest what 1 believe is the appropriate 
interpretation of Rawls's intended project. Indeed some critics 
have diagnosed the problem with Rawls's theory of justice by 
reducing all evils to his contractualism, suggesting that Rawls 
ought to do away with the idea of contractualism tout court, indeed 
his theory of justice would improve as a result. My suggestion is
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to take the opposite line and argue that the problem with Rawls's 
theory is that Rawls makes only a limited use of contractualism; 
what Rawls's theory of justice needs is more contractualism, not 
less.
2.1. The Anatomy of a Social Contract.
Before addressing the more difficult question concerning the 
anatomy of a social contract theory, we must first agree on a 
definition of the social contract. Defining the nature and scope of 
a social contract is more controversial than it may at first 
appear, in fact we find that different definitions of the social 
contract are inevitably partial towards certain theories or 
interpretations of the contractarian enterprise. Furthermore, as we 
shall see later, in the history of the social contract tradition 
there are varying and irreconcilable positions.
Consider the following two definitions of the social contract:
(1) Fundamental to the contractarian enterprise is the task of 
showing how in appropriate circumstances social order can 
arise from the operation of individual rationality. (Weale 
1993, p.75)
(2) A social contract theory, in the traditional or 'hypothetical' 
sense, is one which deduces moral principles for society from
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what individuals motivated by self-interest agree to or would
agree to. (Lessnoff 1990, p.15)
To the extent that they reflect the views of some of the 
historical figures behind the contractarian ideology (principally 
Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau or Kant), the above two definitions are 
correct. Nevertheless, I feel that these two definitions suffer 
from being too narrow and partisan.
In the case of Weale, we are told that the social order^ can 
be reduced to the operation of individual rationality. First of 
all, it is not clear what Weale means by 'operation'. Since the 
social contract is not an historical event, but an hypothetical 
construction, the point is not so much the operation of individual 
wills as much as the grounds on which individuals could 
hypothetically agree to cooperate. Secondly, Weale defines 
'individual rationality' in terms of individuals pursuing their own 
interests. Again this may be misleading, in fact if we replace 
'individual rationality' with 'individuals pursuing their own 
interests' we reach the following definition: contractualism is 
about how the social order can arise from the operation of 
individuals pursuing their own interests. What is interesting to 
note is that Weale's definition of the social contract has a 
striking similarity to an idealized laissez-faire market system. I
25 _ "The idea of a social order may be understood as a set of 
rules and practices within which individuals can pursue their own 
ends whilst respecting the rights of others to pursue their own 
ends". Weale (1993), p.75.
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should emphasize here that it is not my intention to criticise 
Weale's understanding of the contractarian enterprise, instead I 
simply want to draw the attention to the fact that Weale's 
definition has a marked economic undertone^, which is in contrast 
with contractualism understood as part of moral theory.
Consider now Lessnoff's definition. He clearly states that the 
contractarian enterprise entails deducing moral principles from 
what self-interested individuals would agree to. Lessnoff's 
definition seems to have strong similarities with Weale's, and I 
would argue it has the same limitations. In fact Lessnoff's 
definition excludes the possibility that moral principles are not 
deduced from the agreement but are an a priori assumption of the 
agreement itself (Kant), or that the social contract is not 
exclusively concerned with individuals motivated by self-interest, 
since other forms of motivation may be appealed to^.
In order to avoid the problems which stem from narrow and 
partisan interpretations of the social contract, I suggest we start 
from the most general and (I hope) uncontroversial definition of 
the contractarian enterprise. I suggest the following definition: 
A social contract is an agreement based on the consent of every
^ - In fairness to Weale, it should be said that he discusses 
the contractarian enterprise in relation to the question of 
economic justice.
- For example, a motivation to act impartially; see Scanlon 
(1982). Scanlon's theory will be discussed at length in Chapter 3: 
"Contractualism: Metaphysical not Political".
69
individual to regulate the benefits of social cooperation^^.
The advantage of this definition is that the two key terms, namely 
agreement and social cooperation, are undetermined, hence the above 
definition cannot be charged with partisanship.
Now that we have a working definition of the social contract, 
I suggest we analyze in more detail its anatomy. The formal 
structure of the contractarian argument follows a two-stage 
process: in Stage 1 we have the agreement based on individual
consent, in Stage 2 we have the benefits of social cooperation. The 
format of traditional social contract argument can be represented 
schematically as follows:
STAGE 1 STAGE 2
agreement (based on ------------ > benefits of social
individual consent) cooperation
Figure 2.1
Remember that this diagram represents only the basic format of 
the social contract. In fact there are many variations of it, as
- In formulating this definition of the contractarian 
enterprise I have found two recent articles by Samuel Freeman very 
helpful: "Social contract views work from the intuitive idea of
agreement. The appeal of the notion lies in the liberal idea that 
cooperation ought to be based in the individuals' consent and ought 
to be for their mutual benefit. Social contract views differ 
according to how the idea of agreement is specified" (Freeman 1990, 
p. 122); "Characteristic of the social-contract views are the ideas 
that social rules and institutions are to be freely acceptable to 
all persons bound by them, and for their mutual benefit" (Freeman 
1991, p.282).
70
different theories adopt the contractarian framework for different 
purposes, give different interpretations of its two key moments 
('agreement' and 'social cooperation') as well as different
accounts of the relationship between these two key moments.
Nevertheless all social contract theories, qua contractarian
theories, agree that 'agreement' and 'social cooperation' are
intrinsic to the social contract.
A growing number of scholars have become convinced that in the 
history of the social contract tradition, Kant and Hobbes stand on 
opposite ends of the spectrum. As Will Kymlicka (1991) points out:
There are two basic forms of contemporary social contract
theory  One approach stresses a natural equality of
physical power, which makes it mutually advantageous for
people to accept conventions that recognize and protect each 
other's interests and possessions. The other approach stresses 
a natural equality of moral status, which makes each person's 
interests a matter of common or impartial concern.... I will 
call proponents of the mutual advantage theory 'Hobbesian 
contractarians', and proponents of the impartial theory
'Kantian contractarians' for Hobbes and Kant inspired and 
foreshadowed these two forms of contract theory. (Kymlicka 
1991, p.188)
Analogous accounts to Kymlicka's can also be found in Hampton
(1991, p.33), and Lessnoff (1990, p.15).
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I will adopt this dichotomy between Kant and Hobbes as the 
starting point for our enquiry on Rawls's social contract, since it 
is only by comparison to extreme ideal-types that Rawls's theory 
can be evaluated. Thus before introducing Rawls, a closer 
inspection of Kant's and Hobbes's understanding of the social 
contract is required.
2.II. Kant and Hobbes on the Social Contract.
According to Kant's social contract, the most crucial moment 
in the contractarian procedure occurs at the stage of the agreement 
(Stage 1). This is because Kant's concept of 'agreement' is morally 
loaded, that is to say, it is an agreement based on pre-determined 
moral motivations. The agreement comes prior to and therefore 
determines the terms of social cooperation, or in other words the 
terms of social cooperation are determined by a priori moral 
claims.
Kant's most clear account of the social contract comes from 
his essay "On the Common Saying: 'This May be True in Theory, but 
it does not Apply in Practice'", where he argues that if theory is 
of little practical use, it is not the fault of the theory; the 
fault is that there is not enough theory. In this essay Kant is 
concerned to show that in matters of morality any worry about the 
empty ideality of theory completely disappears, although he also 
argues that applying the maxim that gives the title to his essay to
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matters of morality does very great harm. In the essay Kant deals 
with the relationship of theory and practice in three separate 
areas; morality, politics and the cosmopolitical sphere. The second 
of these ('On the Relationship of Theory and Practice in Political 
Right') is a direct attack on Hobbes's De Cive, and it is here that 
Kant discusses his view of the social contract (and how it differs 
from Hobbes's).
Kant distinguishes between two types of social contract: as 
the basis of a society {pactum sociale) and as a basis of a civil 
state, i.e. a commonwealth (pactum unionis civilis). The former is 
more general, and it refers to a union of many individuals for some 
common end which they all share. The latter is more specific, and 
it refers to a union as an end in itself which they all ought to 
share. Needless to say that Kant defends the latter type of social 
contract as pertinent to the civil or political state, and he sees
Hobbes as his major adversary, since Hobbes fails to distinguish
between a society and a civil state:
The civil state ... is based on the following a priori
principles:
1. The freedom of every member of society as a human being,
2. The equality of each with all the others as a subject.
3. The independence of each member of a commonwealth as a 
citizen.
These principles are not so much laws given by an already 
established state, as laws by which a state can alone be
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established in accordance with pure rational principles of
external human right. (Kant 1991, p.74; emphasis in original)
The reason why Kant is keen to discredit Hobbes's social 
contract is the following: he feels that under Hobbes's contract 
the head of state has no contractual obligation towards the people, 
while Kant wants to emphasize that the people too have inalienable 
rights against the head of state. It is because Kant believes in 
such inalienable rights that his contract is based on a priori 
principles'^
To recapitulate, Kant's social contract is grounded on a a 
priori moral principles, hence it is the unanimous (moral) 
agreement that determines the type of social cooperation being 
pursued:
Sense of ----> Unanimous Moral ---> Benefits of Social
Morality Agreement Cooperation
Figure 2.2 (Kantian Social Contract)
Contrary to Kant, under Hobbes's social contract the most 
salient moment in the contractarian procedure occurs at the stage
- "But reason provides a concept which we express by the 
words political right. And this concept has binding force for human 
beings who coexist in a state of antagonism produced by their 
natural freedom ... Thus it is based on a priori principles, for 
experience cannot provide knowledge of what is right, and there is 
a theory of political right to which practice must conform before 
it can be valid." (Kant 1991, p.86; emphasis in original).
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of social cooperation (stage 2). This is because Hobbes's concept 
of 'agreement' is not morally loaded; according to Hobbes 
individuals in the state of nature are beyond moral consideration. 
Morality follows from the agreement, it does not precede it.
Hobbes's rejection of all metaphysical foundations of politics 
is well documented. In lieu of metaphysics in Leviathan Hobbes 
prescribes a scientific account of politics, hence he defends a 
mechanistic account of sensation, and the belief that human 
motivations can be reduced to appetites and aversions. What is 
important to note here is that such motivations are beyond any 
moral appraisal, indeed 'good' and 'evil' do not relate to moral 
qualities of objects themselves, but are the names of what 
different individuals desire or hate. This implies that Hobbes 
undermined all arguments based on an objective basis for morality:
But whatsoever is the object of any mans Appetite or Desire; 
that is it, which he for his part calleth Good: And the object 
of his Hate, and Aversion, Evill; and of his Contempt, Vile, 
and Inconsiderable. For these words of Good, Evill, and 
Contemptable, are ever used with relation to the person that 
useth them: There being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor 
any common Rule of Good and Evill, to be taken from the nature 
of the objects themselves. (Hobbes 1651, p.24; all emphasis 
omitted)
- All page references to Leviathan are to the pagination of 
the original edition of 1651 which is indicated [in square 
brackets] in the edition by C.B. Macpherson (1968).
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Hobbes's denial of moral motives and moral standards is 
reflected in his accounts of the state of nature and the laws of 
nature. Concerning the state of nature, Hobbes points out that this 
hypothetical state is once again beyond moral evaluation:
To this warre of every man against every man, this also is 
consequent; that nothing can be Unjust. The notions of Right 
and Wrong, Justice and Injustice have there no place. Where 
there is no common Power, there is no Law: where no Law, no 
Injustice. (Hobbes 1651, p.63)
If Hobbes's account of a pre-moral state of nature is 
surprising, his account of natural laws is even more striking. It 
should be pointed out that in the 17th century the language of 
natural laws often implied moral imperatives, especially in the 
works of those following in the Christian and Aristotelian 
tradition. Hobbes adopts the notion of natural law, but strips it 
of all moral connotations. The first two laws of nature are nothing 
more than necessary conditions if men are to leave the state of 
nature by the making and keeping of covenants, indeed Hoobes goes 
as far as saying that it is misleading to refer to these as laws:
These dictates of Reason, men use to call by the name of Laws; 
but improperly: for they are but Conclusions, or Theorems
concerning what conduceth to the conservation and defence of 
themselves. (Hobbes 1651, p.80)
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As Hampsher-Monk rightly points out, for Hobbes the laws of nature 
are nothing more than rules, and "these rules are advisory, they 
are not moral absolutes, nor commands" (Hampsher-Monk 1992, p.31).
If the state of nature is beyond moral appraisal, and the laws 
of nature are not moral imperatives, it follows that (unlike in the 
case of Kant) there is no right and wrong prior to human agreement. 
Similarly justice is determined by human agreement, not by moral 
absolutes prior to such agreement:
For where no Covenant hath preceded, there hath no Right been 
transferred, and every man has right to every thing; and 
consequently, no action can be Unjust. But when a Covenant is 
made, then to break it is Unjust; And the definition of 
INJUSTICE, is no other than the not Performance of Covenant. 
And whatsoever is not Unjust, is Just. (Hobbes 1651, p. 71; 
all emphasis omitted)
To recapitulate, according to Hobbes the 'agreement', being 
stripped of moral connotations, can only be grounded on the 
bargaining of individual men, and the terms of social cooperation 
on the idea of mutual advantage. It is the idea of mutual advantage 
that ensures that the agreement is unanimous:
Agreement as --- > social cooperation ----> sense of
bargaining for mutual advantage morality
Figure 2.3 (Hobbesian Social Contract)
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In the last analysis, what distinguishes Kant from Hobbes is 
their different conception concerning the nature of morality: 
according to Kant morality is intuitively discernible, hence it is 
invoked prior to the agreement, while for Hobbes morality is evoked 
after social cooperation. As Hampton rightly points out, according 
to Hobbes: "morality is a human-made institution, which is
justified only to the extent that it effectively furthers human 
interests" (Hampton 1991, p.36).
So far I have described two ideal-typical interpretations of 
the social contract idea. I have tried to show that the difference 
between Kant and Hobbes's contract theories can be seen in terms of 
three interrelated features: first, their different conception of 
the key stages of 'agreement' and 'social cooperation'; second, 
their different understanding of the relation between 'agreement' 
and 'social cooperation'; and third, their different ideas of the 
nature of morality. If we place all the social contract theories 
along a continuum, with Kant and Hobbes at the two extremes, where 
does Rawls's neo-contractualism lie? In what follows I will argue 
that in Rawls's contractualism we find elements from both Kant and 
Hobbes, and that these elements are incompatible with each other. 
In order to support this claim, I will examine Rawls's conceptions 
of social cooperation (2.Ill) and agreement (2.IV).
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2.III. Rawls on Social Cooperation.
The idea of social cooperation is indispensable for Rawls's 
theory of social justice. As he explains at the outset of A Theory 
of Justice, principles of social justice must necessarily assume 
social cooperation:
[principles of social justice] provide a way of assigning 
rights and duties in the basic institutions of society and 
they define the appropriate distribution of the benefits and 
burdens of social cooperation. (Rawls 1971, p.4; see also 
p.7)
In other words, if there is no social cooperation, there is no 
point drafting principles of social justice. Having established 
this, what is of interest to us here is Rawls's specific conception 
of social cooperation.
In what follows 1 will argue that in A Theory of Justice Rawls 
appeals to two separate but related conceptions of social 
cooperation: (a) as promoting mutual advantage and (b) as endorsing 
a well-ordered society. In Rawls's theory these two conceptions of 
social cooperation are tightly knit together, to the extent that 
they become indivisible: "In [justice as fairness] we think of a 
well-ordered society as a scheme of cooperation for reciprocal 
advantage" (Rawls 1971, p.33). What Rawls fails to see is that the 
concepts of mutual advantage and of a well-ordered society reflect
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two radically different theories in the social contract tradition, 
and they also portray two radically different conceptions of 
morality.
These two conceptions of social cooperation find support in 
the two schools of thought I referred to earlier, hence the 
rationalist camp has given prominence to social cooperation as 
mutual advantage, while the moral-intuitionist camp has focused on 
the idea of a well-ordered society. I suggest we start by 
considering first the rationalist camp.
The idea of social cooperation as mutual advantage endorses 
the principle of mutual benefit; all those who participate in the 
cooperative venture will benefit from it. It is not surprising to 
find that the idea of social cooperation as mutual advantage, often 
upheld by Rawls, is also advocated by neo-Hobbesian political 
theorists, which explains why Gauthier (1986) is happy to echo 
Rawls regarding the issue of social cooperation^. This similarity 
between Rawls and Gauthier is misleading, in fact although Rawls 
adopts the idea of social cooperation for mutual advantage, as we 
shall see the reason for doing so are very different from 
Gauthier's.
Samuel Freeman (1990) has made an interesting attempt to 
isolate Rawls's conception of social cooperation from Gauthier's by 
focusing on their respective notion of mutual advantage. Freeman 
points out that while Rawls and Gauthier share the idea of social
- D. Gauthier (1986), esp. pp.10-13.
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cooperation for mutual advantage^, they differ in the 
characterization of this basic idea: according to Gauthier,
cooperation for mutual advantage involves no irreducible moral 
elements, instead the only valid conception of cooperation is one 
of efficiently coordinated activity for each person's benefit^. On 
the other hand, Rawls's idea of cooperation as mutual advantage 
endorses irreducible moral notions, which implies that Rawls's 
conception of social cooperation has a dual aspect:
[I]n addition to a conception of each individual's rational 
good, the idea of social cooperation has an independent moral 
component (characterized in Rawls by the notion of fair terms 
and what is reasonable...). (Freeman 1990, p.124)
While I share Freeman's view that there is a difference 
between Gauthier and Rawls on the issue of social cooperation, I 
think Freeman is wrong to look for this within the notion of mutual 
advantage. That is to say, I don't think there is any difference in 
the way Gauthier and Rawls understand mutual advantage. Instead, 
the difference between Gauthier and Rawls is that social 
cooperation for mutual advantage is Gauthier's only conception of 
social cooperation, while Rawls appeals also to another conception 
of social cooperation, a moral conception, enclosed in the idea of
- "Both [Rawls and Gauthier] take the idea of reciprocity 
the idea that social cooperation should be for mutual advantage 
as fundamental" (Freeman 1990, p.123).
- See Freeman (1990) p. 124.
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a well-ordered society - not surprisingly the concept of a well- 
ordered society is absent from Gauthier's moral theory. If the idea 
of mutual advantage is Rawls's first conception of social 
cooperation, his account of the well-ordered society makes up his 
other conception of social cooperation.
Another way of stating the difference between Gauthier and 
Rawls on the question of social cooperation is to say that Gauthier 
is interested in the benefits of social cooperation, while Rawls is 
interested in the terms of social cooperation. In the words of 
Rawls :
Social cooperation is not merely coordinated social activity 
efficiently organized for some overall collective end. Rather, 
it presupposes a notion of fair terms of cooperation. (Rawls 
1982; p.164)
Justice as fairness starts from the idea that society is to be 
conceived as a fair system of cooperation. (Rawls 1985; 
pp.232-233)
The terms of social cooperation are the object of Rawls's 
second conception of social cooperation, namely, as a well-ordered 
society. Rawls explains that a well-ordered society is effectively 
regulated by a public sense of justice, which implies that its 
members have a strong and normally effective desire to act as the
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principles of justice require*. Rawls's idea of a well-ordered 
society embodies the central theme of his theory of justice, 
namely, the notion of a sense of justice*. A central aspect of a 
well-ordered society is the idea of social union, defined as 
"shared final ends and common activities valued for themselves" 
(Rawls 1971, p.525), in fact Rawls goes as far as saying that a 
well-ordered society is itself a form of social union, it is a 
social union of social unions*.
So far I have argued that Rawls holds two ideas of social 
cooperation, as mutual advantage and as a well-ordered society. I 
believe that two conclusions can be drawn from this dual 
conception. First, that Rawls needs both conceptions for different 
reasons, that is to say these two conceptions of social cooperation 
perform different functions in his theory. Thus while social 
cooperation for mutual advantage is important to Rawls in order to 
establish the circumstances of justice, the idea of a well-ordered 
society reflects Rawls's ethical idea of justice. Secondly, these 
two conceptions of social cooperation reflect two opposing social 
contract traditions, thus social cooperation as mutual advantage 
and as a well-ordered society represent respectively Hobbes's and 
Kant's views of social contract.
34 - Rawls (1971) pp.4-5 and 453-4.
* - Rawls (1971) explains what he means by a well-ordered 
society in § 69, which is the first section in Chapter VIII. "The 
Sense of Justice".
* - Rawls's concept of social union is emphasized by Sandel 
(1982) pp.81-2 and 150-1.
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It is important for Rawls that these two conceptions of social 
cooperation are kept separate: in his theory of justice, social 
cooperation as mutual advantage plays an instrumental role, while 
the idea of a well-ordered society plays a normative role. The 
problem with Rawls's dual conception of social cooperation is that 
he fails to adequately distinguish between their separate 
functions, therefore we find that the idea of social cooperation as 
mutual advantage has serious repercussions on Rawls's moral theory.
I believe that the reason why Rawls endorses two separate 
notions of social cooperation, as well as the reason why he fails 
to keep these separate, can be traced back to his idea of 
agreement. It is to Rawls's idea of agreement as original position 
that I want to turn my attention.
2.IV. Rawls on Agreement.
Rawls's idea of agreement is embodied by the well-known 
original position, by far the most discussed and criticised aspect 
of his entire theory of justice. I want to argue that Rawls's 
notion of agreement is ambivalent, to the extent that it aims to 
reproduce both aspects of social cooperation (as mutual advantage 
and as a well-ordered society).
Before pursuing our analysis, it is important to have clear in 
our minds what the original position represents in Rawls's theory 
of justice, that is to say, what function the original position
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performs in Rawls's theory. The original position is Rawls's idea 
of a moral decision procedure. As Fishkin points out, moral
decision procedures:
define a perspective of impartiality for the equal
consideration of relevant claims of interests, and this 
perspective is offered as the foundation for social choice in 
a just society. (Fishkin 1984, p.95)
It follows that Rawls's original position can therefore be 
seen as a device half-way between our general moral intuitions and 
specific principles of justice. We appeal to the original position 
in order to clarify and render more precise our general intuitions 
about equality; in other words the original position is a device
which expresses the idea of moral equality (Kymlicka 1990a, pp.68-
69) and translates it into principles of justice.
On the basis of this account of the role of the original
position in Rawls's theory, we can now analyze the original
position in more detail. I believe we can distinguish two features 
of the original position: (a) its arbitrariness and (b) its
internal procedure. I suggest we address these two features 
separately.
By its 'arbitrariness' I am referring to the fact that the
original position is rigged to give certain results. In the words
of Rawls:
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we want to define the original position so that we get the 
desired solution. (Rawls 1971, p.141)
The conditions embodied in the description of the original 
position are ones that we do in fact accept. Or if we do not, 
then perhaps we can be persuaded to do so by philosophical 
reflection. (Rawls 1971, p.587)
Rawls admits to modify the original position in order to make sure 
that it produces the principles of justice Rawls wants to advocate, 
that is to say principles which match our moral intuitions 
(Kymlicka 1990, p.67). As Fishkin points out, the original position 
is only one among many moral decision procedure in contemporary 
liberal political theory: slight variations in the hypothetical
conditions in these choice situations leads to sharply divergent 
outcomes^.
The second feature concerns the internal procedure or 
mechanics of the original position. In the original position people 
choose social principles on the basis of self-interest from behind 
a 'veil of ignorance'. As Williams correctly points out, this does 
not mean that Rawls wants to deduce principles of social justice 
from personal self-interest, instead:
The point is that a self-interested choice in ignorance of
- Other examples are Ackerman's notion of "neutral dialogue" 
and Peter Singer's perfectly sympathetic spectator. See Fishkin 
(1984), esp. Chapter 4.
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one's identity is supposed to model in important respects non­
self-interested or moral choice under ordinary conditions of 
knowledge. (Williams 1985, p.78)
In other words the device of the original position is used to model 
what would be a fair arrangement for people in ordinary life.
Unfortunately for Rawls, there are many problems with the 
original position as a moral decision procedure. Indeed many 
critics have rightly argued that the problem with the original 
position is that rational choice under uncertainty does not 
represent our moral intuitions on equality: Rawls's idea of social 
contract, materialised in terms of the original position, fails as 
a device for embodying a conception of equality^.
I believe we can see exactly why the original position fails 
to embody our conception of equality by investigating what this 
idea of rational choice under uncertainty can tell us about social 
cooperation: what we find is that the assumption of self-interested 
motivation goes hand-in-hand with the idea of social cooperation as 
mutua1 advantage.
It was argued in the previous section that the role of social 
cooperation as mutual advantage lies in setting the ground for the 
circumstances of justice, which means that the idea of mutual 
advantage per se is devoid of an ethical dimension. Unfortunately 
the ethical neutrality of social cooperation as mutual advantage is 
violated by the original position, in fact Rawls's moral decision
38 - See Williams (1985) p.79 and Barry (1989b).
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procedure is characterised by a distinctive ethical dimension, 
namely, a conception of individual autonomy grounded on rational 
self-interest.
In order to illustrate this point, it is necessary to recall 
Gauthier's assessment of Rawls's original position. Gauthier's 
(1986) main criticism of Rawls's original position is that it 
excludes bargaining; contrary to Rawls, Gauthier upholds bargaining 
to the extent that bargaining embodies the spirit of the social 
contract, i.e. individual consent. If we recall the definition of 
the contractarian enterprise, the social contract theory refers to 
the agreement as based on the consent of individuals, thus by 
interpreting this agreement in terms of bargaining Gauthier is 
emphasising the individuality of the consent.
The most striking characteristic of Gauthier's conception of 
agreement is that it is 'agent centred'^, that is to say all 
reasons centre on the desires and interests of individual agents. 
According to Gauthier self-interest promotes and reflects the 
dimension of individuality in individual consent, while bargaining 
promotes and reflects the idea of consent and agreement.
Gauthier's attempt to force the concepts of individuality and 
agreement into the narrower concepts of self-interest and 
bargaining is grotesque: there is more to individuality than the 
pursuit of self-interest, and bargaining is certainly not the only
39 - I have borrowed this idea from Freeman (1990) p.126.
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motive behind an agreement^. Having said that, Gauthier's critique 
can be rescued to point out a potential weakness in Rawls's social 
contract. If the original position does not involve bargaining or 
any other type of collective decision process^, it is not clear 
under what form individuality appears in Rawls's contractualist 
framework. Gauthier's conception of agreement as rational
bargaining, for all its defects, is strongly agent-centred,
therefore it preserves a strong connection to individual practical 
reason.
It is important to remember that Rawls saw the social contract 
tradition as an alternative to utilitarianism, which he criticised 
for not taking account of the separateness of individual persons. 
This tells us that individuality is important to Rawls, in fact 
Rawls regards the agreement stemming from the original position as 
a better alternative to utilitarianism, better in the sense that it 
respected the individuality of everyone.
I believe it is in order to preserve an element of
individuality in his contractualism that Rawls appeals to self-
- Furthermore Gauthier's idea of agreement as rational 
bargaining faces the moral problem of justifying social and natural 
inequalities which greatly determine the outcome of bargaining. 
Gauthier overcomes this problem by making all natural inequalities 
legitimate, but of course Rawls has other ideas.
- Rawls tells us that ”[T]he original position is not to be 
thought of as a general assembly which includes at one moment 
everyone who will live at some time; or, much less, as an assembly 
of everyone who could live at some time. It is not a gathering of 
all actual or possible persons". (Rawls 1971, p.139); "[W]e can 
view the choice in the original position from the standpoint of one 
person selected at random. If anyone after due reflection prefers 
a conception of justice to another, then they all do, and a 
unanimous agreement can be reached" (Rawls 1971, p.139).
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interested motivation in the original position. The problem with 
Rawls's argument is that from a motivation of self-interest he 
simply cannot deduce the principles of justice he wants. As Brian 
Barry rightly points out:
But the difficulty that Rawls faces is, I believe, this: there 
simply is no way in which he can adapt an original position 
with self-interested choices so as to get it to reflect his 
basic moral commitments. The foundation is wrong and no amount 
of work on the detailing can fix the trouble. (Barry 1989b, 
p.335)
The problem here is that Rawls's appeal to self-interest in the 
original position has some damaging repercussions for his theory of 
justice, since the idea of social cooperation for mutual advantage 
becomes now ethically imbued with a sense of self-interest.
It is true that after 1971 Rawls became aware of the 
possibility of this interpretation, which he wants to avoid. In 
fact although in A Theorv of Justice Rawls was keen to subordinate 
his contractarian theory of justice to rational choice theory: "The 
theory of justice is a part, perhaps the most significant part, of 
the theory of rational choice." (Rawls 1971, p.16), he later 
recognised the fallacious nature of this claim:
it was an error in Theorv (and a very misleading one) to 
describe a theory of justice as part of the theory of rational
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choice ... What I should have said is that the conception of 
justice as fairness uses an account of rational choice subject 
to reasonable conditions to characterize the deliberations of 
the parties as representatives of free and equal persons; and 
all of this within a political conception of justice, which 
is, of course, a moral conception. (Rawls 1985, p.2 37n)
Clearly Rawls wants to break away from neo-Hobbesian views, 
and their inclination to integrate morality with rationality and 
self-interest, yet it seems to me that even his latter restatement 
concerning rational choice theory is problematic. In fact Rawls 
still believes that rational choice theory can be used to 
"characterize the deliberations of the parties as representatives 
of free and equal persons", while I would argue that the problems 
in Rawls's theory originate from the employment of rational choice 
theory tout court.
The problem with employing rational choice theory as part of 
an egalitarian moral discourse is that rational choice theory 
assumes a motivation of self-interest, and this motivation clashes 
with the deliberations of the parties as representatives of free 
and equal persons; at best rational choice theory characterizes the 
deliberation of free and rational persons, and not of free and 
equal persons, as Rawls's theory assumes.
It is interesting to notice that in A Theorv of Justice Rawls 
seems to use 'free and equal persons' and 'free and rational 
persons' interchangeably. Thus Rawls writes that:
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[the two principles of justice] are the principles that free 
and rational persons concerned to further their own interest 
would accept in an initial position of equality as defining 
the fundamental terms of their association. (Rawls 1971, p.11; 
emphasis added).
although the foundation of Rawls's theory is that people should be 
regarded as free and equal:
[W]henever social institutions satisfy these principles those 
engaged in them can say to one another that they are 
cooperating on terms to which they would agree if they were 
free and equal persons whose relations with respect to one 
another were fair. (Rawls 1971, p.13; emphasis added)
Judging from these two quotations, Rawls considers free and 
rational persons to be also free and equal. It would appear 
therefore that the condition of rationality is instrumental for the 
equality of a person, thus we are equal to the extant that we are 
equally rational (or that we have a capacity for equal 
rationality) . Contrary to the view of Rawls, I fail to see the 
correlation between rationality and equality. The assumption of 
rationality cannot be a condition of what it means to be treated 
with equal concern and respect, in fact the claim for 
egalitarianism is particularly pungent when related to those who do 
not have a capacity for equal rationality: for example children and
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those mentally disabled.
Let's recapitulate the argument so far. I have argued that 
there are two models for interpreting the device for agreement in 
Rawls's theory of justice, which are conductive to two opposing 
conclusions, each relating to opposing ethical theories:
MODEL A: The original position is intentionally rigged in
order to yield Rawls's two principles of justice. It follows that 
these principles of justice reflect a pre-determined idea of moral 
equality, hence the embodiment of a well-ordered society.
MODEL B: The internal mechanics of the original position give 
prominence to an individual's motivation for self-interest, which 
translates into the concept of social cooperation as mutual 
advantage.
To the extent that Rawls's principles of justice and idea of 
social cooperation are traceable to a pre-determined moral sense of 
justice, under MODEL A Rawls is advocating a Kantian social 
contract theory. At the same time the original position assumes a 
form of individualism compatible to mutual advantage, which may 
itself determine our sense of morality, hence under MODEL B Rawls 
may be seen as advocating a Hobbesian social contract theory.
In Part 2.V below I will enquire what conclusions can be 
deduced from the claim that Rawls simultaneously upholds two 
separate and conflicting views of morality and of the social 
contract.
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2.V. Social Contracts and Theories of Justice.
So far I have tried to show that although Rawls advocates a 
return to the social contract tradition, he is ambiguous as to the 
kind of social contract theory he wants to defend, in fact both his 
conception of social cooperation and agreement reflect evidence of 
two opposing theories of the social contract. On one side Rawls 
justifies the claim for a well-ordered society (a society 
effectively regulated by a public conception of justice) on the 
grounds of a moral sense of justice^\ Yet on the other hand Rawls 
upholds social cooperation for mutual advantage based on a sense of 
rational self-interest. The former feature echoes a Kantian social 
contract, the latter a Hobbesian social contract.
There is no doubt that Rawls's intention was to formulate a 
non-Hobbesian social contract theory, as he explicitly stated:
As the text suggests, I shall regard Locke ... Rousseau ...
and Kant ... as definitive of the contract tradition. For all
of its greatness, Hobbes's Leviathan raises special problems.
(Rawls 1971, p.lln)
So why does Rawls feel that he must endorse the (Hobbesian) 
idea of social cooperation for mutual advantage? As I explained
- Indeed Rawls tells us that in a well-ordered society 
citizens are moved by a sense of justice.
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already, Rawls adopts the idea of social cooperation for mutual 
advantage based on individual self-interest, for two reasons. First 
of all, because it provides what Hume referred to as the 
'circumstances of justice', that is to say, the conditions which 
establish the usefulness of principles of justice. Secondly, it is 
in order to retain an element of individuality in his theory of 
justice; having rejected the idea of compromise and bargaining, 
Rawls needs to counterbalance his decision to exclude bargaining 
from his theory by emphasizing the element of individuality in the 
notion of social cooperation, since individuality is a sine qua non 
postulate for any social contract theory.
Rawls's failure to combine the idea of a well-ordered society, 
where individual agents are moved by a sense of justice, with that 
of social cooperation for mutual advantage, where the motivation is 
one of rationality aimed at advancing one's own interest, has some 
serious repercussions on Rawls's moral and political theory. Indeed 
Rawls's contractualism, embodying two conflicting theories of the 
social contract, is the cause of an unworkable contradiction in his 
theory of justice. Here I am referring to Brian Barry's well known 
claim that Rawls endorses two conflicting theories of justice, one 
pointing to justice as impartiality, the other to justice as mutual 
benefit.
In the first volume of his tetralogy on social justice, Barry 
(1989b) argues that we can extrapolate two theories of justice from 
Rawls's work. The two moral capacities depicted by Rawls, one for 
a conception of the good (expressed by a rational plan of life),
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the other for a sense of justice (expressed by a regulative desire 
to act upon certain principles of right) are the founding stones of 
two predominant and conflicting approaches to social justice, 
respectively justice as mutual advantage and justice as 
impartiality. According to Barry, these two approaches to social 
justice are both implicit in Rawls's A Theorv of Justice.
It seems to me that the two moral capacities above mentioned, 
namely the rational pursuit of one's conception of the good and the 
sense of justice, which Barry traces back to Rawls's theory of 
justice, are also the same moral capacities assumed by Hobbes and 
Kant in their respective social contract theories. It follows that 
the tension within Rawls's A Theorv of Justice between two opposing 
theories of justice is the symptom of a deeper contradiction, 
namely, between two conflicting social contract traditions: one
Hobbesian, the other Kantian.
To recapitulate, I believe that the ambiguity in Rawls's 
theory of justice stems from his endorsement of two opposing social 
contract traditions. In other words, in Rawls's theory we find 
elements of two separate and opposing social contract theories, and 
therefore elements of two opposing theories of justice. Justice as 
impartiality stems from a Kantian interpretation of the social 
contract, while justice as mutual benefit stems from a Hobbesian 
interpretation.
2.VI. Conclusion.
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The aim of this chapter was to shed some light on Rawls's 
intended project by exploring that aspect of his work that has been 
acclaimed as Rawls's greatest contribution to contemporary 
political philosophy: having revived the social contract theory as 
a response to utilitarian moral and political theory. I believe 
that establishing the exact role of contractualism in Rawls's A 
Theorv of Justice is the key to a full understanding of the 
strengths and limits of Rawls's intended project. In other words it 
is in light of Rawls's commitment to the social contract that his 
intended project must be understood.
In this chapter I argued that there are elements of two 
opposing social contract traditions in Rawls's theory: Kant's idea 
of a morally loaded agreement, and Hobbes's idea of social 
cooperation for mutual advantage. I also argued that the 
contradiction stemming from these two traditions is not resolved by 
Rawls but merely reflected in his theory of justice, in fact it is 
possible to detect two opposing theories of justice in Rawls's 
work.
Brian Barry's interpretation of Rawls's work goes a long way 
towards justifying the argument presented in this chapter that 
there are elements of two social contract theories in Rawls's work: 
one Hobbesian, the other non-Hobbesian. The Hobbesian element in 
Rawls's theory of justice can be found in the idea of social 
cooperation for mutual advantage and the motivation for self- 
interest in the original position, while the Kantian element lies 
in the idea of an intuitive sense of justice and the concept of a
97
well-ordered society.
Considering the unresolved problems which derive from Rawls's 
use of the social contract, it is not surprisingly that Rawls's 
revival of the social contract has received mixed responses. This 
can be seen in the way in which the 'rationalist' and 'moral- 
intuitionist' camps have reacted to Rawls's attempt to revive 
interest in the social contract tradition.
There is little doubt that the rationalist-camp is keen on 
Rawls's contractualism. This is not surprising considering that the 
original position is the centre piece of the rationalists' 
interpretation of Rawls's intended project. By identifying with 
Rawls's original position and the use of rational choice theory, 
some exponents of the rationalist camp have seized upon the 
opportunity to uphold the original position and the logic of 
rational choice in order to deduce principles of justice. This is 
the case of David Gauthier, who argues that only a theory of 
justice as bargaining can result from rational postulates.
On the other hand the moral-intuitionist camp, remaining 
faithful to Rawls's ethical assumptions concerning fairness, has 
argued that if the social contract amounts to the original position 
(i.e. rational choice under uncertainty), then we can do without 
the social contract tout-court. Moral-intuitionists claim that 
hypothetical contracts do not supply an independent argument for 
the fairness of certain terms of agreement, instead it is a 
fundamental right to equal concern and respect^ that gives Rawls's
- What Dworkin calls the 'deep' theory.
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theory its justificatory power.
The irreconcilable tension between Rawls's moral intuition and 
his moral decision procedure has resulted in a on-going debate 
concerning the correct interpretation of Rawls's political theory. 
Having analyzed Rawls's contractualism in depth, the time has come 
to draw some conclusions: What is the role of Rawls's
contractualism? Is Rawls's political theory 'rationalist' or 
'moral-intuitionist'?
While I agree with the rationalist camp that Rawls's original 
position does point to a rationalist interpretation, I also think 
that reducing Rawls's theory of justice to an attempt to deduce 
moral claims from rational axioms is to misunderstand Rawls's 
intended project. Indeed if that was the case, then one would need 
to explain Rawls's claim that the original position is rigged to 
give certain predetermined results.
Contrary to the rationalist camp, I believe Rawls's intended 
project was to ground principles of justice on specific egalitarian 
moral-intuitions, namely, the idea of persons as free and equal, 
indeed the principles of justice are the best endorsement of this 
moral assumption. Yet I also believe that Rawls's political theory 
cannot be divorced from the contractarian approach, since it is by 
endorsing contractualism that Rawls is able to challenge 
utilitarianism in the first place. Contractualism made it possible 
for Rawls to justify his principles of justice by retaining an 
element of individual autonomy, although in his attempt to do so 
Rawls unexpectedly and carelessly bridged the gap between his
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political theory and Hobbesian contractualism.
In the following chapter, I will argue not only that it is 
possible to endorse Rawls's egalitarian moral intuitions without 
abandoning contractualism, but that contractualism is the best 
method of explaining and justifying egalitarian principles. It 
follows that the major weakness of Rawls's theory is not his 
contractualism, but the fact that he makes limited use of 
contractualism in his theory, or inother words, the problem is that 
there is not enough contractualism in Rawls's theory.
Rawls appeals to the contract device exclusively to indirectly 
tease out the implications of certain moral premises or 
motivations; what he should have done instead is to appeal to 
contractualism in order to directly justify our moral intuitions.
I am referring here to the well known distinction between 
ethical and meta-ethical theory: briefly, ethical theory is
concerned to determine which actions are right or wrong, while 
meta-ethical theory is an enquiry into the nature of morality 
itself (that is to say, in what sense moral judgements can be held 
to be correct)*. Rawls evokes the social contract at the level of 
the ethical theory, but not at the meta-ethical level. This is 
problematic since unless contractualism works on both levels there 
is a risk of embracing contradictory positions between the ethical 
and meta-ethical levels. Rawls's theory of justice is an example of 
this contradiction. In order to resolve the contradiction within 
Rawls's theory, the contractarian device must be raised from the
44 - For an analysis of these two notions, see Scanlon (1992).
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ethical level to the meta-ethical level^. It follows that the 
problem with Rawls is not the social contract per se, but the use 
Rawls makes of it.
I believe Thomas Scanlon was one of the first to understand 
this. In a famous article from 1982, "Contractualism and 
Utilitarianism", Scanlon attempts to explain egalitarian moral 
intuitions (i.e. our moral motivations) with the help of a 
contractualist framework. I believe that Rawls's intended project 
can be rescued if we replace the idea of the original position with 
Scanlon's idea of a reasonable agreement. The advantage of 
Scanlon's conception of agreement over Rawls's is that in the 
former case our moral intuitions are intrinsically related to the 
contractualist approach. The basic idea of the social contract is 
the basis of our own moral intuitions: the contractarian model, and 
our moral intuitions, cannot be divorced. It follows that the 
social contract device is more than a heuristic apparatus for 
"teasing out" the implications of our moral intuitions. The concept 
of agreement reveals the nature of morality, that is to say the 
social contract is the basis of our sense of justice, and thus 
consequently of a theory of justice.
- As will shall see in the following chapter, this is the 
contribution of Thomas Scanlon to contemporary moral and political 
theory.
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3. CONTRACTUALISM: METAPHYSICAL NOT POLITICAL
In the previous chapter I argued that there are elements of 
two opposing social contract traditions in Rawls's theory: Kant's 
idea of a morally loaded agreement, and Hobbes's idea of social 
cooperation for mutual advantage. I also argued that the 
contradiction stemming from these two traditions is not resolved by 
Rawls but merely reflected in his theory of justice, in fact it is 
possible to detect two opposing theories of justice in Rawls's 
work.
Some commentators have argued that all the complications in 
Rawls's theory of justice originate from his contractualism, in 
fact the original position is at best useless, and at worse 
counter-intuitive. This general feeling of dissatisfaction is 
captured by Kymlicka when he writes that:
So the contract device adds little to Rawls's theory. The 
intuitive argument is the primary argument, whatever Rawls 
says to the contrary, and the contract argument (at best) just 
helps express it. But it is not clear that Rawls needs an 
independent contract argument. (Kymlicka 1990a, p.69)
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In this chapter I will argue not only that it is possible to 
endorse Rawls's egalitarian moral intuitions without abandoning 
contractualism, but that contractualism is the best method of 
explaining and justifying the moral intuition of impartiality. In 
other words, contractualism is particularly important when applied 
to the meta-ethical level. It follows that the major weakness of 
Rawls's theory is not his contractualism, but the fact that Rawls 
does not make use of contractualism in order to explain and justify 
his intuitive argument.
A theory of justice based on the intuition of impartiality, 
such as Rawls's, needs the contractualist device in order to 
explain and justify its meta-ethical root. The meta-ethical level 
deals with questions relating to the nature of morality, for 
example in what sense moral judgements can be held to be correct. 
Contractualism helps us to answer these type of questions, rather 
than with establishing which actions or practices are right or 
wrong.
I believe Thomas Scanlon was one of the first to understand 
that contractualism had a meta-ethical dimension. In a famous 
article from 1982, "Contractualism and Utilitarianism", Scanlon 
attempts to explain egalitarian moral intuitions with the help of 
a contractualist framework, although as we shall see Scanlon's 
contractualism differs from Rawls's in both its scope and aim. This 
chapter will therefore focus on the contribution of Scanlon to the 
recent literature on contractualism.
This chapter is divided in six parts. Parts 3.1 and 3. II
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comprise of a refutation of the argument, championed by Kymlicka, 
that it is a major weakness of some contemporary theories of 
justice to ground the idea of justice as impartiality on the notion 
of agreement. In order to vindicate the role of contractualism in 
contemporary theories of justice, I will argue that the idea of 
agreement is crucial for a meta-ethical discourse. Thus Scanlon's 
contractualism can be distinguished from Rawls's contractualism to 
the extent that the former operates at the meta-ethical level, 
while the latter operates at the ethical level.
Parts 3.Ill and 3.IV analyzes Scanlon's contractualism in 
general, and his theory of reasonable agreement in particular. Here 
I will argue that Scanlon's theory has two major merits, namely 
challenging utilitarianism at its very moral foundations, and 
formulating an original contractualist theory which differs from 
Rawls's on some key issues.
Part 3.V shows that although Scanlon's contractualism 
represents an improvement on Rawls's theory, there are still some 
major unresolved problems with Scanlon's theory, for example 
Scanlon's failure to conceptualise with adequate precision the key 
idea of reasonableness and his over-reliance on the psychological 
faculty of 'desiring'.
In order to strengthen the case for a theory of reasonable 
agreement, I believe these complications must be overcome. Indeed 
we find that failure to deal with these problems is a major 
weakness in the theories of Samuel Freeman and Thomas Nagel, two 
strong sympathizers of Scanlon's theory. The theories of Freeman
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and Nagel will be analyzed in Part 3.VI.
3.1. The Idea of Agreement.
If there is a recurring theme in Kymlicka's writings, it must 
be his severe scepticism of the contractarian device in moral 
theory. In its milder form, such scepticism is portrayed by 
comments referring to the redundant nature of contractualism in a 
Kantian moral theory:
What is not clear is whether the contract device does any work 
defending or developing these ideas [i.e. basic elements of 
our everyday moral understanding V.B.]. (Kymlicka 1991, 
p.193)
In its more austere form, Kymlicka's scepticism is a direct 
attack against those neo-Rawlsians^ whose project is to vindicate 
a theory of justice as impartiality by appealing to the notion of 
agreement. On the receiving end of Kymlicka's attack we find 
Scanlon and Barry.
According to Kymlicka, the notion of agreement is not a valid 
foundation for a moral discourse. The reason for this is that the 
parties who can potentially partake in an agreement reflect a
- By neo-Rawlsians I am referring to those who are 
intuitively sympathetic to Rawls's A Theory of Justice, but who are 
frustrated by his line of work since 1980.
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narrow spectrum of moral beings, namely "competent adults" 
(Kymlicka 1990b, p.110). In other words, the notion of agreement 
unfairly leaves out a range of people who have a right to be 
considered by a moral theory, for example infants, future 
generations and the demented^:
But what does it mean to desire impartial agreement with 
infants, or to desire to be able to justify one's actions to 
people who don't yet exist? If someone is incapable of being 
a party to an agreement with us, does that mean we lack any 
moral motive for attending to their interests? The emphasis on 
agreement within impartiality seems to create some of the same 
problems that the emphasis on bargaining power creates within 
mutual advantage theories: some people will fall beyond the 
pale of morality, including those who are most in need of 
moral protection. (Kymlicka 1990b, p.110)
Thus while the notion of agreement applies for competent adults, it 
does not apply beyond this small circle of beings.
It ought to be pointed out that for all its critical sting, 
Kymlicka's argument is not rejecting the idea of justice as 
impartiality. The controversy between Kymlicka on one side, and
- T have left out one entry from Kymlicka's list: 'animals'. 
It seems to me that the question concerning animals raises special 
problems that are not encountered in the case of babies, the unborn 
and the demented. Since it is an issue of contention whether human 
beings have the same moral duty towards animals as they have 
towards each other, I feel it is best for the moment to neglect the 
question concerning non-human beings.
106
Scanlon and Barry on the other, is not whether it is desirable to 
defend a theory of justice as impartiality, since they all agree on 
the necessity to ground justice on the idea of impartiality. 
Instead the dispute concerns the nature of impartiality: according 
to Kymlicka we should not ground impartiality on some kind of 
agreement, as Scanlon and Barry seem to think, since impartiality 
refers to the belief that the well-being of all moral beings 
matters intrinsically. In other words according to Kymlicka 
impartiality simply means giving all interests equal weight:
Some beings with moral status can be given a justification, 
others can't. What makes them all moral beings is the fact 
that they have a good, and their well-being matters 
intrinsically. (Kymlicka 1990b, p.Ill)
While the above assertion by Kymlicka can be seen as an 
alternative account of impartiality to Scanlon's, it must be said 
that Kymlicka's polemic in relation to Barry's work takes an 
interesting twist, since Barry entertains the idea (so dear to 
Kymlicka) that impartiality is a criterion that gives all interests 
equal weight^. For this reason I feel that Kymlicka's critical 
assessment of Barry's theory deserves closer attention.
Kymlicka is all in favour of Barry's theory when the latter 
claims that the basis of our impartial moral motivation is the 
recognition of others as having legitimate claims to have their
48 - See Barry (1989b), p.269.
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interests taken into account. Yet such harmony is short lived; the 
cleavage between Kymlicka and Barry occurs when Barry tries to 
connect the demand for agreement with the consideration of people's 
interests. In the words of Kymlicka:
Unfortunately, Barry invariably goes on to muddy the waters by 
rephrasing these interest-based statements of impartiality in
terms of agreement....... But if the aim is that people's
legitimate interests be taken into account, then why not just 
say that impartial theorists try to find principles that give 
equal weight to everyone's interests? The further claim that 
everyone has to agree to the principles does nothing except 
put those who are incapable of agreement beyond the pale of 
justice. (Kymlicka 1990b, pp.111-112)
In what follows, I want to refute Kymlicka's claim that the 
notion of agreement 'does nothing' except make things worse. 
Contrary to Kymlicka's claim, I believe that agreement does 
something fundamental for a theory of justice, something that 
Kymlicka totally neglects, namely, it enables us to distinguish 
between people's interests and people's legitimate interests. It is 
curious that Kymlicka should not pick up on this point considering 
that his own criterion of impartiality assumes legitimate 
interests.
It seems to me that there are two problems with Kymlicka's 
account of contractualism. First of all, there is a sense in which
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an agreement can only be between competent adults living at the 
same time. After all, one of the basic functions of contractualism 
is to foster peace and harmony, a view endorsed by Hobbes in the 
Leviathan and by Rawls (1993b) in his International Amnesty 
Lecture. Considering this role played by a social contract theory, 
it is not surprising that the parties taking part in the agreement 
should be competent adults.
In fact as Scanlon (1988b) argues, the very essence of an 
agreement is based on the nonmoral capacity for critically 
reflective, rational self-governance:
Basic to morality as I understand it is an idea of agreement 
between individuals qua critics and regulators of their 
actions and deliberative processes. Critically reflective, 
rational self-governance is a capacity which is required in 
order for that idea not to be an idle one. It follows that 
moral criticism is restricted to individuals who have this 
capacity and to actions which fall within its scope. (Scanlon 
1988b, p.175)
Competent adults are, by definition, imbued with the capacity 
for critically reflective, rational self-governance. Hence 
contractualism cannot be other than between competent adults. It 
follows that while there is no limit to who or what can be a 
recipient of morality, from the environment to foetuses, there is 
in fact only one originator of morality, namely, the competent
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adult human being'^ .^ In other words if a tree or a foetus is 
promoted to the realm of moral beings, thus enjoying all the 
benefits this entails (such as protection), it is only because 
competent adults, being the originators of morality, have agree 
that trees or foetuses should be considered moral beings while the 
flea should not.
Secondly, it seems to me that Kymlicka has a mechanical 
conception of agreement. What Kymlicka fails to appreciate is that 
what is important for a theory of justice is not simply the 
agreement as much as the idea of agreement. The crucial element in 
the notion of agreement for a contractualist approach is the fact 
that the parties seeking an accord are willing to compromise their 
conception of the good in order to make room for others. It is this 
willingness to compromise that is the key to the idea of agreement.
It follows that contrary to Kymlicka's view, the idea that 
everyone has to agree to the principles performs a fundamental role 
in a theory of justice, namely, it enables us to distinguish 
acceptable from unacceptable interests. In other words, what makes 
an interest acceptable or legitimate is the fact that one is 
willing to compromise (or revise) one's interest in order to seek 
agreement. It is interesting to note that all the time Kymlicka is 
assuming that what matters are legitimate interests, not just any 
interests: "At the deepest level, justice is about the equal
4* - I am grateful to Brian Barry for pointing this out to me. 
I have also found Jeremy Waldron's review article of Dworkin's 
Life's Dominion particularly relevant on this point. See Waldron 
(1994) .
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consideration of our legitimate interests ...” (Kymlicka 1990b, 
p.112; emphasis added)^. Yet Kymlicka fails to tells us when an 
interest is legitimate and when it is illegitimate. I believe the 
answer lies in the idea of agreement: it is the process of seeking 
an agreement that legitimizes one's position.
It should also be emphasized that the idea of agreement, and 
the criterion that gives all interests equal weight, are not 
mutually exclusive, which is why Barry appeals to both in his 
account of impartiality. We start from the criterion that gives all 
interests equal weight, but then in order to overcome fundamental 
conflicts it is necessary to distinguish between legitimate and 
illegitimate interests. This is where the idea of agreement 
applies.
My critique of Kymlicka's refutation of agreement is echoed in 
a recent article by Kai Nielsen (1992). Nielsen argues that 
although there is plainly something right about Kymlicka's 
argument, he may have been too quick to dismiss the notion of 
agreement. While Nielsen accepts Kymlicka's line that intuitively 
justice is about the equal consideration of our legitimate 
interests, he goes on to ask how do we know that justice is what we 
think it is. According to Nielsen, the answer to this question lies 
in the notion of agreement:
How do we know that this is what justice is and that this is
- "But if the aim is that people's legitimate interests be 
taken into account ...." (Kymlicka 1990b, p.112; emphasis added).
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what justice requires such that we must act in this way if we 
would be just and that for there to be just social 
institutions our social practices must be so structured? It is 
here that agreement may come in by the back door. (Nielsen 
1992, pp.93-94)
According to Nielsen, the notion of agreement is important in order 
to establish the foundations of our moral claims. The alternative 
to the notion of agreement seems to be the discredited intuitionist 
and natural law traditions.
I believe Nielsen is making a crucial point here, which I will 
investigate further in Part 3. II, namely, that the notion of 
agreement (and contractualism in general) applies to the 
fundamental or justificatory level of meta-ethics. According to 
Nielsen, at a fundamental level the notion of agreement is needed 
to justify a specific wide reflective equilibrium, just as a wide 
reflective equilibrium justifies an account of justice as 
impartiality:
It is not that the substantive principles and claims of social 
justice are not what Kymlicka says they are or that justice is 
what we can agree on in certain idealized situations but that, 
if we are to show that Kymlicka's or anyone else's substantive 
claims of justice are justified, we must show that there is 
such agreement. (Nielsen 1992, p.97)
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In order to sustain the claim that contractualism applies at 
a fundamental level, it is necessary to distinguish between the 
ethical and the meta-ethical level. It is this question that I want 
to address now.
3.II. Contractualism and Moral Theorv.
Arguments in moral philosophy can be distinguished between two 
levels of inquiry: the ethical and meta-ethical level. At the
ethical level we are concerned with judging which actions or 
practices are right or wrong, while at the 'philosophical' or 
'meta-ethical' level we are concerned with the nature of morality, 
or in what sense moral judgements can be held to be correct^. The 
question I want to address now is the role of contractualism in 
moral theory, in other words, at what level of moral enquiry is 
contractualism engaged by Rawls and Scanlon.
Rawls's contractual conception is represented by the original 
position. Yet in the previous chapter I argued that the original 
position is arbitrarily devised in order to give pre-determined 
principles of justice. This is an important point since it 
indicates that the original position does not presuppose some 
particular view of moral motivation, instead Rawls discusses the 
relationship between moral theory (of which justice is a part) and
- Scanlon (1992) refers to the former as Moral Enquiry, and 
the latter as Philosophical Enquiry. In this chapter, I will call 
the former 'ethical level', and the latter 'meta-ethical level'.
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the ordinary moral judgements in his account of reflective 
equilibrium^^.
What does this tell us about the role of contractualism in 
Rawls's moral theory? Basically, that the original position is 
silent about questions of moral motivation or the nature of 
morality (questions dealt with at the meta-ethical level). Instead 
the original position operates exclusively at the ethical level, 
determining the rightness of principles of justice.
Yet as I have argued in the previous chapter, there is an 
unresolved contradiction in Rawls's theory between the motivation 
operating in the original position, and the moral motivation on 
which the two principles of justice as fairness are based. What 
Rawls's theory requires is an investigation of the moral 
motivations assumed by his principles of justice as fairness. Rawls 
fails to see that contractualism can be used at the meta-ethical 
level to explain the nature of our moral intuitions. In other 
words, the foundation of the moral intuition which Rawls is 
appealing to can be traced back to the idea of agreement.
Appreciating the meta-ethical dimension of contractualism is 
arguably Scanlon's greatest contribution to contemporary moral and 
political philosophy. Thus while Rawls's contractualism is present 
only at the ethical level, Scanlon pushes contractualism beyond the 
ethical to the meta-ethical level. Scanlon argues that 
contractualism concerns an agreement between persons moved by a 
desire to justify their actions to others on grounds they could not
- See R. Plant (1991), pp. 101 & 107.
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reasonably reject. As we shall see later, according to Scanlon this 
idea of contractualism is the essence of morality.
The two key concepts in Scanlon's contractualism are 'desire' 
and 'reasonableness'. The desire to find an agreement based on the 
concept of impartiality is the moral motivation in Scanlon's 
contractualism. Equally important to this desire is the notion of 
reasonableness, in fact one does not exaggerate by saying that the 
condition of reasonableness does all the work in Scanlon's 
contractualism.
Scanlon addresses the question of defining the notion of the 
'reasonable' in an important footnote: "Reasonably, that is, given 
the desire to find principles which others similarly motivated 
could not reasonably reject" (Scanlon 1982, p.ll6n). In the attempt 
to define the notion of reasonableness, Scanlon introduces the idea 
of others being "similarly motivated". I believe that the notion of 
all the parties seeking agreement being "similarly motivated" holds 
the key to Scanlon's concept of reasonableness.
In fact this simple idea of others being "similarly motivated" 
hides an important belief, worth exploring in some detail. Why 
would Scanlon, for example, want to justify his actions to others 
who are similarly motivated? That is, to others who also want to 
justify their actions to Scanlon on grounds he could not reject? It 
is important to be clear on what is meant by "similarly motivated".
To be "similarly motivated" does not mean that we have the 
same goals, or conceptions of the good. The 'others' in Scanlon's 
assertion are not people who think like Scanlon, or share his set
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of beliefs. In other words it is not a community made up of many 
Scanlons. Instead in the process of seeking an agreement, the idea 
of being "similarly motivated" refers to the starting point rather 
than finishing point. In other words we share certain assumptions 
concerning, roughly, what conceptions of the good are acceptable 
and what are not acceptable, while we do not all share the same 
conception of the good. To this extent the idea of being "similarly 
motivated" is what makes the agreement unanimous.
It follows that the idea of being "similarly motivated" is 
related to the other key concept in Scanlon's theory of moral 
motivation, namely, the desire to justify one's actions to others, 
or the desire to find principles others could accept. This desire 
can more appropriately be called a desire for reasonable agreement.
The desire for reasonable agreement is the cornerstone of 
Scanlon's contractualist account of moral motivation: Scanlon's
contractarians desire to cooperate, and the terms of cooperation 
arise from the agreement itself^. I will have more to say about 
Scanlon's contractualism shortly, in particular how it differs from 
other forms of contractualism and why it is superior to 
utilitarianism. What is important to emphasize for the moment is 
the fact that Scanlon's contractualism operates at the meta-ethical 
level.
- In the words of John Charvet, Scanlon's agreement is 
grounded "in the will of persons to pursue their good together as 
members of a cooperative association on terms which all can accept 
from an impartial point of view", from John Charvet's 
"Contractarianism in International Political Theory", unpublished 
manuscript.
116
According to Scanlon's idea of contractualism, the parties 
involved must be moved by a desire to seek an agreement that 
everyone would find acceptable. Therefore what is important for 
contractualism is not the agreement itself as much as the 
motivation behind the agreement. The disposition to find an 
agreement that everyone would find acceptable implies being open to 
compromise or revise one's own conception of the good in order to 
make room for others, assuming that others would do the same for 
you or anyone else. It is the motivation behind the idea of 
agreement that explains the nature of morality, or in other words 
which explains in what sense moral judgements can be held to be 
correct. The disposition to seek an acceptable agreement is the 
foundation of liberal and egalitarian meta-ethics, hence 
contractualism is first and foremost a meta-ethical notion.
In order to see how Scanlon's idea of contractualism operates 
at the meta-ethical level, it is necessary to give a detailed 
account of "Contractualism and Utilitarianism", especially as the 
theory of reasonable agreement 1 will be presenting in the next 
chapter uses Scanlon's approach as its foundation.
Scanlon's self-proclaimed goal in this influential essay was 
to adopt the ideas stemming from the social contract tradition in 
order to extract a non-utilitarian account of moral motivation. 
This article has been appreciated mainly for its critique of 
utilitarianism and for advocating the social contract tradition as 
an alternative to utilitarianism. Yet 1 believe there is more to 
Scanlon's contractualism than has so far been recognized.
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In what follows, I will argue that what many have failed to 
notice (partly because of Scanlon's self-proclaimed goal and partly 
because his writing is undeniably dense) is that Scanlon's essay is 
composed of two parts. The first, well documented part is a 
critique of utilitarianism, while the second part, generally 
neglected, is a critique of other neo-contractualist theories, 
notably Rawls's. In other words Scanlon is not simply mounting a 
critique of utilitarianism, rather he is also advancing an original 
interpretation of the social contract, which differs from both its 
classic formulation (Kant and Hobbes), and from contemporary 
versions of neo-contractualism (Rawls and Gauthier).
1 believe that a proper analysis of Scanlon's contractualism 
requires that these two parts are dealt with separately, even 
though analytically they are interrelated. In fact Scanlon adopts 
a contractualist stand as the focus of his critique of 
utilitarianism, while at the same time using his critique of 
utilitarianism to distinguish his theory from that of Rawls.
3.111. Scanlon's Critique of Utilitarianism.
Working on the impetus of Rawls's theory of justice, Scanlon 
succeeded where Rawls had failed*: he developed a plausible
* - A more accurate formulation of this claim would be that 
"Scanlon oartiallv succeeded where Rawls partiallv failed". 
Scanlon's success is only partial since he only provided us with a 
rough outline of a neo-Rawlsian version of contractualism. In the 
concluding paragraph of his article Scanlon writes "1 have
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alternative account to utilitarian moral motivation. According to 
Scanlon, an adequate moral philosophy must make clear to us the 
nature of morality, or in other words provides us with reasons to 
act. Providing us with a seemingly persuasive theory of moral 
motivation is utilitarianism's comparative advantage with respect 
to many other theories. Hence a non-utilitarian moral philosophy 
must first show that utilitarian moral motivations are inadequate, 
and consequently formulate an alternative theory of moral 
motivation to utilitarianism.
According to Scanlon the moral motivation behind 
utilitarianism consists in maximising the sum of individual well- 
being^, or in other words it aims to generate maximum aggregate 
happiness^. Scanlon makes a distinction between two types of 
utilitarianism: philosophical utilitarianism and normative
utilitarianism. Although Scanlon finds philosophical utilitarianism 
attractive (the idea of grounding the nature of morality on 
individual well-being), he rejects normative utilitarianism, in
described this version of contractualism only in outline. Much more 
needs to be said to clarify its central notions and to work out its 
normative implications" (Scanlon 1982, p.128). Although Scanlon's 
1988 Tanner lectures on "The Significance of Choice" are an attempt 
to carry on the work he started in 1982, he has not yet attempted 
the hard work of exploring the implications of his contractarian 
moral motivation on a theory of justice. On the other hand Rawls's 
failure is only partial since justice as impartiality was always 
central to his work; as Barry (1989b) argues, the elements of 
justice as impartiality in Rawls's construction are at least as 
important as the elements pertaining to justice as mutual 
advantage.
- Scanlon (1982) p. 110.
- Scanlon (1988a) p. 137
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particular he rejects the idea that maximising aggregate well-being 
is forced on us;
once philosophical utilitarianism is accepted, some form of 
normative utilitarianism seems to be forced on us as the 
correct first-order moral theory. (Scanlon 1982, p.109)
What Scanlon finds intuitively wrong with utilitarianism is the 
coercive and inegalitarian aspect of this theory. Maximising 
aggregate happiness becomes the independent criterion imposed on 
each one of us as the basis for reaching agreement regardless of 
whether we find the agreement acceptable.
Scanlon rejects the idea of an enforced agreement, arguing 
instead for an alternative account of moral motivation along 
impartial lines. This motivation is triggered by the belief that an 
action is wrong, in Scanlon's own words:
if its performance under the circumstances would be disallowed 
by any system of rules for the general regulation of behaviour 
which no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, 
unforced general agreement. (Scanlon 1982, p.110; emphasis 
added)
Echoing Rawls, Scanlon finds in the social contract tradition 
the antidote against utilitarianism. Yet this rejection of 
utilitarianism is only half of Scanlon's project. As I pointed out
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earlier, Scanlon is fighting simultaneously two battles. On one 
front he is criticising utilitarianism, yet on the other front 
Scanlon is criticising other social contract theories.
Although Scanlon was greatly influenced by Rawls's work, in 
rejecting utilitarianism Scanlon was not simply making a general 
statement in favour of the revival of contractualism along the 
lines suggested by Rawls in 1971. We have seen that Scanlon rejects 
utilitarianism because the concept of maximising aggregate well­
being is given priority over each individual. In other words 
Scanlon cannot accept the fact that society is organized around the 
idea of aggregate well-being instead of individual agreement^. 
What is interesting about Scanlon's critique of utilitarianism, 
something that Scanlon's commentators have failed to see, is that 
it also applies to some aspects to Rawls's theory;
I have been criticising an argument for Average Utilitarianism 
that is generally associated with Harsanyi [...] But the 
objections I have raised apply as well against some features 
of Rawls's own argument. (Scanlon 1982, pp.12 3-4)
Thus we can see that Scanlon is not simply relying on Rawls's 
contractualism as a way of criticising utilitarianism, instead
- To be precise, what Scanlon finds unacceptable in 
aggregate well-being is not so much the idea of individual well­
being but the fact that this should be aggregative "One worthy 
feature of contractualist argument as I have presented it so far is 
that it is non-aggregative: what are compared are individual gains, 
losses and levels of welfare" (Scanlon 1982, p.123).
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Scanlon is using his critique of utilitarianism as a way of 
distinguishing his own version of contractualism from Rawls's.
What Scanlon finds unacceptable in Rawls's contractualism is 
the fact that Rawls's theory runs the risk of subordinating moral 
motivations to an independently chosen social goal, namely, social 
cooperation as mutual advantage. To the extent that some idea of 
social cooperation is given priority over the original agreement, 
Scanlon rejects utilitarianism and Rawls's contractualism on the 
same grounds; in the case of utilitarianism the goal is maximizing 
aggregate well-being, while in the case of Rawls it is social 
benefit for mutual advantage.
After all, the concept of maximising aggregate well-being, 
central to utilitarianism, can be seen as a rationale for social 
cooperation, or in other words as the basic reason which determines 
the original agreement. As we have seen, what Scanlon finds 
unacceptable is not the concept of maximizing aggregate well-being 
per se, but the fact that this concept determines the original 
agreement (rather than being determined by it).
Thus according to Scanlon, both utilitarianism and Rawls's 
contractualism are upside-down: morality is instrumentally
determined by an (independently determined) idea of social 
cooperation rather than allowing for social cooperation to be 
instrumentally determined by morality. It is to Scanlon's critique 
of Rawls's contractualism that I want to turn to next.
122
3.IV. Scanlon's Critique of Rawls.
Before launching on a detailed analysis of Scanlon's critique 
of Rawls, it ought to be emphasized that Scanlon's critiques are 
not meant to be a refutation of Rawls's theory, but an attempt to 
strengthen the latter. Indeed we can say that Rawls and Scanlon are 
engaged in the same project. This explains why there are many 
important similarities between Rawls's and Scanlon's 
contractualism. For example, the most important aspect of Scanlon's 
contractualism is that it rules out bargaining theory. According to 
Scanlon, bargaining is morally unacceptable since it results in:
being forced to accept an agreement by being in a weak 
bargaining position, for example because others are able to 
hold out longer and hence to insist on better terms. (Scanlon 
1982, p.Ill)
Scanlon's rejection of bargaining theory is simply an echo of 
Rawls's views, in fact the function of a veil of ignorance in the 
original position is exactly that of erasing bargaining 
advantages^.
Nevertheless there is also a major divergence between Rawls's 
contractualism and Scanlon's. Consider the following claim by 
Scanlon on the kind of contractualism he is prescribing:
58 - See Rawls (1971), pp.139-140.
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On this view (as contrasted with some others in which the 
notion of a contract is employed) what is fundamental to 
morality is the desire for reasonable agreement, not the 
pursuit of mutual advantage. (Scanlon 1982, p.llSn)
It is not clear who Scanlon has in mind in the comment he makes in 
brackets; certainly it applies to Hobbes's social contract and his 
contemporary advocates, but as I have argued in Chapter 2 it may 
also apply to Rawls's theory. If the latter interpretation is 
correct we have a first indication of were Scanlon's contractualism 
differs from Rawls's - while mutual advantage plays an ambiguous 
role in Rawls's moral theory, it plays no part in Scanlon's moral 
set up.
In what follows, 1 will argue that Scanlon's rejection of 
mutual advantage as a moral concept indicates the gap between his 
view of contractualism and Rawls's in terms of the gap between the 
meta-ethical level and the ethical level. In other words while 
Rawls's contractualism operates at the ethical level, aiming to 
determine what principles are right or wrong, Scanlon's 
contractualism operates at a deeper level, a meta-ethical level, 
which aims to determine the nature of morality itself.
In order to see why Rawls's contractualism operates at the 
ethical level, 1 suggest we recall Rawls's idea of the original 
position. The original position is a decision procedure in ethics, 
that is to say, it is a device used to translate our moral 
intuitions into principles of justice. It follows that Rawls's
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contractualism is silent about moral motivations, instead it is 
happy to assume our moral intuitions as raw data, and its function 
is to refine our intuitions and translate them into principles of 
justice. In doing so the original position upholds a specific view 
of egalitarianism. This can be defined as formal egalitarianism, to 
the extent that the principles chosen in the original position can 
be justified to each of their members.
We have seen that Rawls's contractual ism is not concerned with 
our moral intuitions (i.e. with meta-ethical questions concerning 
the nature of morality) , but with determining principles of justice 
(i.e. the ethical question of establishing what is right and 
wrong). Scanlon's contractualism is fundamentally different from 
Rawls's. In fact Scanlon understands that contractualism has an 
important role to play at the meta-ethical level, that is to say, 
the level of moral intuitions. The advantage of pitching 
contractualism at the meta-ethical level is that it enables Scanlon 
to theorise a concept of equality beyond formal egalitarianism.
In order to see the difference between Scanlon and Rawls, it 
is instructive to recall Scanlon's understanding of contractualism. 
According to Scanlon, hypothetical contracts;
include particular judgments as to what considerations should 
or should not be recognized as legitimate grounds on which 
members may refuse to accept given terms of cooperation. 
(Scanlon 1977, p.51)
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What is interesting to note is that in Scanlon's contractualism 
formal egalitarianism is replaced by a sense of equality based on 
what people could not reject as basis of agreement for terms of 
social cooperation.
It is because Scanlon's hypothetical contract is operating at 
the meta-ethical level rather than the ethical level that Scanlon's 
original agreement is different from what Rawls's envisioned, 
allowing for a different type of social cooperation compared to 
Rawls's.
Scanlon refers to the original agreement in his contractualism 
as 'reasonable agreement'. Here Scanlon finds no place for the veil 
of ignorance or rational choice theory in his model. The reasons 
for these omissions can be explained as follows; first, it permits 
Scanlon to avoid any correlation between his idea of an unanimous 
agreement and bargaining theory. Secondly, Scanlon rejects the 
claim that rational choice under uncertainty can model our moral 
intuitions in order to make these more vivid and precise.
In Scanlon's contractarian model, reasonable agreement is 
based on the moral motivation to act impartially, and impartiality 
is "the desire to be able to justify one's action to others on 
grounds they could not reasonably reject" (Scanlon 1982, p.116; 
emphasis added). It follows that according to Scanlon, the 
agreement is a direct consequence of this desire:
According to contractualism, moral argument concerns the
possibility of agreement among persons who are all moved by
126
this desire, and moved by it to the same degree. (Scanlon
1982, p.Ill; emphasis added)
The difference between Scanlon's contractualism and Rawls's 
can be detected not only on the issue of the original agreement, 
but also on the issue of social cooperation. In fact just as 
Rawls's original position reflects the priority of mutual advantage 
within his conception of social cooperation, Scanlon's reasonable 
agreement upholds a specific idea of social cooperation, where 
mutual advantage is secondary: Scanlon's reasonable agreement
indicates that social cooperation is determined first and foremost 
by the motive for impartial moral concern. According to Scanlon 
what is important to stress is the ethical dimension of social 
cooperation - that social cooperation among equals is to be valued 
for its own sake and not exclusively for its benefits.
The point is that according to Scanlon there is more to social 
cooperation than mutual advantage. As Scanlon points out: 
"membership in a cooperative association of equals .... may itself 
be counted an important and valuable good" (Scanlon 1977, p.58). In 
other words social cooperation among equals has an independent 
moral value separate from the benefits that can result from it.
If I read Scanlon correctly, principles of social justice 
ought to be grounded on the moral motivation to endorse 
impartiality, not on the pursuit of mutual advantage based on 
rational self-interest. This does not mean that social cooperation 
as mutual advantage plays no part in Scanlon's contractualism, but
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simply that he subordinates the criterion of mutual advantage to 
the idea of agreement on a footing of equality.
I started this account of Scanlon's theory by claiming that 
Scanlon's contractualism deserves to be evaluated on its own right, 
and not as a parasitic byproduct of Rawls's contractualism. The 
distinction between Scanlon's contractualism and other theories is 
nowhere more evident than in the last few paragraphs of his article 
"Contractualism and Utilitarianism":
It is sometimes said that morality is a device for our mutual 
protection. According to contractualism, this view is partly 
true but in an important way incomplete ... The contrast may 
be put as follows. On one view, concern with protection is 
fundamental, and general agreement becomes relevant as a means 
or a necessary condition for securing this protection. On the 
other, contractualist view, the desire for protection is an 
important factor determining the content of morality because 
it determines what can reasonably be agreed to. But the idea 
of general agreement does not arise as a means of securing 
protection. It is, in a more fundamental sense, what morality 
is about. (Scanlon 1982, p.128)
I believe the above statement cleverly summarises the debate 
within the social contract tradition between the Hobbesian and 
Kantian camps, and it firmly establishes Scanlon as an 
authoritative advocate of the latter. By 'mutual protection'
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Scanlon probably has in mind Hobbes's contractualist theory, where 
protection is the prime motivation behind the covenant, although 
there is no direct reference to Hobbes in Scanlon's article. If by 
'mutual protection' we understand a specific case of 'mutual 
advantage', we have a first glimpse of where Scanlon's 
contractualism breaks away from other social contract theories. 
Although Scanlon doesn't reject the idea of social cooperation for 
mutual advantage tout court, he rejects the claim that mutual 
advantage is a determining factor in establishing the parameters of 
morality^.
What makes Scanlon's contractualism different from Rawls, and 
in many ways better, is that Scanlon reassesses the balance between 
the two conceptions of social cooperation. That is to say, Scanlon 
subordinates social cooperation as mutual advantage to the idea of 
social cooperation on a footing of equality. Although both Rawls 
and Scanlon endorse a dual conception of social cooperation (as 
mutual advantage and as a morally desirable goal), Scanlon gives 
priority to the latter concept, while in Rawls's model the idea of 
mutual advantage plays an ambiguous moral role.
In conclusion, by pitching contractualism at the meta-ethical 
level, Scanlon is in a position to grasp a conception of equality 
that unquestionably rejects bargaining as a moral tool. 
Unfortunately the same cannot be said of Rawls's contractualism.
- According to Scanlon the idea of social cooperation as 
mutual advantage has no moral force, instead social cooperation 
acquires a moral content only because it is subordinate to an 
agreement. In other words according to Scanlon what is moral in 
social cooperation is derived from the agreement, not vice versa.
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Rawls's contractualism in general, and the original position in 
particular, re-introduces the logic of bargaining from the back 
door. This is why Scanlon claims that morality is not about mutual 
advantage, instead morality is about reasonable agreement.
By combining contractarian forms of argument with meta-ethical 
issues of moral motivation, Scanlon's theory is a valid and 
important contribution to the contemporary debate on social justice 
and liberal morality. The theory of reasonable agreement that I 
will offer in Chapter 4 is directly inspired by Scanlon's project. 
Nevertheless, it seems to me that there are some problems with 
Scanlon's theory that need to be resolved. It is to the limits of 
Scanlon's contractualism that I want to focus on next.
3.V. The Limits of Scanlon's Contractualism.
We saw earlier that the concepts of 'desire' and 
'reasonableness' are of cardinal importance for Scanlon's 
contractualism, indeed they combine in the notion of contractualism 
as reasonable agreement. Unfortunately, these two concepts are also 
the weakest part in Scanlon's theory. There are two major problems 
with Scanlon's attempt to ground his moral theory on these two 
concepts: first, Scanlon is begging the question by defining the 
'reasonable' in moral terms. Secondly, the psychological faculty of 
'desire', central to Scanlon's argument, is insufficient (although 
necessary) to carry on its shoulders the weight of a moral theory.
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In what follows I will consider these two fallacies.
A) The Fallacy of Petitio Principii.
l.M. Copi (1986, p.101) explains that the fallacy of Petitio 
Principii, or 'begging the question', is committed when one assumes 
as a premise for an argument the very conclusion it is intended to 
establish. 1 believe elements of this fallacy can be traced in 
Scanlon's argument. If we analyze Scanlon's idea of a non­
utilitarian moral motivation, and his definition of reasonableness, 
we see that moral motivation centres on the notion of
reasonableness, although reasonableness is in turn defined in terms 
of moral motivation.
The problem of circularity in Scanlon's argument has been 
stressed by Brian Barry:
According to [Scanlon's] alternative conception of morality, 
the primary motive for behaving morally for its own sake is 
simply "the desire to be able to justify one's actions to 
others on grounds they could not reasonably reject", where the 
basis for others' reasonable rejection of one's actions is 
given by their "desire to find principles which others 
similarly motivated could not reasonably reject". This may 
appear to be a circular definition of morality and the moral 
motive because the notion of 'reasonableness' already 
presupposes that people have some moral ideas. (Barry 1989a,
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pp.423-4; emphasis in original)
I think Barry has pointed to a serious problem intrinsic to 
Scanlon's contractualism, although this does not invalidate 
Scanlon's theory tout court. In order to avoid this fallacy all 
that needs to be done is to define reasonableness in such a way 
that it does not encompass everything that is moral. There is no 
problem with acknowledging that the concept of reasonableness has 
a moral core, as long as this concept is not an identical 
reflection of morality. In other words we must avoid saying that to 
be reasonable is to act morally, where moral behaviour is 
reasonable behaviour.
I think it is possible to distinguish between a thick theory 
of moral motivation and a thin theory of moral motivation. The 
former is what Barry is objecting to, that is to say, an theory of 
moral motivation that entails the same meaning of morality that was 
supposed to be deduced from the account of moral motivation. On the 
other hand, a thin theory of moral motivation means that our 
motivations have a moral core, although this core per se is 
insufficient to explain the nature of morality unless it is 
combined with a moral and political context.
To return to Scanlon, what his theory of reasonable agreement 
requires in order to avoid this fallacy is a comprehensive 
definition of the notion of reasonableness. This definition must be 
morally thin, that is to say, it must reflect the moral aspect of 
an impartial agreement, while avoiding the risk of simply begging
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the question. In other words, we must avoid saying that to be 
reasonable is to act morally, where moral behaviour is reasonable 
behaviour.
B) The Limits of 'Desire'.
The other weakness of Scanlon's model is its reliance on the 
idea of 'desire'. It seems to me that although 'desires' are a 
necessary ingredient in any contractualist model, they are not 
sufficient to carry the weight of a moral theory. I will illustrate 
this critique with the help of an analogy drawn from the literature 
on philosophy of action. In a famous article Donald Davidson (1963) 
explained rational behaviour in terms of two factors: belief and 
desires. He later modified his theory by adding a third factor, 
intentions, which stands between the belief-and-desire and the 
action^.
Desires are a type of pro-attitude, that is to say attitudes 
directed toward action of a certain kind. Under pro-attitudes we 
find "desires, wantings, urges, promptings, and a variety of moral 
views, aesthetic principles, economic prejudices, social 
conventions, and public and private goals and values" (Davidson 
1963, p.686). Obviously a desire or any pro-attitude per se cannot 
explain action; to will something is not the same as doing it,
60 - D.Davidson (1985). See also C.J. Moya (1990).
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although any rational action springs from a desire^. It follows 
that a desire must be followed by (a) a belief that some action 
will satisfy our desire, and (b) an intention, i.e. an all-out 
judgment, or positive evaluation of a way of acting. Thus Davidson 
concludes that we cannot ground our explanation of rational action 
exclusively on a desire or pro-attitude, instead 'desires' must be 
supported by 'beliefs' and 'intentions'.
I believe that the same medicine can be prescribed for 
Scanlon's reasonableness. Scanlon delineates reasonableness in 
terms of the "desire to find principles which others similarly 
motivated could not reasonably reject". While 1 agree with Scanlon 
that this 'desire' is necessary, it is not sufficient. The desire 
for reasonable agreement (i.e. Scanlon's moral motivation), or the 
desire to find adequately impartial principles, is unquestionably 
important, but it needs to be supported by beliefs and intentions: 
beliefs concerning the integrity of the desired end, for example 
the belief that reaching reasonable agreement is better than 
reaching other types of agreement or even no agreement at all, and 
future intentions concerning one's behaviour after the agreement 
has been reached, for example intentions to cooperate in the future 
even if one could be better off under a different set-up (i.e. the 
idea of fair-play)^.
- J. Elster even suggests that behaviour, to be rational 
"must stem from desires and beliefs that are themselves in some 
sense rational" (Elster 1985, p.62).
- It may be argued that when Scanlon defines reasonableness 
in terms of a 'desire', he is not referring to first-order desires 
(i.e. the desires or wants which shape a person's everyday actions
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By comparing Scanlon's account of reasonableness with theories 
from philosophy of action my intention was only to reveal a 
weakness in Scanlon's theory, and point to possible ways of 
strengthening the latter. Unfortunately I have neither the space 
nor competence to take up this challenge in the present work. The 
point I am trying to make is that the two fallacies in Scanlon's 
account of reasonable agreement are testimony that this concept is 
still at its embryonic stage, and it will require much refinement 
before it can challenge utilitarianism as an alternative moral and 
political theory. Nevertheless I believe that Scanlon argument, 
even if not conclusive, is an invaluable contribution to the recent 
debate on contractualism and political theory.
So far I have argued that Scanlon's contractualism, grounded 
on the idea of reasonable agreement, is in many ways an improvement 
on Rawls's theory. Yet I have also shown that there are still some 
problems with Scanlon's theory, in particular the key concepts of 
the 'reasonable' and 'desire' are still problematic. In Part 3.VI 
I will consider two recent attempts to uncritically follow on 
Scanlon's footsteps. 1 will argue that both attempts are
and choices) but instead to second-order desires, where second- 
order desires incorporate beliefs and intentions. This distinction 
was first made by H.G. Frankfurt (1971), who argued that second- 
order desires, or desires about desires, will not necessarily 
coincide with first-order desires. 1 find Frankfurt's distinction 
to be more confusing than enlightening. If second-order desires are 
still desires, then my criticism of Scanlon's definition of 
reasonableness still stands. And if second-order desires are not 
desires, but only a catch-phrase for all sorts of motivations, then 
this category becomes too vague to be of any use while the 
analytical advantage of distinguishing between desires, beliefs and 
intentions is lost.
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unsatisfactory, since the two respective theorists were not able to 
resolve the problems diagnosed in Scanlon's contractualism.
3.VI. Following in Scanlon's Footsteps.
The aim of this chapter was to vindicate the claim that 
contractualism is a necessary instrument for a moral theory 
grounded on impartiality. I argued that the idea of agreement (the 
willingness to compromise one's own conception of the good in order 
to allow room for others) is the key to the contractarian moment, 
indeed I argued that Scanlon's notion of a reasonable agreement is 
the first conscious attempt to build a contractualist theory around 
the idea of agreement, therefore raising contractualism to the 
meta-ethical level.
The theory of reasonable agreement is comprised of the 
consolidation of two separate concepts: agreement and
reasonableness. So far the concept of agreement was given 
predominance, thus in the remaining pages of this chapter I want to 
briefly address the question of reasonableness^.
Recently a number of political theorists have attempted to 
pursue Scanlon's project by developing the account of 
contractualism grounded on reasonable agreement. This is the case 
of Samuel Freeman and Thomas Nagel, who have explored the concept
- The concept of reasonableness will be discussed in much 
greater detail in the following chapter: 'A Theory of Reasonable 
Agreement'.
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of reasonableness in some detail. The reason why I feel it is 
important to look at the works of Freeman and Nagel is because 
their attempts to further Scanlon's project only highlights the two 
fallacies afflicting Scanlon's contractualism.
Since the publication of Scanlon's influential article on 
"Contractualism and Utilitarianism" in 1982, there has been a 
tendency to think that because contractualism applies to the meta- 
ethical level, indeed the agreement is based on the moral 
motivation to act impartially, then the concept of reasonableness 
must also be approached from a meta-ethical angle, or in other 
words the concept of reasonableness must also be explained in terms 
of such motivation.
Basically, this is how Freeman and Nagel have approached the 
concept of reasonableness. The problem with this approach is that 
it starts from the assumption that reasonableness is an agent- 
relative motivation, furthermore it assumes that reasonableness is 
a psychological rather than political concept. Because of these 
erroneous assumptions, the theories of Freeman and Nagel suffer 
from the same two fallacies as Scanlon's contractualism.
In what follows, I will argue that this approach is either 
futile (Freeman) or problematic (Nagel). It is futile because it 
only reiterates the problems inherent in Scanlon's contractualism; 
it doesn't help us to overcome them. On the other hand it is 
problematic because it steers us towards problematic questions that 
seem to be unanswerable.
Freeman (1991) claims that the primary significance of the
137
contractualism advocated by Scanlon lies in the way it relates 
motivation to practical reason (Freeman 1991, p.281). Indeed it is 
the specific account of moral motivation and its relation to 
practical reason that enables Scanlon to offer a philosophical 
account of morality*.
In his detailed account of Scanlon's moral theory. Freeman 
makes two important points. First, that according to Scanlon's 
contractualism, there are no moral facts or properties prior to 
reasonable agreement. In other words, moral truth is defined by 
reference to the hypothetical agreement where free and informed 
persons could agree under ideal conditions. Secondly, that we have 
reasons to act in non-instrumental ways. Freeman tells us that 
contrary to the view of a growing number of moral philosophers 
(Foot, Williams, Harman, Gauthier), who argue that one can have 
reason to act morally only if it satisfies a moral desire or at 
least advances some other desire or non-moral interest (Freeman 
1991, p.290), the moral motivations at the basis of contractualism 
are not for the sake of maximizing anything or effectively 
promoting a particular end, but for the sake of regulative, moral 
principles:
According to contractualism, moral motivation is ultimately 
principle-dependent; it rests on a desire to act on principles 
that could be justified to reasonable individuals. (Freeman
* - A philosophical account of morality entails (1) a
foundational account of the subject matter of morality, and (2) a 
general moral view; see Freeman (1991), p.281.
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1991, p.299)
In what follows I will attempt to show that Freeman's 
rejection of instrumental moral motivations, far from strengthening 
Scanlon's project, highlights the two fallacies I pointed out 
earlier.
The major problem with Freeman's account of contractualist 
morality is that he relies too heavily on psychological attributes, 
in particular the concept of reasonableness becomes a psychological 
characteristic. Freeman's rejection of instrumental moral 
motivations points to a moral view which risks being stripped of 
political reasons. Indeed it is not clear from his account of 
reasonable agreement why acting "for the sake of regulative (moral) 
principles" (Freeman 1991, p.293) should be preferred to 
instrumental reasons. It seems to me that Freeman's argument could 
stand on its feet only if certain principles are considered to be 
moral truths prior to reasonable agreement, although as we have 
seen this option is not open to Freeman.
The psychological attributes of Freeman's contractualism are 
no-where more evident than in his attempt to investigate the 
concept of reasonableness. According to Freeman, the concept of 
reasonableness is made up of two aspects: answerability and ideal 
codeliberation. Freeman tells us that:
individuals are answerable to one another for their conduct,
the claims they make, and the expectations they have regarding
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others' conduct and claims. (Freeman 1991, p.285)
Yet Freeman is keen to point out that answerability does not simply 
imply being held accountable, or responsible, for one's actions. 
Answerability "means that we ... be able publicly to justify our 
conduct, aims, and expectations on terms others could freely 
accept" (Freeman 1991, p.285).
Unfortunately Freeman does not tell us what these terms that 
others could freely accept are, hence his attempt at an explanation 
is as blurry as the concept he is trying to explain. Furthermore it 
appears that Freeman is as guilty as Scanlon of the petitio 
principii fallacy. Answerability is part of what it means to be 
reasonable, yet answerability is defined in almost identical terms 
to Scanlon's own definition of reasonableness: while Scanlon refers 
to reasonableness as the desire to find principles which others 
similarly motivated could not reasonably reject. Freeman talks of 
answerability as justifying one's conduct on terms others could 
freely accept.
Although answerability fails to elucidate the idea of the 
reasonableness, it would be unfair to dismiss Freeman's theory at 
this early stage. In fact answerability is only one part of what it 
means to be reasonable. The other part is a process of 
codeliberation. This process (which echoes Nagel's own solution) 
involves asking if my agent-centred deliberations satisfy moral 
requirements. What do these moral requirements amount to? 
Unfortunately Freeman's answer is always the same: "asking whether
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my proposed actions, ends, and agent-centred reasons could be 
justified on grounds others could reasonably accept" (Freeman 1991, 
p.296).
Judging from Freeman's account of answerability and 
codeliberation, it is safe to conclude that he has been swimming in 
a circle, ending up where he had started out from. The idea of 
answerability and ideal codeliberation, central to Freeman's 
argument, cannot be considered a progress towards finding a valid 
conceptualization of reasonableness. It seems to me that if we want 
to make sense of the notion of reasonableness, we need to look 
beyond Scanlon's terminology, and look elsewhere for an explication 
of this key concept.
A similar critique to Freeman's account of reasonableness 
applies to Thomas Nagel. In 1987, Nagel made a first attempt to 
understand the idea of reasonableness by claiming that:
the standard of individual reasonableness is not merely a
premoral rationality, but rather a form of reasoning that
includes moral motives. (Nagel 1987, p.220)
I believe this is an important claim. Nagel understood that 
the notion of reasonableness must not be seen as antithetical to 
rationality, instead it is a form of rationality that entails moral 
motivation.
Four years later Nagel (1991) set out to investigate the 
concept of reasonableness in more detail, in the belief that this
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concept may be instrumental in reconciling rationality with 
morality. Starting from the assumption that there is a conflict 
within each individual between the partiality of rational self- 
interest and the impartiality of moral motivations^, Nagel 
envisioned the central problem facing moral and political 
philosophy in terms of discovering principles of conduct which 
accommodate both agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons for 
action. In other words Nagel wants to reconcile reasons specified 
by universal principles which nevertheless refer to features or 
circumstances of the agent for whom they are reasons, and reasons 
which depend on what everyone ought to value, independently of its 
relation to himself.
As I mentioned earlier, the concept of reasonableness is 
crucial for Nagel's enterprise, in fact Nagel's aim is to show how 
the concept of reasonableness can bridge the gap between the 
private sphere of rationality, and the public sphere of morality. 
Unfortunately Nagel is unable to solve the riddle he poses, instead 
he is forced to conclude that personal and impartial reasons cannot 
be reconciled in principles that are seen as acceptable from all 
points of view.
The inability to reconcile rational motivations with moral 
motivations leads Nagel to cast a pessimistic shadow on our future 
as well as on the likeliness of reasonableness to illuminate a way 
out of our misery. His conclusions are far from optimistic:
- In the words of Nagel: "we are simultaneously partial to 
ourselves, impartial among everyone, and respectful of everyone 
else's partiality" (Nagel 1991, p.38).
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At the moment I see no general solution to this problem. That 
is, there are, I suspect, no general principles governing both 
agent-relative, personal reasons and agent-neutral, impartial 
reasons, and their combination, which are acceptable from all 
points of view in light of their consequences under all 
realistically possible conditions. (Nagel 1991, pp.48-9)
While I agree with Nagel that the conflict within each one of 
us between the partiality of rational self-interest and the 
impartiality of moral motivations does exist, I am sceptical that 
this struggle can ever be resolved by appealing to the concept of 
reasonableness.
According to Nagel, reasonableness implies nothing more than 
standards of individual reasonableness, or in other words some kind 
of individual motivation to act morally. I believe this way of 
understanding reasonableness is the seed of Nagel's problems^. 
Nagel's account of reasonableness is morally overloaded, with the 
result that the fallacy of petitio principii is once again present. 
As I pointed out earlier, while there is no problem with 
acknowledging that the concept of reasonableness has a moral core, 
the concept of reasonableness cannot be an identical reflection of 
morality.
^ - Nagel may reply that his analysis is based on a valid 
deduction from Scanlon's own claims on impartiality. While not 
denying this, the fact remains that the limits of Scanlon's theory 
apply to Nagel's argument. It is also interesting to note the 
continuity in Nagel's thought from 1987 to 1991, in fact in the 
earlier article he writes that he is concerned with "the standard 
of individual reasonableness" (Nagel 1987, p.220; emphasis added).
143
It seems to me that by pitching reasonableness at the meta- 
ethical level, Nagel's approach is begging the question, in fact it 
is no great achievement to advocate reasonable agreement on the 
basis that agreement comes naturally once we all share the same 
commitment to act reasonably. Furthermore it makes reasonable 
agreement look trivial, since the problem which liberalism, and 
social justice in particular, is supposed to overcome is exactly 
that of a non-homogeneous social demands.
To recapitulate the argument, I have argued that contrary to 
the views of Freeman and Nagel, endorsing the view that 
contractualism applies to the meta-ethical level does not compel us 
to maintain that reasonableness is also a meta-ethical concept. It 
is a mistake to assume that reasonableness has to do with agent- 
relative motivations. If follows that the weakest part of Freeman's 
and Nagel's theories is their account of the concept of 
reasonableness, in fact their understanding of reasonableness 
focuses exclusively on agent-relative motivations.
In the following chapter, I will argue that if the concept of 
reasonableness is to be the grounding of reasonable agreement, and 
if reasonable agreement is going to overcome both (a) the petitio 
principii fallacy and (b) the over-reliance on the psychological 
faculty of desiring, then it is imperative to untie the knot that 
links the concept of reasonableness with agent-relative 
motivations. In order to make sense of the concept of 
reasonableness we must transcend the level of individual 
motivation, and look for a criterion of reasonableness which is
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agent-neutral. Reasonableness must be considered a social and 
political concept, not a psychological motivation.
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4. A THEORY OF REASONABLE AGREEMENT
In the previous two chapters, I critically evaluated the neo- 
contractualist theories of John Rawls and Thomas Scanlon. It should 
be clear by now that my intention was not to undermine their 
undertaking, but to point out weaknesses in their theories with the 
prospect of strengthening and thus pursuing the project they 
started. Following Rawls and Scanlon, my intention is to ground 
liberalism on a more adequate interpretation of egalitarianism 
compared to utilitarianism.
The character of the next two chapters will be more positive 
compared to the previous chapters. What 1 mean by this is that the 
point now is not of criticising, but of constructing, or in other 
words building upon the theories of Rawls and Scanlon in order to 
take neo-contractualism a step further.
The focus of this chapter will be on the concept of 
reasonableness, and how it relates to reasonable agreement. The 
reasonable agreement school of thought gets its name by advocating 
the consolidation of two separate concepts: 'Reasonable' and
'Agreement'. Yet while the latter term is relatively unproblematic, 
the idea of 'reasonableness' is still vague and unspecified, and 
although a growing number of scholars have backed reasonable
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agreement as the central cog in the liberal engine, there is still 
very little agreement on what is considered reasonable or the 
meaning of reasonableness. This chapter will address this paradox 
inflicting reasonable agreement. Starting from the assumption that 
a clear and unambiguous understanding of the concept of 
reasonableness is a prerequisite if reasonable agreement is to be 
taken seriously (when is an agreement reasonable?), I will argue 
that the only sensible starting point must be an explication of the 
core term reasonableness.
This chapter is divided in six parts. Part 4.1 takes issue 
against Scanlon's claim that the concept of reasonableness need not 
be substantively defined. Contrary to Scanlon, my impression is 
that a contractualist theory of reasonable agreement necessarily 
requires that the concept of reasonableness be specified. Indeed in 
Part 4.II, I will highlight the problems that derive from the 
failure to provide a precise definition of this concept.
In Part 4. Ill, I will argue that a prerequisite before 
attempting to define the concept of reasonableness is to 
disassociate this concept from the sphere of our moral intuition. 
Indeed reasonableness must not be synonymous with morality, 
furthermore it ought to be considered an agent-neutral concept.
Part 4.IV sets out the methodology for analysing and defining 
the concept of reasonableness. The way I intend to approach the 
elusive concept of reasonableness is by comparing it with the more 
common notion of rationality; this comparison will show that the 
reasonable and the rational are two separate concepts.
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In Part 4.V, I will advance the proposition that the concept 
of reasonableness ought to be defined in terms of the maxim 'not 
asking for too much'. The advantage of this definition is that it 
turns reasonableness into an agent-neutral concept; reasonableness 
does not define our moral psychology, instead in the theory of 
reasonable agreement, the concept of reasonableness acts as a 
rationale which illuminates our moral intuitions. Part 4.VI will 
provide a short summary of the chapter.
4.1. Some Preliminarv Remarks.
In the last five years, the idea that the concept of 
reasonableness ought to be defined has come under close scrutiny. 
For example, Thomas Scanlon (1992) and Peter de Marneffe (1990) 
have put forward arguments denouncing such undertaking. The 
starting point to our enquiry will be the sceptical views of 
Scanlon and de Marneffe concerning the project of defining the 
concept of reasonableness.
In recent years, moral theory has come under attack by two 
prominent philosophers, Bernard Williams (1985) and Michael Walzer 
(1983). Williams and Walzer see the aim of moral theory in terms of 
the discovery of objective truths about morality, for example, the 
view that there is a single correct theory of justice. To the 
extent that they consider this aim undesirable, Williams and Walzer 
are prepared to reject recent attempts to endorse and defend a 
liberal moral theory.
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In a recent article, Scanlon (1992) rejects the idea that 
moral theory is about the search for clear and general principles 
which we can appeal to in order to decide which things are right or 
wrong. In order to defend moral theory from the charges of Williams 
and Walzer, Scanlon distinguishes between two aims of moral theory: 
Philosophical Enquiry, concerned with the nature of morality, and 
Moral Enquiry, concerned with establishing which actions or 
practices are right or wrong^.
Scanlon is making an important point here. He wants to argue 
that a moral theory can still make valid statements about rightness 
and wrongness at the meta-ethical level, without necessarily having 
to endorse statable rules (or substantive moral principles) from 
which conclusions in particular cases can be derived. For example 
Scanlon views his own theory of contractualism as engaged in 
Philosophical Enquiry®*, whereas Harsanyi's utilitarianism is an 
example of a Moral Enquiry. Failure to distinguish between these 
two aims of moral theory leads to a narrow and incorrect view of 
moral theory, as the critiques by Williams and Walzer illustrate.
It is in order to subtract his contractualist theory from the 
critiques levelled at liberal moral theory by Williams and Walzer 
that Scanlon repudiates all attempts to scrutinize the concept of
- In Chapter 3, I referred to Philosophical Enquiry as a 
meta-ethical theory, and Moral Enquiry as ethical theory.
®* - See Scanlon (1992) p.5; Scanlon's formula that an act is 
wrong when it would be disallowed by any principles that no one 
could reasonably reject if they were seeking principles which could 
be the basis of informed, unforced general agreement, is not a 
substantive moral principle.
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the reasonable. In other words, it is exactly because "a single 
unified set of substantive principles" is not waiting to be
discovered that Scanlon undermines all attempts to explore the 
concept of reasonableness:
According to my version of contractualism, for example, we 
have reason not to be cruel to people or to break our promises 
to them because such actions would not be allowed by
principles that they could not reasonably reject Even if
this account is accepted, however, it does not follow that 
there need be a single unified set of substantive principles 
to which we can appeal to decide which things are wrong. I
myself doubt that there are statable rules of this kind, from
which conclusions in particular cases can de 'derived'. The 
grounds on which it is reasonable to object to cruelty, and 
unreasonable to reject a principle barring it, are different 
from the reasons why it would be unreasonable to reject a 
principle requiring the fulfilment of promises. (Scanlon 1992,
pp.11-12)
What Scanlon is saying here is that we are deluding ourselves 
if we think that reasonableness can act as a common principle from 
which more specialized rules can be derived. In other words Scanlon 
is afraid that scrutinizing the concept of reasonableness in search 
for a substantive moral principle undermines the distinction 
between Philosophical Enquiry and Moral Enquiry, thus justifying
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the views of Williams and Walzer. A similar argument to Scanlon's 
is put forward by Peter de Marneffe.
The starting point of de Marneffe's argument is given by the 
following question: can there be any values that are neutral
between conceptions of the good? He argues that there is only one 
sense in which values can be neutral, namely, if "there are values 
that any reasonable person would accept as the basis of moral 
claims regardless of his or her particular conception of the good" 
(de Marneffe 1990, p.256).
What is of interest to us here is de Marneffe's treatment of 
the idea of a 'reasonable person'. Although he does not specify in 
any detail what reasonableness means, he is very explicit in 
specifying what reasonableness does not mean. In fact de Marneffe 
warns us against 'trivially' building into our concept of 
reasonableness the assumption that reasonable people will accept 
certain moral claims. He then adds:
What we can do, however, is point to certain values which are 
good candidates. If it is plausible to claim that any 
reasonable persons would accept a value as the basis of moral 
claims, then it is plausible to claim that this value is 
neutral in the relevant sense .... This is the project I take 
Rawls to be pursuing in presenting justice as fairness as a 
political conception of justice' (de Marneffe 1990, p.256).
de Marneffe is making a valid distinction between moral claims
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and moral values. He correctly points out that while it is trivial 
to associate reasonableness with specific moral claims, what can be 
done is to formulate moral values that reasonable people would 
accept. Reasonableness entails the acceptance of certain values as 
the basis of moral claims, values that everyone ought to find 
acceptable; it does not entail the acceptance of specific claims.
I agree with Scanlon and Peter de Marneffe that the concept of 
reasonableness does not hide objective moral truths waiting to be 
discovered. The concept of reasonableness is not a modern day 
Platonic Form, nor is it the answer to all our moral dilemmas. 
Furthermore I agree with de Marneffe that if reasonableness is to 
gain substance and strength it is necessary to detach it from moral 
claims. Yet I also believe that if we are going to justify the 
contractualist idea of reasonable agreement, it is imperative to 
provide a tighter definition of reasonableness. In what follows I 
want to consider the risks the theory of reasonable agreement runs 
unless the concept of reasonableness is defined with precision.
4.II. Leaving Reasonableness Undetermined: Two Risks.
Not being able to provide a precise definition of the concept 
of reasonableness means that the idea of reasonable agreement is 
susceptible to the following two risks.
First, since at the moment the concept of reasonableness is, 
so to speak, up-for-grabs, we find that it is being adopted (and
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abused) by a number of philosophers in order to add strength to 
their theories. This is the case with Thomas D. Perry (1976) and 
John Finnis (1980).
In Moral Reasoning and Truth Perry argues that it is possible 
to defend a theory of objective standards and evaluative truth, 
"based on the commonly accepted idea of reasonableness in moral 
reflection and argument." (Perry 1976, p.12). The core of Perry's 
argument is that reasonableness is a privileged value in ordinary 
moral discourse, whereby a reasonable judgment is both impartial 
and universal.
Perry seems to equate reasonableness with everything that is 
moral, indeed he claims that moral reasonableness cannot be 
coherently challenged or rejected by anyone if he or she is to 
engage in moral reasoning at all (Perry 1976, p.219). Yet Perry 
never attempts to define the concept of reasonableness, or tells us 
why we should accept his interpretation of reasonableness. It would 
appear as if under the guide of Perry the concept of reasonableness 
acquires a magical quality, since it can mean anything Perry wants 
it to while at the same time being unrefutable.
The problem with Perry's theory is that by appealing to the 
"commonly accepted criteria of reasonableness" Perry is begging the 
question. Contrary to Perry's optimistic views, it is not always 
obvious what is commonly accepted. Thus for example many liberals 
in the United States would argue that it is reasonable to be 
'politically correct', while for many Germans in the 1920's it was 
reasonable to be anti-semitic. Perry tells us that reasonableness
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is a moral concept, without telling us what it means.
A similar critique can be made to Finnis. Natural Law and 
Natural Rights is a long and complex book, where Finnis puts 
forward his theory of ethics as 'practical reasonableness'. By 
'practical' Finnis means "with a view to decision and action" 
(Finnis 1980, p.12) and practical reasonableness is "reasonableness 
in deciding, in adopting commitments, in choosing and executing 
projects, and in general in acting" (Finnis 1980, p.12). The major 
problem with Finnis's argument is its circularity.
The circularity of Finnis argument becomes evident if we try 
to extrapolate a more precise definition of practical 
reasonableness from his work. I believe this definition lies in 
what Finnis calls the eighth requirement of practical 
reasonableness, namely, favouring and fostering the common good of 
one's community. This requirement is so important that it forms the 
basis of Finnis's definition of (general) justice:
Justice ... is in its general sense always a practical 
willingness to favour and foster the common good of one's 
communities, and the theory of justice is, in all its parts, 
the theory of what in outline is required for that common 
good. (Finnis 1980, p.165).
Once again we find that the concept of reasonableness is 
invoked to justify whatever the author thinks is right (in Finnis's 
case the common good of one's community) without any attempt to
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explain why we should accept this particular interpretation of 
reasonableness.
The problem with Perry and Finnis is that they seem to embrace 
some idea of crude intuitionism, in fact their theories come across 
as nostalgic reiterations of the defunct natural law tradition. It 
is not surprising therefore that Perry and Finnis fail to justify 
their definitions of reasonableness, in fact in their moral 
theories the concept of reasonableness acts like a trump card: it 
wins the argument a priori.
The way in which the concept of reasonableness has been abused 
by Perry and Finnis justifies all the fears of Scanlon, which 
induced him to reject the view that the concept of reasonableness 
holds a substantive moral core. While I share Scanlon's 
preoccupations, my own response to this problem takes a different 
line from his: it is exactly in order to avoid more arbitrary
abuses of the concept of reasonableness that it is necessary to 
give a tighter definition of reasonableness.
The second risk associated with the inability to provide a 
precise definition of reasonableness follows from the first risk, 
namely, it makes the contractualist idea of reasonable agreement 
vulnerable to charges of crude intuitionism.
The concept of reasonableness is at the heart of contractarian 
moral theory, hence understanding the former is a way to understand 
the latter. By the same token any problems associated with 
reasonableness are replicated on the contractualist theory of 
reasonable agreement; if the concept of reasonableness is treated
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as a crude intuition, it follows that reasonable agreement too 
becomes engulfed in intuitionism.
Alan Hamlin (1989) argues that reasonableness and 
contractual ism are intrinsically related. Echoing Scanlon's theory, 
Hamlin points out that any social arrangement or institution passes 
the contractarian test if no one can reasonably reject it. He then 
continues: "Of course, all the work here is being done by the
requirement of 'reasonableness'". (Hamlin 1989, p.98). According to 
Hamlin, the requirement of reasonableness is what contractualism is 
all about. Indeed discussing the theme of contractarian rights, 
Hamlin points out that reasonableness is the core of 
contractualism:
Again, this formulation loads all of the work onto the 
requirement of 'reasonableness', but this is precisely the 
intent of any contractarian. Given a particular notion of what 
is individually reasonable, the contractarian method is the 
means of building from that notion into principles to govern 
social interaction. (Hamlin 1989, p.99)
If we accept Hamlin's view of contractualism as essentially 
correct, it follows that a contractualist theory of reasonable 
agreement cannot avoid tackling the problem of investigating the 
concept of reasonableness.
Leaving the concept of reasonableness undetermined has led 
some to feel that there is nothing more to this concept than a mere
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moral intuition, which means that the contractarian theory of 
reasonable agreement is by implication nothing more than a 
sophisticated moral intuition dressed up as a constructivist 
theory.
The charge of intuitionism has been made forcefully by Allan 
Gibbard in his review article of Brian Barry's Theories of Justice. 
Gibbard (1991) argues that if the concept of reasonableness is 
given such prominence in a theory of justice, as in the case of 
Barry's theory^, then it is unacceptable to depend for an 
elucidation of the term 'reasonableness' on intuitive 
understandings. It is unacceptable because it reduces 
reasonableness to brute intuitions, and intuitions are at best a 
weak and controversial foundation for a theory of justice^. In the 
words of Gibbard:
If, though, the unreasonableness of rejecting certain 
principles is just a brute moral fact, whispered to us by the 
voice of intuition, then I worry. Argument stops somewhere, to
- "Barry's test is to ask which agreements agents of certain 
kinds could reject and still be reasonable. This puts the burden on 
the moral term 'reasonableness'". (Gibbard 1991, pp.278-9).
- In the previous chapter I mentioned that Nielsen accuses 
Kymlicka of intuitionism. Nielsen's argument can be compared to 
Gibbard's: "But if there are any accounts that are by now widely 
recognized to be non-starters, it is intuitionism and natural law 
theories where we in some mysterious way must just have direct 
access to the truth - indeed, even on some accounts, the certain 
truth - of certain moral propositions. How then does Kymlicka know, 
and how can we know, that his fundamental substantive moral claims, 
claims not subject to agreement, are true or justified?" (Nielsen 
1992, p.94).
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be sure, but I hope it does not have to stop with brute 
intuitions of what is reasonable and what is not. If someone 
tells me a demand is unreasonable, 1 want to ask why. 
(Gibbard 1991, p.279)
1 believe Gibbard's challenge is important, and ought to be 
taken seriously. The accusation of intuitionism deserves a 
response. If reasonable agreement is to be the foundation of a 
comprehensive liberal political theory, then the concept of 
reasonableness cannot be left undefined.
To recapitulate the argument so far, 1 have argued that 
failure to provide an accurate definition to this concept leads to 
two unwanted consequences. First, it facilitates the seizure of 
this concept by unscrupulous philosophers who preach the virtue of 
reasonableness in an attempt to defend their subjective moral 
views. Indeed the theories of Perry and Finnis are confirmation 
that this has already been the case, with the result that the 
concept of reasonableness has lost any credibility. Secondly, 
failure to define the concept of reasonableness means that the 
contractualist idea of reasonable agreement is vulnerable to the 
charge of crude intuitionism.
In what follows, 1 will argue that in order to avoid these two 
traps, it is imperative to give an accurate definition to the 
concept of reasonableness, furthermore it is fundamental that this 
concept does not become a catch-all phrase for all that is morally 
good.
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4.III. Defining Reasonableness.
So far I have argued that it is a grave risk to leave the 
concept of reasonableness undefined. At the same time one has to be 
careful not to define this concept in such a way that will 
undermine Scanlon's important distinction between Philosophical 
Enquiry and Moral Enquiry.
In searching for a definition of the concept of 
reasonableness, it is important to always remember that the 
foundation of a contractualist moral and political theory (i.e. the 
foundation of reasonable agreement) is in the moment of 
hypothetical agreement, based on impartial moral motivation. The 
concept of reasonableness should not replace the moment of 
agreement, and moral motivation in particular, as the focus of 
moral theory. Instead defining the concept of reasonableness must 
be seen as complementary to moral motivations, or in other words as 
explaining and justifying our impartial moral motivations.
The problems with defining the concept of reasonableness that 
Scanlon alludes to only arise if we treat this concept as integral 
to our moral motivations. Yet the brief accounts of Freeman and 
Nagel in previous chapter demonstrate that there is a tendency to 
assume that the concept of reasonableness is part of our a moral 
motivations. This is exactly where the problem lies. If we start 
from the assumption that reasonableness is part of our moral 
motivations, then we are left with an insurmountable problem.
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furthermore any attempt to define the concept of reasonableness 
substantiates Scanlon's premonitions.
Seeking a definition of reasonableness, based on the 
assumption that this concept reflects our moral psychology, leads 
to a dead end. Once we accept that reasonableness is a moral 
motivation, we are vulnerable to Barry's reproach that the argument 
is guilty of circular logic^^. To recycle one of Barry's aphorisms, 
the project of defining reasonableness in moral terms and then 
deducing normative principles from the idea of reasonable 
agreement, can be compared to a conjurer putting a rabbit in a hat, 
taking it out again and expecting a round of applause.
Yet I see no reason why we must accept the assumption that 
identifies reasonableness with our moral motivations. A theory of 
reasonable agreement does not require that reasonableness be 
considered a moral motivation, since in a contractualist theory the 
moral motivation comes from the idea of agreement, where the idea 
of agreement is defined in terms of the willingness to compromise 
one's conception of the good in order to make room for others.
But if reasonableness is not a moral motivation, what is it? 
Why do we appeal to an agreement that is reasonable? The brief 
answer is that the concept of reasonable enables us to bridge the 
gap between the meta-ethical level of agreement (i.e. our moral 
intuitions), and the political sphere, where institutions are 
evaluated on normative grounds.
- For an account of the problem of circularity, see Chapter 
3 above.
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In order to fully understand the idea that reasonableness can 
be divorced form the sphere of moral motivations, it will be 
instructive to analyze Gibbard's critical assessment of reasonable 
agreement. According to Gibbard (1991), in order to avoid the trap 
of crude intuitionism, we must be able to display a convincing 
rationale for our intuitions, i.e. a rationale that gives us a kind 
of knowledge of what is reasonable. Obviously Gibbard assumes that 
reasonableness is a moral intuition, hence we need a rationale in 
order to explain what is reasonable and what is not. In the words 
of Gibbard;
We do have intuitions, 1 agree, about what is reasonable and 
what is not. The question is how we should regard these 
intuitions. Perhaps they can be given an illuminating 
rationale. Then we can see the intuitions as implicitly 
responding to this rationale. If the rationale is good, we can 
regard the intuitions as giving us a kind of knowledge of what 
is reasonable. (Gibbard 1991, p.279)
1 believe that Gibbard is inadvertently providing us with the 
answer to all our problems; all we need to do is put Gibbard's 
model up-side-down. The point is that we must start from the 
assumption that reasonableness is not our moral intuition, instead 
our intuitions are given by (a) the idea of agreement, and (b) the 
desire to justify our actions to others. If we accept this, then we 
can see that the concept of reasonableness provides (to use
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Gibbard's terminology) the 'rationale' that illuminates our 
intuitions.
It seems to me that the above argument helps us to understand 
both the concept of reasonableness and the notion of reasonable 
agreement; the concept of reasonableness is the rationale which 
qualifies our moral intuitions, where the idea of agreement is the 
basis of our moral intuitions. In the theory of reasonable 
agreement, the concept of reasonableness qualifies the agreement, 
or in other words reasonableness is the rationale that illuminates 
our moral intuitions.
An important aspect of the above argument is that it placates 
Scanlon's worries concerning the distinction between Philosophical 
Enquiry and Moral Enquiry while still allowing us to tighten the 
definition of reasonableness. Seeking a definition of 
reasonableness need not imply that this concept acts as a common 
principle applicable to all issues, from cruelty to keeping 
promises, as Scanlon fears. Instead as Barry points out, what we 
need to do is to specify further the notion of reasonableness, not 
substitute some simpler and more tractable notion^. The only way 
to do this is by defining the concept of reasonableness without 
appealing to moral motivations.
In Part 4. IV, I will argue that the first step towards 
defining the concept of reasonableness is to differentiate it from 
the better known (and hegemonic) idea of instrumental rationality, 
while in Part 4.V I will attempt to give a precise definition of
72 - See Barry (1989a), p.426.
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reasonableness.
4.IV. Reasonableness vs Rationality.
It is important to recognize that the concept of 
reasonableness deserves to be analyzed as a distinct and original 
concept, with full autonomy from other moral, social and political 
terms. For example, the concept of instrumental rationality has 
always subsumed the concept of reasonableness under its hegemony. 
In what follows I intend to show that the uniqueness of 
reasonableness can be best appreciated when contrasted against the 
concept of rationality. By referring to the writings of Chaim 
Perelman and John Rawls, I will argue that the concepts of the 
reasonable and reasonableness^^ are conceptually distinct from the 
idea of rationality; justifying this claim is crucial in order to 
show that a reasonable agreement has nothing in common with what 
can be called a rational agreement^. But first it is useful to say 
something on the etymology of the terms 'rationality' and 
'reasonableness'.
In its everyday use, the term 'reasonable' is used as a 
synonym for 'rationality'. Stemming from the same latin root
- In this chapter, and throughout the thesis, 1 will use the 
terms 'the reasonable' and 'reasonableness' interchangeably.
- A rational agreement is an agreement where the parties are 
moved by a rational desire to maximise their ends, irrespective of 
others; Rawls's original position and Gauthier's bargaining-based 
agreements would fall under this category.
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(RATIO-) , it is not surprising that in the past the 'rational' and 
the 'reasonable' were used as synonyms. Indeed the Oxford English 
Dictionary (hereafter OED) shows that there is a strong affinity 
between these two terms: to be 'rational' means "Having the faculty 
of reasoning; endowed with reason", while 'reasonable' also implies 
being "Endowed with reason. = RATIONAL".
Although the etymology of the words apparently fails to 
distinguish the reasonable from the rational, it cannot be denied 
that in the last fifteen years the way these terms have been 
referred to by some political philosophers points to a degree of 
rupture in the previous synonymous relationship. In what follows 1 
will take the first steps towards distinguishing the concept of the 
reasonable from that of rationality. 1 will first examine two 
recent attempts, by Perelman and Rawls, to distinguish the 
reasonable form the rational. 1 will then draw some speculative 
conclusions on the conceptual fracture between the reasonable and 
the rational, claiming that only the reasonable is a normative 
concept.
The conceptual distinction between the reasonable and the 
rational has troubled legal theorists for a long time^ .^ It is not 
surprising therefore that in recent years, one of the most explicit 
attempt to scrutinize the concept of reasonableness and dissect it 
from that of rationality comes from a legal theorist with a strong 
background in formal logic and highly respected in political
- See Aarnio (1987). For an account of the 'Reasonable Man' 
in jurisprudence, see MacKinnon (1990).
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theory: Chaim Perelman.
In his provocative article "The Rational and the 
Reasonable"^, which has sadly been neglected in recent debates, 
Perelman argues that reasonableness and rationality function on two 
different wavelengths; rationality is instrumental, being concerned 
with the means to ensure predetermined ends, while reasonableness 
is normative, dealing simultaneously with both means and ends.
Perelman claims that rational behaviour, being concerned only 
with each individual's calculation of the best means towards an 
end, is stripped of the social dimension. On the other hand 
reasonable behaviour is characterized by a strong social motivation 
which Perelman traces into the search for acceptability. Thus 
contrary to rational actions, reasonable actions are acceptable to 
everyone, not just to the person who is doing the action:
'Rational' man separates reason from the other human faculties 
and shows a unilateral being functioning as a mechanism, 
deprived of humanity and insensible to the reactions of the 
milieu: he is the opposite of the reasonable man ....
[Reasonable man] is guided by the search, in all domains, for 
what is acceptable in his milieu and beyond it, for what 
should be acceptable by all. Putting himself in the place of
- Lecture delivered at the International Symposium 
'Rationality Today' held at the University of Ottawa in October 
1977. Proceedings published by the University of Ottawa Press 1979, 
213-224. Also reprinted in Chaim Perelman (1979) The New Rhetoric 
and the Humanities. All references are taken from the 1979 
publication.
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others he does not consider himself an exception but seeks to 
conform to principles of action which are acceptable to 
everyone. (Perelman 1979, p.118).
One of the most appealing characteristics of Perelman's 
distinction between the rational and the reasonable is that he 
defines the latter appealing to two Kantian ideas: the categorical 
imperative, which makes the universal the criterion of morality, 
and the Golden Rule. This invocation of Kant is the bridge 
connecting Perelman's views to those of Rawls.
According to Rawls, we ought to make a distinction between 
rationality and the reasonable, where the latter should have 
priority over the former. In his 1980 Dewey Lectures Rawls argues 
that the concept of reasonableness is autonomous and independent 
from the notion of rationality, and ought to be defined on 
different grounds than rationality: the reasonable expresses a
conception of the fair terms of cooperation, while the rational 
expresses a conception of each participant's rational advantage, in 
other words what as individuals each participant is trying to 
advance. (Rawls 1980, p.528).
It follows that according to Rawls, the reasonable has a moral 
underpinning^, making reasonableness and fairness closely related. 
Furthermore the reasonable and the rational do not stand on equal 
rank, instead Rawls clearly believes in a lexical priority between
^ - "Reasonable persons, that is, ... persons who have
realized their two moral powers ..." (Rawls 1989, p.236).
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these two concepts:
[T]he Reasonable presupposes and subordinates the Rational. It 
[the Reasonable] defines the fair terms of cooperation 
acceptable to all within some group of separately identifiable 
persons, each of whom possesses and can exercise the two moral 
powers ... The Reasonable subordinates the Rational because 
its principles limit, and in a Kantian doctrine limit 
absolutely, the final ends that can be pursued. (Rawls 1980, 
p.530)
By distinguishing the reasonable from the rational, and 
claiming that the former limits the latter, Rawls is trying to find 
a place for both the reasonable and the rational in his theory of 
justice. This is the way Rawls's controversial claim of a "social 
cooperation for the mutual benefit of all" (Rawls 1982, p.164) 
should be interpreted; by social cooperation Rawls implies "fair 
terms of cooperation", or reasonable terms of cooperation, whereas 
mutual benefit presupposes rationality.
In his latest work Political Liberalism, Rawls attempts to 
specify more clearly the difference between the reasonable and the 
rational. He claims that rational agents lack the moral sensibility 
that underlies the desire to engage in fair cooperation (Rawls 
1993a, p.51), or in other words that they lack a sense of justice 
and fail to recognize the independent validity of the claims of 
others (Rawls 1993a, p.52). On the other hand reasonable persons
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desire a social world in which they, as free and equal, can
cooperate with others on terms all can accept (Rawls 1993a, p.50).
In his latest work Rawls is also more specific about what he 
understands by the concept of reasonableness. He claims that 
reasonableness has two aspects; (a) the willingness to propose and 
honour fair terms of cooperation among equals, and (b) the
willingness to recognize the burdens of judgment - the sources of 
reasonable disagreement - and to accept their consequences. Rawls 
acknowledges that both aspects of the reasonable are closely 
connected with Scanlon's principle of moral motivation (Rawls 
1993a, p.49n), indeed Rawls is keen to show that Scanlon's
principle is more than a psychological principle of motivation. In 
§7 and §8 of Lecture 11: The Power of Citizens and Their
Representation^, Rawls argues that although the basis of moral 
motivation is partly psychological, it is not exclusively
psychological since it concerns the fundamental question why anyone 
should care about morality at all. In the words of Rawls, moral 
psychology is philosophical, not psychological.
While Rawls's analysis of the reasonable and its difference 
from rationality is a vast improvement on the vague assertions made 
by Perelman, Rawls's latest account raises some new problems which 
he is unable to overcome: Rawls's account of reasonableness is 
nothing more than a theory of moral motivation, and as such it
- While Lecture 2 is taken from material already published 
in 1980, §7 and §8 represent an original contribution by Rawls and 
the material discussed here did not appear in the three Dewey 
lectures on "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory".
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undermines the reason for constructivism.
Rawls distinguishes between three types of desires: object- 
dependent desires (where the object of desire is divorced from 
moral conceptions, for example a desire for sex, food or shelter); 
principle-dependent desires (where the object of desire is given by 
certain rational or reasonable principles, such as the principles 
of utility and lexicographical preferences for rational principles, 
and principles of fairness and justice for reasonable principles); 
and finally conception-dependent desires. Conception-dependent 
desires are according to Rawls the most important of the three, 
therefore require special attention.
Conception-dependent desires are principle-dependent desires 
with a difference, namely, the principles must be related to a 
political ideal. In Rawls's case, the political ideal is that of 
citizenship as characterized in justice as fairness. Rawls's debt 
to Scanlon here is obvious^, in fact it is by emulating Scanlon's 
idea of moral motivation that Rawls elaborates a moral psychology 
of the person: Rawls claims that citizens have a "reasonable moral 
psychology" (Rawls 1993a, p.86), and the salient feature of Rawls's 
sketch of the moral psychology of the person is that it is
philosophical, not psychological. In the words of Rawls:
I stress that it is a moral psychology drawn from the
political conception of justice as fairness. It is not a
- Not surprisingly Rawls claims that Scanlon's moral 
motivation is a conception-dependent desire; see Rawls (1993a), 
p.85n.
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psychology originating in the science of human nature but 
rather a scheme of concepts and principles for expressing a 
certain political conception of the person and an ideal of 
citizenship. (Rawls 1993, pp.86-7).
It seems to me that Rawls's account of moral motivation 
(reasonable moral psychology) assumes the very conclusions that he 
wants to defend (an ideal of citizenship) . The problem with rawls's 
account is that constructivism becomes redundant. That is to say, 
if everyone is moved by the kind of moral motivation Rawls is 
describing, then there would be no fundamental disagreement and 
contractualist would not be doing any work*®.
The conception of reasonableness that 1 want to defend differs 
from Rawls's conception on the issue of the very nature of 
reasonableness. According to Rawls's account, reasonableness is a 
motivation intrinsic to the beholder of reasonable moral 
psychology, while according to my conception, reasonableness is 
something that can be recognized from outside, that is to say, 
reasonableness is an agent-neutral criterion, which in the first 
place is external to the psychology of the person.
While 1 share the view of Perelman and Rawls that rationality 
and reasonableness are two distinct concepts, the distinction is 
not that rationality lacks a moral dimension while reasonableness
*® - In Chapter 3 1 argued that Scanlon's reasoning is
dangerously circular, and that he commits the fallacy of petitio 
principii. 1 believe the same criticism applies to Rawls's account 
of reasonableness and reasonable moral motivation in Political 
Liberalism.
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is a moral term. In fact I believe that reasonableness shares with 
rationality some important characteristics, for example their 
criterion is independent of moral desires.
An example will make this point clear. A rational act is one 
that can be recognized as such by everyone, notwithstanding their 
views. For example if I am in New York and I have a desire to get 
to Los Angeles within the next 12 hours or something catastrophic 
will happen (let's imagine that hospital authorities require my 
signature before operating on my wife, and she is not going to live 
for more than 12 hours) , and I have the choice between a direct 
flight, a three-day train journey or a 6-day drive, it is rational 
for me to go to the airport. What is rational about my decision is 
not so much the fact that I have a desire to save my wife's life, 
but that I want to get from A to B in the shortest possible time*^ .
I believe that a reasonable act must also be universally 
recognized by everyone, notwithstanding the differences between 
persons. The criterion of reasonableness must be independent of our 
desires, that is to say, what is considered 'reasonable' cannot be 
intrinsic to the moral psychology of the person*^.
The distinction between rationality and reasonableness is the 
following: rationality is essentially an individualistic virtue or
- The same reasoning would apply if I had a desire to see a 
baseball game in California. The reason for the trip does not 
interfere with the rationality of my decision concerning the mode 
of transportation.
- In Part 4.V below I will argue that the maxim 'not asking 
for too much' gives a definition of reasonableness which is not 
reducible to the object of our desires.
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quality, while reasonableness is essentially a social virtue or 
quality. Being reasonable and being rational both share the idea of 
being sensible^, yet while rationality is increasingly becoming 
associated with prudence, reasonableness is becoming associated 
with social virtue. As Barry points out, reasonableness "is now 
seen as a more social virtue than rationality" (Barry 1987, p.420).
The social quality of reasonableness, as opposed to 
rationality, was appreciated by W.M. Sibley more than 40 years ago:
To be reasonable ... is to see the matter - as we commonly put 
it - from the other person's point of view, to discover how 
each will be affected by the possible alternative actions; 
and, moreover, not merely to 'see' this (for any merely 
prudential person would do as much) but also to be prepared to 
be disinterestedly influenced, in reaching a decision, by the 
estimate of these possible results. (Sibley 1953, p.557)
It is interesting to note that Rawls models his conception of 
reasonableness on Sibley's definition, indeed in Political 
Liberalism Rawls points out that his discussion of reasonableness 
accords with Sibley's basic distinction between the reasonable and 
the rational (Rawls 1993, 49n).
That Rawls was taken by Sibley's definition is not surprising.
- The OED tells us that to be reasonable means "having sound 
judgment; sensible, sane", while being rational implies being 
"agreeable to reason; reasonable, sensible; not foolish, absurd, or 
extravagant".
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in fact there are strong affinities between Scanlon's account of 
moral motivation, being a desire to justify our actions to others 
on grounds they could not reasonably reject, and the following 
definition of reasonableness by Sibley;
I must justify my conduct in terms of some principle capable 
of being appealed to by all parties concerned, some principle 
from which we can reason in common. (Sibley 1953, p.557)
Of course Sibley saw reasonableness as a moral virtue, as 
essentially related to the disposition to act morally, and Rawls 
follows in Sibley's footsteps to read into the concept of 
reasonableness a moral motivation. I think Sibley and Rawls are 
both wrong to identify the concept of reasonableness with our moral 
motivations^, although Sibley was right to emphasize the social 
quality of reasonableness as the distinctive factor of this concept 
compared to rationality^.
I am not denying that the concept of reasonableness has a
^ - In Chapter 3 I mentioned Barry's warning that it is not 
sufficient to substitute reasonableness with some simpler and more 
tractable notion, instead what we need to do is to specify further 
the notion of reasonableness. It seems to me that Sibley does 
exactly what Barry says we should not do: "Reasonableness thus
requires impartiality, 'objectivity'; it expresses itself in the 
notion of equity." (Sibley 1953, pp.557-558).
- Rawls also accepts that rationality is an individual 
virtue while reasonableness is a social virtue, in fact echoing an 
argument by Freeman (1990, p.141-147), Rawls claims that "A further 
basic difference between the reasonable and the rational is that 
the reasonable is public in a way that the rational is not" (Rawls 
1993a, p.53). Yet in Rawls the social virtue collapses in moral 
power; see Rawls (1993a), pp.48-54.
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moral dimension. After all, if we endorse the argument that the 
distinction between rationality and reasonableness is that 
rationality is essentially an individualistic virtue or quality, 
while reasonableness is essentially a social virtue, then it 
becomes impossible to strip the concept of reasonableness of all 
moral connotations (that is, if by morality we understand a certain 
type of social behaviour, where my actions interact with or have 
consequences on others). The affinity between moral concepts and 
social circumstances explains why Sibley gives reasonableness a 
moral coating^.
Nevertheless, the concept of reasonableness is not an 
identical reflection of the concept of morality, or in other words 
reasonableness cannot be a synonym for morality. In what follows, 
I will argue that the concept of reasonableness is an agent-neutral 
concept which has the function of illuminating the moral intuitions 
of impartiality and the idea of agreement.
4.V. Rethinking Reasonableness.
So far I have tried to show that there is some evidence of a 
conceptual fracture between these two concepts. But what exactly 
does being reasonable or reasonableness amount to? How does the
^ - I am grateful to Margaret Moore for a discussion on the 
morality of reasonableness.
174
reasonable relate to reasonable agreement? In this section I will 
attempt to answer these questions.
I believe Barry (1987) comes closest to pin-pointing the 
social quality of reasonableness when he reminds us that according 
to the OED, reasonableness may also mean 'not asking for too much'. 
In what follows, 1 will start by exploring the idea of 'not asking 
for too much', followed by an attempt to relate the concept of 
reasonableness, as defined above, to the idea of an agreement: 
hence reasonable agreement.
The intuitive idea of reasonableness as 'not asking for too 
much' needs to be examined and qualified further if it is to prove 
useful to the contractualist theory of reasonable agreement. There 
is an explicit and an implicit side to the idea of 'not asking for 
too much'. Explicitly the notion of 'too much' points to a 
quantitative measurement, while implicitly it implies a comparative 
relation.
Thus in ordinary speech when we say that something is 'too 
much' we have in mind a quantitative relationship whereby something 
is too much of something-else which is in limited supply. This 
first qualification finds support in the OED, where under 
'Reasonable' we find the following explication: "Of such an amount, 
size, number, etc., as is judged to be appropriate or suitable to 
the circumstances or purpose".
Implicitly, 'not asking for too much' assumes that one's claim 
is too much compared to some other claim for the same limited good, 
hence its intrinsic comparative quality. Once again this second
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qualification finds support in the OED, where it is said that the 
term 'Reasonable' may also be used to mean 'Proportionate'.
The important characteristic of the notion of something being 
'too much' is that this notion assumes the scarcity of some good or 
resource. Thus in order to establish if a demand is 'too much', we 
must first have an idea of what the subject of the demand is. All 
demands are demands for something that is usually in limited 
supply. It is that something which gives the notion of 'not asking 
for too much' the social dimension, since all demands are evaluated 
within the context of scarcity of resources, and everyone^ has an 
equal right to make a claim to these resources.
If we take the idea of 'not asking for too much' as a whole, 
that is to say combining its explicit and implicit connotations, 
together with the awareness of a context of scarcity in which 
demands are made, we get an approximate idea of how reasonableness 
can be defined.
A demand is reasonable if it does not ask for too much of a 
scarce resource compared to other demands for the same 
resource.
The above definition of reasonableness is important because it 
puts our moral motivations (defined by the idea of agreement) 
within the appropriate social and political context. In other words 
the concept of reasonableness acts as the rationale that
87 - Everyone here applies also to those who are not yet born.
176
illuminates our intuitions. It follows that intuitionism plays a 
necessary role in contractualism, but not a sufficient role.
Brian Barry (1989b, pp.271-282) points out that there are 
three possible views about the relation between constructivism and 
intuitionism; that constructivism and intuitionism are entirely 
independent; that constructivism is simply a variety of 
intuitionism; and that constructivism cannot be entirely
independent of intuitionism but is not entirely reducible to it 
either*®.
Of the three views, Barry defends the third alternative, 
claiming that "constructivism [is] dependent on but not reducible 
to intuitionism" (Barry 1989b, p.282). I believe that defining the 
notion of reasonableness in terms of the maxim 'not asking for too 
much' is crucial if contractualism is to maintain a link with 
intuitionism without being entirely subordinated to it; if 
reasonableness refers to a social and political context of
scarcity, then the notion of reasonable agreement cannot be reduced 
to intuitionism.
The time has come to reconcile the above definition of
reasonableness with the contractarian argument. In other words to
reconcile the idea of the reasonable, with the moment of agreement.
** - Logically speaking, there is also a fourth alternative, 
namely, that intuitionism is simply a variety of constructivism. I 
think this fourth alternative is a non-starter. Perhaps the best 
attempt to provide a constructivist account of our motivations is 
found in Gauthier's Morals bv Agreement, although it may be argued 
that Gauthier is unable to avoid moral intuitions. For a criticism 
of Gauthier along those lines, see Goodin (1993) and Lehning 
(1993) .
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In Chapter 3 I pointed out that the notion of agreement is at the 
heart of Scanlon's model, an agreement to cooperate on terms that 
everyone could reasonably accept (an agreement people could make 
under circumstances where no one was ignorant or coerced).
While the idea of agreement defines our moral intuition, crude 
intuitionism cannot be the foundation for a political theory. For 
a moral theory to become a political theory, it is fundamental to 
bridge the gap between our moral intuitions and the political 
sphere; this is the role performed by the concept of
reasonableness, and the maxim 'not asking for too much'.
The question 1 want to address in this section is how the 
definition of reasonableness in terms of 'not asking for too much' 
fits in with Scanlon's contractualism. As 1 said before, the
contribution of Scanlon's moral theory is to have offered a 
contractualist account of moral motivation. Scanlon says that 
according to contractualism, the source of motivation is the desire 
to be able to justify one's actions to others on grounds they could 
not reasonably reject.
It is important to see that Scanlon is not simply appealing to 
an inter-subjective equilibrium, where everyone agrees in virtue of 
giving their consent. In other words Scanlon is not simply saying 
that we have a desire that others do not reject our actions, for
this would be nothing more than justifying an agreement based on
the consensus of the people. The problem here is that such 
equilibrium does not have moral force, for example a person may be 
spontaneously willing to give up her freedom and become a slave.
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thereby creating a consensus agreement between the slave and her 
owner, yet this equilibrium per se does not have moral force.
I believe there is an objective standard at the core of 
Scanlon's formula, albeit hidden, which qualifies our moral 
motivations. Indeed a closer examination of Scanlon's formula 
reveals that Scanlon is appealing to certain grounds that others 
could not reject. It is these grounds that are the basis for the 
equilibrium between my actions and the refutability of others. 
Having established this fact, the question I want to address now is 
the following: what are the grounds that others could not reject?
I believe that establishing these grounds is the primary 
function of the concept of reasonableness. More specifically, I 
believe that the maxim 'not asking for too much' identifies the 
grounds that establishes what others could not reasonably reject. 
In other words the maxim 'not asking for too much' sets the ground 
for determining if certain actions can be rejected by others or 
not. Although the category of others in Scanlon's contract does not 
include everyone but only those moved by a similar desire to reach 
an agreement (in other words Scanlon does not have to justify his 
actions to everyone but only to others similarly motivated), we 
need a standard for determining the validity of our motivations. I 
believe the idea of 'not asking for too much' can shed some light 
on this requirement.
It follows that the definition of reasonableness as 'not 
asking for too much' can be used as the key to understand the idea 
of reasonable agreement. Indeed I want to argue that reasonable
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agreement is a desire to find an agreement under circumstances of 
scarcity, where the agreement itself cannot be divorced by the fact 
that everyone who is making a claim for resources is thereby 
excluding others.
If reasonableness involves 'not asking for too much' it 
follows that reasonable agreement is an agreement reached when (a) 
everyone is moved by a similar moral motivation, and (b) no-one is 
asking for too much, since not asking for too much is the only 
demand that others could not reasonably reject: an agreement is 
reasonable when no-one seeking agreement is asking for too much,
I conclude therefore that reasonableness concerns fair demands 
for scarce resources, and that reasonable agreement is an agreement 
concerning the use or distribution of scarce resources that takes 
account of the fair demands of others^.
4.VI. Conclusion.
- Of course one may object that the maxim 'not asking for 
too much' does not ensure that others are not made worse off, since 
it may well be the case that even asking for very little of a 
scarce resource may make others infinitesimally worse off. For 
example my demand for better public lighting in my street in North 
London may cost the state very little but still make someone in 
Liverpool worse off by a fraction of a penny. While this objection 
cannot be refuted, it applies only if the maxim 'not asking for too 
much' is seen as a moral virtue which we can appeal to determine 
what is right and wrong. But this is not how I intend to use the 
maxim, hence the objection is out of place. The maxim 'not asking 
for too much' is not a rule from which conclusions in particular 
cases can be derived (this is Scanlon's objection to a normative 
enquiry in the concept of reasonableness), instead the maxim simply 
reflects a social virtue that enables us to understand our moral 
intuitions.
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In this chapter, I have argued that if the concept of 
reasonableness is going to be the basis of the contractualist 
theory of reasonable agreement, it is necessary to search for a 
definition that divorces reasonableness from our moral motivations. 
The importance of such an account of reasonableness is that it 
provides an independent standard or rationale to illuminate our 
moral intuition to seek agreement.
The point is that moral motivations taken in their isolation 
are susceptible to two criticisms: they are either predominantly 
psychological attributes, in which case these motivations are 
devoid of a political dimension and therefore insufficient as a 
foundation of a moral theory, or they are philosophical accounts of 
moral psychology drawn from political conceptions, in which case 
moral motivations are so well formulated^ to make constructivism 
in ethics totally redundant.
1 believe that we should be somewhere in the middle of these 
two positions, that is to say, the psychological aspect of our 
moral motivations should not be undervalued, although at the same 
time these should not become a mere reflection of our political 
conceptions. Instead moral motivations should be considered within 
a social and political context. It is the combination of our moral 
motivations and the social context that transforms such motivations 
into the foundations of a political theory.
The only way to tread this middle road is by rejecting the
- By this 1 mean that they are not simply our unconsidered 
intuitions or judgments, but judgments we hold after due 
reflection.
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view that the concept of reasonableness refers to our moral 
psychology. Instead I have argued that reasonableness ought to be 
seen as a rationale for illuminating our moral motivations. I 
believe that the concept of reasonableness, defined in terms of the 
maxim 'not asking for too much', provides the grounds on which our 
moral motivations are to be tested.
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PART n  - REASONABLE AGREEMENT AND POLITICAL 
LIBERALISM
It is a well-known fact that the aftermath of any revolution 
is demarcated by two factors. First, the extensive fragmentation of 
political units fighting for legitimacy and supremacy. Secondly, 
the success of any revolution is determined by its ability to 
replace existing institutions with alternative ones which are both 
stable and legitimate.
While most people would not hesitate to accept these two rules 
as being relevant to history and politics, perhaps only a few 
realize that the same rules apply to philosophy. Most political 
philosophers would acknowledge that 1971 represents a revolution in 
political philosophy. As Brian Barry points out, Rawls's A Theory 
of Justice is the watershed that divides the past from the present, 
indeed in political philosophy there is a pre-Rawlsian world, and 
a post-Rawlsian world (Barry 1990c).
In the three chapters that make up Part I, I focused on the 
revolutionary nature of Rawls's theory, and the fragmentation which 
resulted from it. A revolution signals a radical break with the 
tradition legitimizing the status quo, and if we consider
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utilitarianism the dominant tradition in the pre-Rawlsian world, 
then contractualism represents the commanding credo in the post- 
Rawlsian world.
The fragmentation which characterised the immediate aftermath 
of the Rawlsian revolution has not spared the idea of 
contractualism, in fact we have seen how since 1971 opposing 
contractualist traditions have developed. On one side we find the 
contractualism of Scanlon, built around the idea of reasonable 
agreement, while on the other hand we find the contractualism of 
Gauthier, built around the idea of rational bargaining^.
The aim of my thesis so far has been to show that reasonable 
agreement is where the future of the Rawlsian revolution lies. I 
have argued that to the extent that it advocates a superior 
conception of equality, only the contractualist theory of 
reasonable agreement represents a valid alternative to 
utilitarianism. Indeed the theory of reasonable agreement draws out 
more clearly than Rawls's original position the moral intuition of 
impartiality which is the driving force behind Rawls's theory of 
justice.
In the chapters that follow, I will concentrate on the second 
factor that applies to all revolutions, namely, that a revolution 
is successful if and only if the principles it champions constitute 
a coherent and workable alternative. Thus it is not sufficient to
- The fragmentation in the post-Rawlsian world is not 
limited to contractualism, in fact a plethora of non-utilitarian 
political theories has emerged. Amongst the most influential 
alternatives we find libertarianism, perfectionism, 
communitarianism and analytical marxism.
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eradicate the fundamental principles behind the existing status quo 
and replace them with a new set of principles. It is also necessary 
to show that the new principles being advocated are capable of 
acting as the foundation of a comprehensive political theory.
In the case of contractualism, by a 'comprehensive political 
theory' I am referring to the key notions that constitute the 
subject of political liberalism: political obligation, social
justice and neutrality. The challenge facing contractualism now is 
exactly that of inferring from the basic principles of reasonable 
agreement theories of political obligation, social justice and 
neutrality, and to combine these three key concepts in a 
comprehensive theory.
It is important to realize that undermining the inadequacy of 
the utilitarian account of one of the three key notions of 
political liberalism is not sufficient to dethrone utilitarianism. 
One of the great assets of utilitarianism is that it is not a 
theory of political obligation, neutrality or social justice, 
instead it is all three at the same time. Utilitarianism 
manipulates political liberalism through its theory of moral 
motivation.
On the basis of the argument presented in Part I that 
reasonable agreement gives an alternative account of moral 
motivation to utilitarianism, in the chapters that follow I will 
argue that from the contractualist theory of reasonable agreement 
we can extract theories of political obligation, social justice and 
neutrality.
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5. POLITICAL OBLIGATION
Do citizens have an obligation to obey the laws of the state? 
And if so, why? On what grounds is our duty to obey the law 
justified? The above questions set the agenda for the problem of 
political obligation, and for the last 350 years liberalism has 
been concerned to give persuasive answers to such questions.
The various attempts to construe a liberal account of 
political obligation have hitherto received a mixed reception. 
Indeed only a few years ago it was fashionable to claim that 
liberalism could not provide a workable theory of political 
obligation: two of the best known advocates of this position are 
Alan J. Simmons (1979) and Carole Pateman (1985). While some 
liberal thinkers have responded to this critique by denying that 
the citizen has an obligation to obey the law, hence denying 
political obligation tout court^^, others have been seeking a 
reconciliation between liberalism and the problem of political 
obligation.
Among the latter group, two recent theories deserve closer 
inspection. George Klosko (1992) attempts to ground political
^ - See for example Raz (1986) and Green (1990).
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obligation on the principle of fairness, while Jeremy Waldron 
(1993) argues that a natural duty to justice is the basis for a 
liberal theory of political obligation. Although the theories of 
Klosko and Waldron stand out as the most intelligible attempts to 
construe a liberal theory of political obligation, in what follows 
I will argue that the theories of Klosko and Waldron are both 
inadequate.
The validity of a liberal theory of political obligation can 
be tested in terms of its ability to respond to two questions. 
First, how the theory deals with the distinction between 
presumptive and discretionary goods, that is to say, does the 
theory of political obligation justify a duty towards a state 
providing only presumptive goods, or does it also justify a duty 
towards a state which provides also discretionary goods? Secondly, 
how a theory reconciles our duty towards the state with our right 
to civil disobedience, that is to say, is a theory of political 
obligation capable of distinguishing between an overall obligation 
to a just state and a non-obligation towards unjust single laws”? 
Throughout this chapter, I will refer to the combination of these 
two questions as the validity-test.
The argument in this chapter is developed in four main parts. 
Parts 5.1 and 5.II will concentrate respectively on the theories of 
Klosko and Waldron. I will argue that both theories fail the
” - Richard Bellamy (1994) believes that the question of civil 
disobedience creates fundamental problems for contemporary liberal 
theories, in fact liberalism is incapable of reconciling theories 
of political obligation with accounts of civil disobedience.
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validity-test, hence their attempts to construe a liberal theory of 
political obligation is not totally successful. Thus while Klosko's 
theory is incapable of giving adequate responses to either 
question, Waldron's theory has difficulty with the latter question.
In Part 5.Ill, I will put forward an alternative theory of 
political obligation which I believe passes the validity-test. I 
will argue that this theory finds justification in the 
contractualist theory of reasonable agreement.
Finally, I will consider the views of Bhikhu Parekh on 
political obligation. Parekh's theory is interesting because it 
appears to clear the obstacles set by the validity-test, 
furthermore he approaches the question of political obligation from 
a moral angle. In Part 5.IV, I will argue why we should resist the 
temptation to follow Parekh's lead on questions of political 
obligation.
5.1. Fairness and Political Obligation.
George Klosko claims that the materials for a solution to the 
problem of obligation have been at hand since 1955, when H.L.A. 
Hart's essay "Are There Any Natural Rights?" was first published. 
The principle of fairness was originally formulated by Hart as 
follows:
[W]hen a number of people conduct any joint enterprise
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according to rules and thus restrict their liberty, those who 
have submitted to these restrictions when required have a 
right to a similar submission from those who have benefited by 
their submission. (Hart 1955, p.185; quoted in Klosko 1992, 
p.33)
This principle has since been adopted by Rawls, although not 
in the context of political obligation. Klosko's contribution was 
to apply Hart's principle of fairness to the problem of political 
obligation.
The moral intuition behind the principle of fairness is that 
it is wrong to 'free-ride' on the efforts of others. On a more 
basic level, the principle of fairness expresses the general idea 
that similar individuals should be treated similarly, since it is 
wrong for certain people to be exempt from burdens others must bear 
in the absence of morally relevant differences between them (Klosko 
1992, p.34).
Klosko's attempt to ground political obligation on the concept 
of fairness has some advantages but also some devastating 
disadvantages. One advantage is that grounding political obligation 
on the principle of fairness helps to overcome the kind of problems 
that have inflicted consent-based accounts of political obligation. 
For example A.J. Simmons argues that consent theories are not able 
to account for the political obligation of large number of 
citizens, yet as Klosko points out: "The principle of fairness does 
not ground obligation on consent - either express or tacit - and so
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its generality is not hampered by the need for citizens to consent 
to their governments” (Klosko 1987, p.356).
Another advantage of grounding political obligation on the 
principle of fairness is that it provides a moral standard from 
which to assess our sense of duty; thus political obligation is not 
based on the idea of mutual advantage or on a right to benefit from 
co-operation, but on a duty to reciprocate.
Notwithstanding the above advantages, there are two major 
disadvantages associated with the idea of grounding obligation on 
fairness, which threaten to undermine the validity of Klosko's 
theory. First, it fails to distinguish between presumptive and 
discretionary goods, and secondly, it fails to take into account 
cases of civil disobedience. I will consider these two issues 
separately.
Let us begin by defining the terms in question. Presumptive 
public goods are goods that are indispensable, that is to say, they 
are necessary to all members of the community regardless of their 
individual conception of the good. For example law and order are 
presumptive goods in a way that a national art gallery is not. 
Discretionary public goods are goods that are desirable rather than 
indispensable. For example, state support for the arts and the 
reparation of roads are desirable although strictly speaking not 
essential, hence these goods are discretionary*.
The distinction between presumptive and discretionary goods
* - The distinction between presumptive and discretionary 
goods can be compared to Scanlon's (1975) distinction between 
urgency and preferences.
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has important political implications. For example Nozick's 
minimalist state is a state that provides exclusively presumptive 
goods, while Rawls's principles of justice promote a society where 
the state provides both presumptive and discretionary goods. Unless 
one wants to embrace a libertarian philosophy, and I don't think 
this is Klosko's intention, it is necessary to show that we have an 
obligation towards a state that supports the provision of 
discretionary goods.
Yet it appears that Klosko's theory of political obligation, 
grounded on the principle of fairness, fails to justify a duty 
towards a state that provides discretionary goods. Indeed Klosko 
seems to be aware of this deficiency:
Though [the principle of fairness] creates strong obligations 
for individuals to contribute to the provision of presumptive 
goods, it does not create obligations to help provide 
discretionary public goods. (Klosko 1992, p.85)
The problem Klosko faces is that as it stands, the principle 
of fairness seems able to justify an obligations only to support a 
minimalist state^, not a state that supports the provision of 
discretionary goods. Not being sympathetic to a Nozickian society, 
Klosko is keen to convince us that this objection can be overcome, 
and he devotes a whole chapter of his book to a discussion of this
- That is to say, a state providing only presumptive public
goods.
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problem.
Klesko's solution to the problem is the following: one needs 
to extend the functions of cooperative schemes that have been set 
up to provide presumptive public goods in order to include also 
discretionary goods. In other words although the principle of 
fairness cannot oblige individuals to support schemes that furnish 
only discretionary public goods, it can generate obligations to a 
scheme that provide discretionary goods if it can be shown that the 
given scheme also provides presumptive public goods (Klosko 1992,
p.86).
I find Klosko's response unsatisfactory, indeed Klosko's 
failure to deal with the question of discretionary goods adds 
support to the claim that a theory of political obligation grounded 
on the principle of fairness is valid only to justify a minimalist 
state. In what follows I will first look at Klosko's solution in 
detail, followed by an account of why his response is far from 
being convincing.
Klosko argues that two main considerations support obligations 
to contribute to discretionary public goods if they are provided by 
cooperative schemes that also provide presumptive public goods: the 
indirect and the institutional argument. The general idea behind 
the indirect argument is that presumptive and discretionary goods 
comprise an indivisible benefit package; it is because 
discretionary public goods fall in such package that individuals 
can be obligated to support them. The institutional argument is 
similar to the indirect argument. It states that presumptive and
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discretionary goods are part of the same decision process, hence of 
the same institutional package. It follows that even if 
institutional benefits (such as law and order) are closely related 
to presumptive goods, they extend to discretionary goods as well.
I believe that both the indirect and the institutional 
argument fail to bail out Klosko from the charge that grounding 
political obligation on the principle of fairness only justifies a 
duty to a minimalist state, in fact Klosko seems unable to justify 
our obligation to a state that provides discretionary goods.
I suggest we start from the indirect argument. The point of 
the indirect argument is that the provision of discretionary public 
goods is instrumental for the provision of presumptive public 
goods. As Klosko points out:
The indirect argument relies on the practical indispensability 
of certain discretionary public goods .... In other words, 
though discretionary public goods are not directly required 
for individual well-being, they are required indirectly. 
(Klosko 1992, p.87)
Klosko's example of an indivisible benefit package is that of 
a presumptive good (national defense) and a discretionary good 
(repairing roads); according to Klosko, some level of 
transportation and other discretionary public goods are 
indispensable to national defense - and to the provision of other 
presumptive public goods. I think Klosko's indirect argument fails
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on two accounts.
First of all, the example of national defense and repairing 
roads is misleading. If Klosko wants to argue that the provision of 
discretionary public goods is instrumental for the provision of 
presumptive public goods, I suggest he explains how the provision 
of discretionary goods as national art galleries are indispensable 
to national defense. Such argument would need to show that if all 
soldiers were erudite in 16th century Flemish paintings, they would 
be better soldiers. Although this makes for a fascinating 
experiment, I am sceptical that it can produce a valid result, 
therefore we can safely conclude that the idea of an indivisible 
benefit package is unpersuasive.
Secondly, and more seriously, it seems to me that Klosko has 
not responded to the challenge of showing how the principle of 
fairness can provide an obligation for discretionary goods, instead 
all he has done is to dissolve the distinction between presumptive 
and discretionary goods by defining away the problem. Klosko tells 
us that an objection along these lines was brought to his attention 
by B.J. Diggs, and Klosko devotes a one-page-long endnote trying to 
respond to the charge that by making discretionary goods 
indispensable the distinction between presumptive and discretionary 
goods is obfuscated to the degree of being meaningless. Klosko's 
reply is that presumptive and discretionary goods differ in two 
main respects: (1) the kinds of uses to which they are put; and (2) 
the kinds of problems they are designed to overcome. I believe both 
arguments can be refuted.
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Klosko argues that presumptive goods have more specialized 
uses, while discretionary goods have more varied uses. For example 
while the components of the criminal justice system - police, 
jails, courts, parole boards, etc. - are closely tied to the supply 
of law and order (a presumptive good), the provision of
transportation and communication facilities (discretionary goods) 
are "components of an overall societal infrastructure and so less 
closely bound up with specific indispensable functions" (Klosko 
1992, p.l09nl3).
I cannot see how appealing to degrees of specialization helps 
Klosko to confront the accusation of defining away the distinction 
between presumptive and discretionary goods. The question here is 
not the degree to which these types of goods are indispensable, but
whether they are indispensable or not. By maintaining that
presumptive and discretionary goods are part of the same "overall 
societal infrastructure" Klosko is hammering the last nail in his 
coffin, since the idea of an overall societal infrastructure 
totally undermines any hope of distinguishing between different 
types of public goods. By being part of the same overall societal 
infrastructure, discretionary goods and presumptive goods are both 
indispensable, even if in different degrees, hence their 
distinction disappears.
The second major difference between presumptive and
discretionary goods is that they address different kinds of 
problems: "In sum, presumptive public goods alleviate specific,
pressing problems, while the difficulties that discretionary public
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goods confront are more diffuse and less immediate, if no less 
real" (Klosko 1992, p.110). Klosko maintains that the difference 
between the two types of goods boils down to a difference in time 
frame, thus while failure to provide presumptive goods leads to an 
immediate catastrophe, the result of not providing discretionary 
goods would be no less catastrophic, but a longer time frame would 
be involved.
Once again, it seems to me that Klosko fails to responds to 
the accusation that he obfuscates the distinction between 
discretionary and presumptive goods. The fact is that in Klosko's 
account the provision of presumptive and discretionary goods are 
similar to the extent that they both help to prevent catastrophes, 
and the issue of a longer or shorter time frame does not hide the 
fact that they are both similarly indispensable.
As Klosko's many arguments fail, one is left with the 
impression that by grounding political obligation on the principle 
of fairness Klosko is incapable of justifying a duty towards a non­
minimalist state, that is to say, a state that provides both 
discretionary goods and presumptive goods. Yet this is not the only 
deficiency in Klesko's theory, in fact Klosko is also incapable of 
reconciling a theory of political obligation with the right to 
civil disobedience. It is to this question that I want to turn to 
now.
So far I have rejected Klesko's claim that the indirect 
argument explains how the principle of fairness justifies our 
obligation towards a state providing discretionary public goods. Of
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course this is not Klosko's only argument, in fact (presumably in 
case the reader is not convinced) Klosko puts forward an 
alternative argument which he thinks is capable of redeeming his 
theory from the accusation of justifying only a duty towards a 
minimalist state, namely, the institutional argument.
The thrust of Klosko's institutional argument for political 
obligation is that disobedience has potentially devastating 
effects:
The main reason why individuals must obey the law is the 
corrosive effects of disobedience. If A disobeys the law, he 
acts to undermine the rule of law, which is central to the 
welfare of society and to his own welfare as well. (Klosko 
1992, p.101)
In other words there is no difference between an obligation to 
follows rules that provide presumptive goods (i.e. law and order), 
and an obligation to follow rules that provide discretionary goods 
(i.e. road repairs), since all rules are based on the same 
institution, namely, the rule of law: "Thus 'A' should not disobey 
minor laws; because general disobedience of even minor laws would 
undermine law and order throughout society, it would be unfair of 
him to disobey them" (Klosko 1992, p.103).
I believe Klosko's institutional argument is seriously 
defective. The most unattractive aspect of Klosko's institutional 
argument is that it rejects all claims for civil disobedience.
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indeed Klosko's institutional argument is incapable to even 
acknowledging cases of civil disobedience.
It is important to remember that civil disobedients, as 
Richard Bellamy rightly points out, are neither revolutionaries 
aiming at total social disintegration, nor criminals concerned only 
with personal gain, instead civil disobedients "accept the 
legitimacy of the existing legal order and wish merely to amend a 
particular law" (Bellamy 1994, p.26). Civil disobedients, Bellamy 
continues, "frequently claim that because the particular law they 
are protesting about is at odds with the norms and practices of the 
polity as a whole, it is illegitimate and likely to bring the whole 
regime unjustifiably into disrepute" (Bellamy 1994, p.26).
Judging from Klosko's definition of the institutional 
argument, it would appear that according to Klosko an act of civil 
disobedience is as criminal as an act of terrorism. If, as Klosko 
points out, "the institutional argument supports obligations to 
obey all laws" (Klosko 1992, p.105)^, this includes an obligation 
to follow laws that may be regarded unjust.
Klosko attempts to counter this further complication by 
considering a counterexample, although as we shall see this is 
unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. The example Klosko 
considers concerns adhering to the laws of a state "as grievously 
unjust as Nazi Germany" (Klosko 1992, p.103). In this case Klosko 
argues that we don't have an obligation to obey such laws since
- As Klosko explains: "Because of the possibility that
violating any law will erode one's habit of obedience, there is a 
prima facie obligation to obey all laws." (Klosko 1992, p.105).
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this obligation would be overridden by the moral requirement not to 
pursue unjust acts. There are two major problems with Klosko's 
example. First, Klosko is appealing to a further moral principle 
(for example that it is wrong to commit unjust actions or support 
their perpetration), which has little in common with the principle 
of fairness. It seems to me that appealing to a further moral 
principle undermines the utility and validity of the principle of 
fairness; I shall return to this point later.
The second reason why Klosko's example is unsatisfactory is 
because it fails to address those hard cases that would really 
stretch his theory of political obligation. Consider the example of 
Great Britain in the 1980's and early 1990's, a state that is 
sufficiently just to be considered legitimate. Apart from providing 
presumptive goods, the government of Great Britain passes or 
preserves laws that many feel to be unjust: examples are the poll 
tax, the T.V. licence, the Road Tax, or adding 17.5% VAT on fuel. 
All four examples have in common the fact of being flat taxes.
In those cases, a citizen may feel that he or she has a 
general obligation to the state, but not towards the single issues 
he or she regards grossly unjust. Thus for example I may feel I 
have an obligation to pay my income tax and respect criminal laws, 
and perhaps even join the army if the country needs me, 
nevertheless I may also feel that the poll tax is unjust. Am I 
under an obligation to pay it? According to Klosko, unquestionably 
'yes'.
The problem I have with such unconditional response is that it
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leaves no room for civil disobedience. This is a clear indication 
that Klosko's theory is clearly unable to deal with the second 
question in the validity-test, namely, being able to distinguish 
between our obligation to obey the laws of a just state, and a non­
obligation to obey single laws deemed to be unjust.
Considering the considerable difficulties Klosko has in 
responding to the validity-test, it is perhaps not surprising that 
on a number of occasions (as in the example of Nazi Germany) Klosko 
admits that fairness theory should be supplemented with other moral 
principles, especially a duty to justice (Klosko 1992, p.91 and 
p.98)^. What Klosko fails to realize is that this concession
threatens to undermine the validity of his theory of political 
obligation.
Surely a moral principle that can justify the provision of 
discretionary goods as well as allow for cases of civil
disobedience, can also justify the provision of presumptive goods
and a general respect for the laws. It follows that this other
moral principle, whatever it may be, is the real foundation behind
^ - Without referring to Klosko's work, Richard Bellamy
reaches the same conclusion, namely, that fairness theory requires 
a substantial account of justice to ground it. According to 
Bellamy, it is essential to the fair-play thesis that the scheme of 
co-operation be fair and the benefits be accepted, yet it is highly 
debatable that agreement can be reached on what counts as fair: 
"Rival accounts can be given, for example, from the perspective of 
desert, need and entitlement, and each of these alternatives are 
open in their turn to differing interpretations ... [W]ithout a 
substantial account of justice to ground it, the fair-play argument 
will be unable to provide an adequate account of political 
obligation" (Bellamy 1994, p.38).
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political obligation^*, indeed it makes the principle of fairness 
entirely redundant.
If fairness theory applies only to simple cases, but requires 
supplementation by other moral principles when confronted with hard 
cases, then the principle of fairness cannot be the foundation for 
a liberal theory of political obligation. Instead we would be 
better advised to look at the other moral principles that 
supplement the principle of fairness for the true foundation of 
political obligation.
So far I have argued that an approach to political obligation 
based on the principle of fairness fails the validity-test. In Part
5.II, I will argue that Waldron's theory of a natural duty to 
justice provides a better theoretical foundation of political 
obligation than the principle of fairness, although it is not as 
convincing as the solution I favour, namely, reasonable agreement.
5.II. Natural Dutv to Justice and Obligation.
In "Special Ties and Natural Duties" Waldron (1993) argues 
that there are two accounts of political obligation: theories of 
acquired obligation and theories of natural duties. So far liberal 
political theorists have neglected theories of natural duties while 
focusing almost entirely on theories of acquired obligation, and as
- In Part 5.Ill, I will argue that the notion of reasonable 
agreement provides the basis for such moral principle.
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a result the debate has been between two approaches to acquired 
obligation: theories of consent and fair play.
Waldron wants to resurrect the theory of natural duty to its 
rightful place at the centre of the debate on political obligation. 
In what follows, I will first give a brief summary of Waldron's 
theory of political obligation as natural duty to justice, followed 
by an account of how his theory fares in terms of the two questions 
that make up the validity-test.
According to Waldron, the claim that we have a natural duty to 
support the laws and institutions of a just state is less well 
known, indeed he tells us that there is less written on it. Waldron 
finds this surprising since he claims that philosophers toy with 
something like the theory of natural duty in almost all their 
theories about what people owe to the state.
It may be argued contra Waldron that his attempt to 
dichotomise the accounts of political obligation into two separate 
camps is illegitimate, since all theories based on consent or fair 
play must necessarily assume natural duties, and vice-versa*. For 
example Rawls's original position is an obvious attempt to device 
the conditions for an hypothetical consent, indeed in a different 
article Waldron rightly points out that according to Rawls: "The 
test of a just society, then, is not whether the individuals who 
live in it have agreed to its terms, but whether its terms can be 
represented as the object of an agreement between them." (Waldron
* - Unless by consent theories Waldron is thinking of only 
actual consent theories, in which case he is challenging a straw 
man.
202
1987, p.142, emphasis in original).
The point is that (hypothetical) consent theories are more 
interested in establishing the terms of a just society, rather then 
portraying the feelings of the individual subjects. Similarly 
theories of natural duties are also interested on the terms of a 
just society; saying that citizens have a duty to support the laws 
and institutions of a just society, or that citizens would consent 
to support the laws and institutions of a just society, amounts to 
the same thing. Hence it appears that there has always been an 
overlap between theories based on consent or fair play and theories 
based on a natural duty to justice.
Yet my major concern with Waldron's approach has little to do 
with his labels, in fact even if we accept Waldron's categories, 
and grant theories of obligation based on natural duties autonomous 
status, I feel there are still some major problems with his thesis; 
in what follows I will argue that Waldron's approach fails because 
of its lack of a meta-ethical dimension, which creates special 
problems especially when Waldron's theory of political obligation 
comes to face issues of civil disobedience.
The backbone of the natural duty position is that our 
cooperation in establishing and sustaining political institutions 
that promote justice is morally required. In order to sustain this 
thesis, Waldron points out that justice is partly a matter of 
cooperation, and partly a matter of coordination. The pursuit of 
justice requires that people cooperate together, and for the 
network of cooperation to be coordinated by institutions.
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Since the avoidance of injustice is a moral imperative, it 
follows that the establishment of coordinating institutions is a 
moral imperative, which means that an institution that fosters 
cooperation and coordination can impose itself on us on moral 
grounds, indeed justifying such imposition is the strength of a 
natural duty approach: "The assumption of the natural duty approach 
is that the pursuit of justice is a moral imperative" (Waldron 
1993, p.28).
Armed with the above account of Waldron's theory of political 
obligation, we can now evaluate how this theory fares in terms of 
the validity-test. It seems to me that Waldron's theory is to be 
preferred to Klosko's on at least one points, in fact Waldron's 
natural duty to justice approach is capable of justifying a duty 
towards a state that provides discretionary goods. Yet Waldron's 
theory is unduly uncompromising in terms of cases of civil 
disobedience, hence it fails the second trial set by the validity- 
test.
By appealing to our natural duty to support the laws and 
institutions of a just state, Waldron may be able to justify a duty 
towards a state that provides discretionary goods. In fact all 
Waldron has to do is to argue that the provision of discretionary 
goods is part of what is considered a just society. Waldron's idea 
of a just society is that of a co-operative venture, hence the 
provision of discretionary goods is needed in order to foster the 
spirit of cooperation.
While it cannot be denied that a society is a co-operative
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venture, I believe there is more to a just society than co­
operation. In other words, it is not co-operation per se that is 
important for a just society, instead what matters are the terms of 
cooperation^^ I believe fair terms of cooperation can be 
established only by a meta-ethical theory, which is something 
totally lacking in Waldron's theory.
It follows that the problem with Waldron's theory of political 
obligation is that it justifies an obligation to a state tout 
court, that is to say, it fails to take account of cases where 
people want to express a dissatisfaction with a specific law 
without necessarily undermining the legitimacy of the state. To 
recapitulate the argument, I believe there are two problems with 
Waldron's approach. First, by defining a just society in terms of 
a co-operative venture, Waldron has no choice but to reject non- 
cooperative actions as unjust. This would include the anti-poll tax 
non-payment campaign, where non-payers would be accused of free 
riding on the co-operative efforts of others.
Secondly, Waldron's approach to the problem of political 
obligation relies heavily on his theory of political legitimacy:
The natural duties come into play only where the organization 
in question passes not only tests of justice and 
effectiveness, but also a test of legitimacy. (Waldron 1993,
p.22)
100 _ Indeed according to Rawls, fair terms of cooperation are 
the foundations of a well-ordered society.
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yet as we shall see his theory of political legitimacy is not 
equipped to deal with specific issues of civil disobedience.
Waldron tells us that political legitimacy has to do with 
"strategic choice in something like a coordination game" (Waldron 
1993, p. 25). It seems to me that this approach to political 
legitimacy has a strong functional flavour, which risks to 
overshadow the important distinction between just and unjust laws 
within a just society. In other words, a system of rules may be 
legitimate, while at the same time a particular law may be 
illegitimate.
To conclude, I am not denying that it is possible to ground 
political obligation on the idea of a natural duty to justice. I 
just think that this theory of political obligation is not 
sufficiently thorough. In particular I am sceptical that this 
approach can ever reconcile political obligation with civil 
disobedience. The natural duty approach is an 'everything-or- 
nothing approach'; unless Waldron supports his theory of a natural 
duty to uphold justice with a meta-ethical account of the just 
society, his theory of political obligation will always lack the 
dimension necessary to deal with issues of civil disobedience.
5.III. Obligation and Reasonable Agreement.
So far I argued that Klosko's approach, based on the principle 
of fairness, fails the validity-test because of its inability to
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justify a duty towards a state providing discretionary goods, as 
well as being unable to reconcile our obligation towards a just 
state, with our right to oppose unjust laws. I have also argued 
that Waldron's approach, based on the idea of a natural duty to 
justice, fails to deal adequately with questions of civil 
disobedience.
I believe that a theory of political obligation based on 
reasonable agreement, where reasonableness is defined by the 
proviso 'not asking for too much', can pass the validity-test by 
providing adequate responses to both questions. Before addressing 
the problem of political obligation, it will be necessary to 
provide a brief restatement of the notion of reasonable agreement.
In Chapter 3, I argued that in the contractualist theory of 
reasonable agreement our moral motivations are defined by the idea 
of agreement, not the concept of reasonableness. The idea of 
agreement states that in seeking an agreement, we are willing to 
compromise the pursuit of our conception of the good in order to 
make room for others^°^. This idea of agreement has a strong 
affinity with the principle of impartiality, where impartiality is 
defined in terms of the belief that the well-being of all moral 
beings matters intrinsically^^, in other words the idea of 
agreement substantiates the recognition of others as having
- M. Gilbert (1993) argues that although the parties of an 
agreement are viewed as separate individuals, by entering an 
agreement we thereby constitute ourselves the members of a 
(collective) we; an agreement is the foundation of mutual 
recognition and joint commitment.
102 - See Kymlicka (1990b), p.111.
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legitimate claims to have their interests taken into account^®^.
Another key aspect of the theory of reasonable agreement is 
that the concept of reasonableness is not the key to our moral 
motivations, instead the concept of reasonableness acts as the 
rationale that illuminates and helps us to understand our moral 
intuitions. Thus in Chapter 4, I argued that reasonableness ought 
to be defined in terms of the maxim 'not asking for too much'.
Starting from this definition of reasonableness, we can define 
the notion of reasonable agreement as an agreement based on the 
desire to seek an agreement, where such desire is qualified by the 
requirement that we should not be 'asking for too much' from 
others.
Now that we have a general idea of the notion of reasonable 
agreement, we must inquire into the ways in which this notion 
relates to the question of political obligation. I think we find 
the answer to this question, albeit at its embryonic stage, in the 
following claim by Scanlon:
An act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances 
would be disallowed by any system of rules for the general 
regulation of behaviour which no one could reasonably reject 
as a basis for an informed, unforced general agreement. 
(Scanlon 1982, p.110)
According to Scanlon, there is a correlation between an act
- See Barry (1989b), p.269.
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that is morally right, and a system of rules which no one could 
reasonably reject. What this means, in terms of political 
obligation, is that we have a duty towards a system of rules that 
is the outcome of a reasonable agreement, or an agreement that no 
one could reasonably reject.
For a theory of political obligation based on reasonable 
agreement, it is important that the system of rules reflects a 
commitment to impartiality, whereby the equal consideration of 
interests of all is defended. The duty of the citizen is directly 
proportional to the impartiality of the system of rules; if 
impartiality is not enforced by the state institutions, the 
conditions for an hypothetical agreement are violated, and as a 
result political obligation is undermined.
Our political obligation is directly related to the neutrality 
of the state, where neutrality means that the system of rules as a 
whole is based on a set of values that no one could reasonably 
reject as the basis of an agreement. It is important to emphasize 
that while we have an obligation to the system of rules as a whole, 
we do not necessarily have an obligation to single rules^ °^ .
The reason why I feel that Scanlon's claim is only a partial 
answer to the problem of political obligation, is because Scanlon 
fails to specify what he considers to be a 'reasonable rejection', 
indeed we have seen that Scanlon eschews all attempts to define the
- For a detailed account of neutrality, see Chapter 7 below; 
'On Liberal Neutrality'.
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elusive concept of reasonableness^^.
By defining the concept of reasonableness in terms of the 
maxim 'not asking for too much', I believe we are in a position to 
deduce from the notion of reasonable agreement a more precise 
account of political obligation. Briefly, the argument runs as 
follows; we have an obligation towards the state if the state 
endorses a system of rules that is not asking for too much from its 
subjects. The idea of agreement, combined with the maxim 'not 
asking for too much', reflects a concern for the consequences of 
our actions on others. This concern is the core intuition behind 
the principle of impartiality, since being concerned with the 
effect of our actions on others enforces the principle of equal 
consideration for other people's interests.
In what follows, I will argue that a theory of political 
obligation based on the notion of reasonable agreement is capable 
of satisfying the requirements set by the validity-test, in fact it 
justifies our duty towards a state that supports the provision of 
discretionary goods, and it reconciles political obligation with 
the principle of civil disobedience.
In order to demonstrate that a theory of political obligation 
grounded on the idea of reasonable agreement is able to justify a 
duty towards a state that provides for discretionary goods, the 
first step will be to show that both discretionary and substantive 
goods are instrumental towards forming a political community based 
on a system of rules that no one could reasonably reject. In other
105 - See Chapter 4, Part I.
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words, a state that provides exclusively substantive goods could be 
reasonably rejected by a faction of citizens.
The key to the idea of reasonable rejection lies in the 
principle of impartiality. Thus a state that provides only 
substantive goods inevitably violates the principle of 
impartiality. If impartiality implies that the well-being of all 
moral beings matters intrinsically, hence that everyone has a 
legitimate claim to have their interests taken into account, then 
by not providing for discretionary goods the state is in fact 
transgressing the interests of those members of a polity that are 
incapable of pursuing their conception of the good.
Another way of expressing this concept is by saying that 
unless a state provides for discretionary goods, some members of 
the polity will be disadvantages by morally arbitrary 
circumstances, such as the natural and social lottery. Furthermore 
for the theory of reasonable agreement, those who would stand to 
gain from a state that provides only substantive goods are not in 
a position to reasonably reject a state that provides both 
substantive and discretionary goods, even if this would mean that 
they are worse off.
Consider the following example. State A provides only 
substantive goods, while State B provides both discretionary goods 
and substantive goods. As a citizen of State A, Margaret (who is 
relatively well-off) would enjoy a living standard of X, while 
under State B Margaret would enjoy a living standard of Y, where Y 
< X. The difference between living standards X and Y is the amount
211
Margaret has to contribute to State B in order for it to provide 
discretionary goods. In other words, X - Y = the difference in 
level of taxation between State A and State B.
According to the theory of reasonable agreement, Margaret has 
a political obligation towards State B, or in other words, Margaret 
cannot reasonably reject the system of laws of State B. Rejecting 
State B on the grounds that one is better off under State A 
contradicts the very idea of agreement, since according to this 
moral motivation Margaret must be willing to compromise the pursuit 
of her conception of the good in order to make room for others.
Although Margaret is better off under State A than State B, 
she cannot claim that state B is asking for too much from her, 
since the maxim 'not asking for too much' only applies to people 
who seek an agreement by endorsing the principle of impartiality, 
which is not the case of Margaret. The inverse is in fact closer to 
the truth. That is to say, all those that would benefit from State 
B can argue that under State A people like Margaret are in fact 
'asking for too much' from them, since they cannot pursue their 
conception of the good (or only under considerable sacrifice) while 
people like Margaret can do so with ease.
So far I have argued that a theory of political obligation 
based on reasonable agreement would justify an obligation towards 
a state providing both substantive and discretionary goods, while 
not necessarily justifying an obligation towards a minimalist state 
providing exclusively substantive goods. I want to consider now the 
case of civil disobedience.
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I believe it can be shown that a theory of political 
obligation grounded on the notion of reasonable agreement does not 
undermine the legitimacy of civil disobedience. That is because 
reasonable agreement is capable of distinguishing between an 
obligation to a just state, and an obligation to a particular law, 
which may be unjust, within a just state.
By grounding political obligation on the theory of reasonable 
agreement we can allow for civil disobedience in cases such as the 
anti-poll tax campaign. The reason why the poll tax was susceptible 
to civil disobedience is because it was not proportionate to 
income. It is this feature of the tax that comes into conflict with 
the notion of reasonable agreement; by unfairly penalizing some 
individuals more than others, a flat tax contradicts the 
foundations of reasonable agreement^®^.
The point to stress here is that one could reasonably reject 
to the poll tax on the grounds that it was based on a principle 
which is irreconcilable with impartiality. By imposing a flat tax 
the British state was in fact discriminating against the less well 
off, making it even more difficult for them to pursue their 
conception of the good.
Although in theory the benefits of paying the poll tax are 
shared by everyone in the community^®^, a flat tax is asking for
- I think the same conclusion applies to all forms of flat 
tax, for example the T.V. licence and road tax. Had the poll tax 
been a progressive tax, I am convinced that it would not have 
instigated the wrath of the British people.
107 _ Even if in practice increases in poll-tax were not 
proportionate to increases in local expenditure.
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'too much' from those who are less wealthy compared to those who 
are more wealthy for the use of the same services. As Bellamy 
points out, the poll tax was held to be related directly to the 
benefits obtained from the services consumed, yet "research in this 
area shows that the poll tax actually had the effect of 
substantially increasing the relative benefit shares of upper 
income groups and lowering that of the poorer groups" (Bellamy 
1994, p.40). It is important to remember that households with an 
average weekly income of between £50 and £200 were on average net 
losers under the poll tax, while the rest were on average net 
gainers. Furthermore while those with an average weekly income of 
under £50 gained on average by 0.01%, those with an average weekly 
income of over £500 gained on average by over 6.73
Grounding political obligation on the notion of a reasonable 
agreement, where reasonableness is defined as 'not asking for too 
much', enables us to develop a double-standard, whereby one can 
express an obligation towards the just state (for example by paying 
income tax or peacefully accepting the results of a general 
election), while at the same time rejecting the obligation to 
follow single laws deemed unjust (the poll tax).
5.IV. Moral and Political Obligation.
In this chapter I have argued that the notion of reasonable
108 - See Gibson (1990), Ch.5; quoted in Bellamy (1994), p.33n.
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agreement provides persuasive answers to the two questions that 
make up the validity-test for theories of political obligation. 
Compared to the theories of Klosko and Waldron, grounding political 
obligation on the notion of reasonable agreement has two major 
advantages. First, it justifies a duty towards a state that 
provides both substantive and discretionary goods. Secondly, it 
reconciles political obligation with cases of civil disobedience, 
thus for example according to reasonable agreement it is not 
inconsistent for British residents to feel an obligation towards 
the British state, while at the same time feeling no obligation to 
pay the poll tax.
It must be said that grounding a theory of political 
obligation on reasonable agreement is not the only way to overcome 
the question of civil disobedience. Among contemporary political 
philosophers, Bhikhu Parekh (1993) is one of the few to have 
considered civil disobedience as a special case for political 
obligation, indeed he goes as far as to argue that civil 
disobedience is the very essence of political obligation. For this 
reason Parekh's theory deserves detailed consideration. Yet I 
believe that a closer inspection will show that Parekh's theory of 
political obligation is not as persuasive as it appeared at first, 
in fact Parekh redefines the concept of political obligation in 
such a way that its problematic nature is obfuscated.
At the basis of Parekh's argument we find two claims: first, 
that political obligation is not about obeying the civil authority 
or the law (he refers to these respectively as civil and legal
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obligation), instead political obligation is about one's 
relationship to fellow-citizens collectively, or more specifically 
one's membership of a polity or community, the conduct of its 
collective affairs, and the preservation and enrichment of the 
quality of its collective life (Parekh 1993, p.243). Secondly, that 
citizens are above all moral agents, therefore capable of 
autonomous choice and responsible for the consequences of their 
actions (Parekh 1993, p.240).
On the basis of these two claims, Parekh builds a theory of 
political obligation which does not stop at a duty to obey the law. 
According to Parekh's theory, political obligation is about 
defending the interests of the moral community, even if this means 
breaking the law:
If they [citizens] feel convinced after calm reflection that 
a law confronts them with unacceptable demands or is likely to 
cause serious harm to the interests of the community, they 
have an obligation to criticize and protest against it and 
even perhaps disobey it. Such disobedience temporarily 
suspends their legal obligation in a specific area and affirms 
their status as moral agents. (Parekh 1993, p.240)
The above claim shows that according to Parekh civil 
disobedience is at the very heart of political obligation in 
general, and of an obligation to support a moral community in 
particular:
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I have tried to show so far, somewhat tentatively, that 
citizens have several obligations in addition to obeying the 
law. These include an obligation to take an active interest 
and to participate in the conduct of public affairs, to keep 
a critical eye on the activities of the government, to speak 
up against injustices of their society, to stand up for those 
too demoralized, confused and powerless to fight for 
themselves, and in general to help create a rich and lively 
community. (Parekh 1993, p.243)
There is no doubt that Parekh's account of political 
obligation is appealing. First of all, it takes seriously the 
question of political disobedience. Secondly, because Parekh builds 
his theory of political obligation around the question of civil 
disobedience, he can easily justify a duty towards a state that 
provides discretionary goods. The argument would run along the 
following lines: unless the state provides for discretionary goods, 
citizens have a duty to protest. In fact the provision of 
discretionary goods is essential in order to redress 'the injustice 
of society', to help those 'too demoralized, confused and 
powerless', and in order to create 'a rich and lively community'.
Notwithstanding the appeal of Parekh's theory, I feel there is 
a major weakness in his account, namely, it is not an account of 
political obligation, instead it is an account of moral obligation. 
Parekh distinguishes between legal, civil and political obligation, 
claiming that obeying the law is a legal obligation, while politics
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and political obligation is about the community of moral agents. I 
believe this distinction is suspect.
The accounts of political obligation discussed in this 
chapter, as well as the majority of other theories of political 
obligation that I have failed to mention, are concerned with our 
duty to obey the law, yet Parekh relegates this to the secondary 
question of legal obligation. It follows that Parekh's account of 
political obligation has in fact very little to do with the rest of 
the literature on the subject.
Contrary to the views of Parekh, I feel that (a) we cannot 
make a distinction between legal, civil and political, since the 
overlap between these three spheres is too great; and (b) Parekh 
fails to specify with sufficient accuracy the relationship between 
political obligation and moral obligation. I will consider these 
two issues separately.
Concerning the first issue, Parekh fails to show that there is 
a difference between a legal and a civil obligation, and between 
the latter and political obligation. Thus Parekh claims that 
although legal obligation presupposes and is derived from civil 
obligation, these two types of obligations are not the same thing.
The example Parekh appeals to in order to make this point is 
that of wars or other types of national emergency, where the 
subjects are expected to give their full support and loyalty to the 
civil authority: Parekh concludes that "this has nothing to do with 
obeying the law". It seems to me that the example chosen by Parekh 
undermines the very distinction he is trying to make. When in the
218
I960's the young American boxer Cassius Clay (before he became 
Muhamed Ali) refused to be drafted to Vietnam, he was sentenced to 
jail for five months: it is because he refused to obey the law that 
he went to jail, not because he was expected to give full support 
to his civil authority. This example shows that Parekh has not been 
successful in distinguishing legal from civil obligations.
Similarly I believe Parekh fails to provide solid foundations 
for the subsequent distinction between civil and political 
obligation. He claims that citizens are primarily related to each 
other, and only secondarily to the civil authority (Parekh 1993, 
p.244), therefore citizens (political obligations) come before 
civil authority (civil obligations). Again I find this distinction 
hard to accept; to the extent that it is difficult (if not 
impossible) to distinguish the concept of citizenship from the 
context of civil authority in which it is defined, I cannot see how 
Parekh can claim that the obligation between citizens has priority 
over the obligation of the citizen to the civil authority.
Turning to the second issue, I find Parekh's treatment of 
political and moral obligation vague and ultimately unpersuasive. 
While the question of moral obligation is very important and 
perhaps slightly neglected by the literature, it is a different 
question from political obligation, dealing with different issues 
and focusing on different social agents. Theories of moral 
obligation are interested in the (horizontal) obligation of 
citizens to their fellow citizens, hence they are concerned with 
what contractualist authors referred to as the pactum unionis. On
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the other hand theories of political obligation are interested in 
the (vertical) obligation of citizens to their rulers, hence they 
are concerned with what contractualist authors referred to as the 
pactum subjectionis.
Saying that moral obligation is not identical to political 
obligation does not mean that moral and political obligation cannot 
be reconciled, but it does mean that the relationship between 
politics and morality concerning questions of obligation must be 
the subject of a meticulous and careful examination. Unfortunately 
Parekh fails to provide this.
Parekh's main intention in his article is to distance 
political obligation away from legal obligation, and bring it under 
the wing of moral obligation. According to Parekh there is no 
reason why all obligations should be imposed by law, indeed Parekh 
claims that political obligation:
is a species of moral not legal obligation and falls outside 
the ambit of law. Political obligation is moral in its nature 
and form, political in its origin and content. (Parekh 1993, 
p.250)
Parekh's attempt to bridge the gap between the spheres of 
political obligation and moral obligation is interesting, yet I 
fail to see what he gains by rejecting any affinity with legal 
obligation. If Parekh's political obligation is not about legal 
obligation, then it cannot be compared to all the other theories of
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political obligation, since in the last analysis Parekh is not 
confronting the question whether citizens have an obligation to 
obey the laws of the state. In other words by redefining the 
question of political obligation Parekh is avoiding all the major 
problems that inflict other theories of political obligation.
Furthermore, although Parekh wants to harmonize political 
obligation with moral obligation, he avoids tackling the key 
question: What is the relationship between morality and politics? 
Parekh's claim that "Political obligation is moral in its nature 
and form, political in its origin and content" is an ingenious way 
of dodging the issue. If political and moral obligation are to be 
reconciled, as I think they should, the only way of doing so is to 
grab the bull by the horns and work out what the moral nature of 
political obligation is, and how it relates to the political 
content.
In this chapter I have argued that in the contractualist 
theory of reasonable agreement, the idea of agreement and the maxim 
'not asking for too much' provide the basis for a moral discourse, 
hence reasonable agreement is a sounder ethical foundation for a 
theory of political obligation. In order to support this claim I 
have argued that a theory of political obligation based on 
reasonable agreement does a better job of distinguishing 
discretionary from presumptive goods, and of explaining why (and 
when) we have an obligation to a non-minimal state.
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6. SOCIAL JUSTICE: 
A COMPATIBILIST APPROACH
If there is a conclusive statement to be drawn from the many 
debates featuring social justice since 1971, it is that all 
theories of justice can be reduced to a priori moral intuitions. In 
fact it would be surprising if that was not the case. The very 
purpose of a theory of justice is to capture our moral intuitions 
about the concept of justice as the prime social value, and to 
formulate principles that determine the justice or injustice of 
situations and institutions^^,
The major problem political philosophers face, when dealing 
with the concept of social justice, is that it is impossible to 
make a direct equation between justice and our moral intuitions, 
since we are moved by a plethora of moral intuitions, and depending 
on the circumstances we appeal to one intuition rather than 
another. Indeed, it is not uncommon that we simultaneously appeal 
to more than one intuition. That is why any theory of justice that 
stems from any one intuition will always appear unsatisfactorily
- For a useful discussion of the concept/conception 
distinction, see Campbell (1988), Chapter 1.
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narrow and ultimately indefensible“°. It follows therefore that, 
rather than argue for the superiority of one moral intuition over 
another, a theory of justice should ideally try to reconcile 
different moral intuitions.
In particular, I believe that two moral intuitions are at a 
basis of social justice: that it is unfair to suffer from ill-luck, 
and that it is unfair to be taken advantage of (i.e. have others 
free ride on your efforts) . A theory of justice must be able to 
find room for both intuitions, and to resolve conflicts which arise 
when these two intuitions inevitably clash. Indeed the soundness of 
a theory of justice is directly proportional to its overall 
coherence after the reconciliation between compensating for ill- 
luck and rewarding merit has taken place.
These two fundamental moral intuitions are represented by two 
separate principles: respectively the principle of compensation and 
the principle of responsibility; these two principles will be 
analyzed in Part 6.1. In Part 6.II and 6.Ill, I will attempt to 
argue for a theory of justice that is conceived from the successful 
(unforced) marriage between the principles of compensation and 
responsibility. I will refer to this as the compatibilist theory of 
justice. In 6.IV and 6.V, I will argue that the compatibilist
- I believe this is the essence of James Fishkin's critique 
of systematic justice. A systematic theory of justice provides us 
(among other things) with an ideal which requires one or more first 
principles that hold without exception. This is the case of Rawls's 
theory of justice as fairness or utilitarianism. Fishkin argues 
that there are fundamental moral conflicts among competing first or 
ultimate principles, or in other words we have competing 'ideals 
without an ideal', hence no systematic theory of justice will ever 
be satisfactory. See Fishkin (1992), Part One.
223
theory of justice is not adverse to Rawls's theory of justice, 
indeed I believe that Rawls's second principles of justice 
exemplifies aspects of compensation as well as responsibility. 
Finally, in 6.VI I will argue that a theory of justice that 
reconciles the principles of responsibility and compensation would 
be endorsed by the contractualist theory of reasonable agreement.
6.1. What is Justice?
At least since Aristotle, it has become accepted that 
questions of social justice strike at the heart of egalitarian 
considerations"!. Echoing Aristotle's famous claim from the 
Politics that "all hold that justice is some kind of equality", 
Perelman claims that:
To everyone the idea of justice inevitably suggests the notion 
of a certain equality. From Plato and Aristotle, through St. 
Thomas Aquinas, down to the jurists, moralists and 
philosophers of our own day runs a thread of universal 
agreement on this point. The notion of justice consists in a 
certain application of the notion of equality. (Perelman 1963,
p.12)
!" - For a brief account of the correlation between justice and 
equality in the history of political philosophy, see Del Vecchio 
(1952) .
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The question for social justice is how to interpret and define 
the application of the notion of equality. Although to be just is 
to treat in equal fashion, it would be a mistake to assume that 
social justice can be reduced to the notion of treating everyone 
equally. As Dworkin and Kymlicka rightly point out, there are two 
ways of interpreting an egalitarian theory: in terms of treating 
everyone in the same way (for example by providing a perfectly 
equal distribution of income), or in terms of treating people as 
equals (for example acknowledging that each citizen is entitled to 
equal concern and respect). Theories of social justice are 
egalitarian in the latter sense.
Thus contemporary theories of social justice are concerned to 
explain and justify both equalities and inequalities; on the 
'equality' side of this equation, all theories of justice must 
explain the concept of treating people as equals, while on the 
'inequality' side of the equation, all theories of justice must 
justify legitimate grounds for differential treatment. The 
important point to emphasize is that all inequalities must be 
inferred from the initial postulate of equality. Thus for example 
Rawls starts from an account of an initial condition of equality 
(namely, the original position), and from this basic premise of 
equality he deduces principles that justify unequal treatment (the 
difference principle).
Starting from the assumption that social justice is concerned 
with the distribution of benefits and burdens, in what follows I 
will address two ways in which the egalitarian core of social
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justice can be addressed. First of all, we can think of principles 
that reflect our intuitions about equal justice, indeed two 
principles have dominated the discussion on social justice: 
responsibility and compensation. Secondly, the sense in which 
justice encompasses equality is determined by the criterion of 
distribution which represents the best endorsement of equality. I 
suggest we start with a detailed inquiry into the principles of 
compensation and responsibility.
In Chapter 5 of Utilitarianism, J.S.Mill investigates the 
connection between justice and utility. Here we find one of the 
most persuasive and succinct accounts of the two dominant but 
conflicting principles of justice. Mill asks whether, in a co­
operative industrial association, it is just or not that talent or 
skill should give a title to superior remuneration. On one side. 
Mill claims that it should not:
whoever does the best he can, deserves equally well, and ought 
not in justice to be put in a position of inferiority for no 
fault of his own. (J.S.Mill 1972, p.60)
On the other hand. Mill recognizes that it should:
society receives more from the more efficient labourer; that 
his service being more useful, society owes him a larger 
return for them; that a greater share of the joint result is 
actually his work, and not to allow his claim to it is a kind
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of robbery. (J.S.Mill 1972, p.60)
According to Mill, justice has two sides to it, which are 
impossible to appease and harmonize. In order to break the 
deadlock. Mill's solution is to appeal to a third principle, 
namely, social utility.
I believe Mill has pinpointed, with characteristic clarity and 
precision, the key question at the centre of all debates on social 
justice. Nevertheless, I believe there is at least one alternative 
solution to the problem concerning social justice to the one 
favoured by Mill. Contrary to Mill's own views, I believe it is 
possible to bring the two sides of justice into harmony; this is 
the goal of the compatibilist theory of justice I will be defending 
in this chapter.
The two positions discussed by Mill can respectively be 
labelled the principle of compensation, and the principle of 
responsibility. Before attempting to provide an alternative answer 
to Mill's principle of social utility, it is important to explore 
the two moral intuitions behind the principles of compensation and 
responsibility.
Consider the following example. After a shipwreck, Ottavio and 
Anna drift on to a tropical island where the only edible type of 
food is coconuts. Let's assume that the two individuals set out 
searching for food, and to make their search more efficient they 
set out in different directions: Ottavio goes to the east, and Anna 
to the west.
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At the end of the day they meet again. Ottavio has brought 
back eighteen coconuts, Anna only two. At this point Ottavio says: 
"I worked hard to find these eighteen coconuts, therefore I have a 
right to all eighteen of them". Anna replies "I worked hard to find 
my two coconuts, but I was unlucky to explore the western side of 
the island where there are very few coconut trees. Furthermore it 
is not my fault if I am only 5 feet tall, while you are seven feet 
tall, hence I cannot reach the coconuts high on the tree. Therefore 
we should divide the twenty coconuts equally, taking ten each". The 
argument put forward by Anna rests on the principle of compensation 
for ill-luck. Justice should compensate for brute bad luck, in this 
case the unfortunate choice of a direction or the fact of not being 
taller.
Consider now another example. Let's assume that two more 
individuals, Masetto and Elvira, are again stranded on a tropical 
island, where the same conditions as in the example of Ottavio and 
Anna apply. Desperate for food, Masetto and Elvira decide to look 
for coconuts by exploring different directions, hence Elvira goes 
north and Masetto south (the coconut trees are evenly spread 
between the north and south coasts of the island).
At the end of the day Elvira brings back eighteen coconuts and 
Masetto only two. Masetto says: "I worked as hard as I could all 
day, it is not my fault if I could only find two coconuts, 
therefore we should divide the total in half". Elvira replies: "I 
have worked hard to find these eighteen coconuts, never taking a 
rest. I climbed on the top of a tree to fetch a coconut and from
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there I could see you sleeping under the shade. Throughout the day 
I have checked on you regularly and you were always sleeping in the 
shade. You are lazy and you want to eat the fruit of my labour. 
Therefore I am going to keep all my coconuts". The argument put 
forward by Elvira rests on the principle of responsibility. Justice 
should not compensate for inequalities when these are the result of 
voluntary acts for which we are directly responsible, in this case 
the choice to being lazy rather than productive.
I hope the two examples show that in determining the core 
principle of social justice, it is impossible to choose between 
responsibility and compensation, since both arguments are 
intuitively valid. Both Anna and Elvira are advancing a valid 
claim, hence a theory of justice that takes account of only one 
criterion at the expense of the other must be incomplete and 
unsatisfactory.
In order to show that the principles of responsibility and 
compensation have an intuitive appeal, I have made use of two 
hypothetical examples featuring Ottavio, Anna, Masetto and Elvira. 
Some readers may feel that the hypothetical examples I have used 
are hopelessly unrealistic, abstract and ultimately unconvincing, 
so that these examples cannot be trusted to validate our moral 
intuitions. Before going any further, I want to justify the nature 
of the above examples.
The purpose of the two examples was simply to add substance to 
the principles of responsibility and compensation, while 
emphasizing their basic moral intuitions. The advantage of abstract
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examples is that they do not force us to think in terms of policy 
recommendations at an early stage in our argument. The two 
paradigmatic positions espoused by Anna and Elvira are both 
intuitively correct, hence they must be seen as two sides of the 
same coin. This is important because the starting point of our 
investigation on social justice must be the recognition that there 
is more overlap than fracture between the principles of 
responsibility and compensation.
In what follows, I want to consider how the principles of 
compensation and responsibility apply to the distribution of 
benefits and burdens. My argument will be divided in two parts. 
First, I will show that the principles of responsibility and 
distribution advance two radically opposed criteria of 
distribution, respectively choicism and anti-brute luck. 
Subsequently, I will put forward a solution that seeks to reconcile 
these two criteria.
6.II. Choicism and Anti-Brute Luck.
The criteria of choicism and anti-brute luck cover the full 
range of possible solutions to the problem of distribution. The 
core postulate behind these two arguments have been captured by 
Brian Barry in his "Chance, Choice, and Justice", indeed in this 
section I will be following closely Barry's exposition.
The anti-brute luck argument claims that "the victims of ill
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luck should as far as possible be made as well off as those who are 
similarly placed in all respects other than having suffered this 
piece of bad luck." (Barry 1991, p.142). Clearly the anti-brute 
luck argument stems from the principle of compensation, namely, 
compensation for ill-luck.
On the other hand the choicist argument maintains that "social 
arrangements should be such that people finish up with the outcomes 
of their voluntary acts." (Barry 1991, p.142). Once again, it is 
easy to spot the correlation between this argument and the
principle of responsibility, in fact the choicist argument tells us 
that ultimately we are responsible for the outcomes of our acts.
It is important to remember that the choicist and anti-brute 
luck arguments are conceptual paradigms"^. In other words, the
choicist and anti-brute luck approaches are umbrella-categories 
covering a vast spectrum of positions. For example, the most 
extreme choicist position is given by Nozick in Anarchv. State, and 
Utopia, whose views can be summed up by the maxim "from each as
they choose, to each as they are chosen". At the opposite pole, the
extreme anti-brute luck position is given by Marx, whose views can 
be summed up by the maxim "From each according to their ability, to 
each according to their needs".
These two extreme positions are equally unpersuasive since 
they totally and unremittingly deny the opposite camp any say in
112 _ This adds justification to my choice of abstract and 
unrealistic examples in section 6.1; because of the theoretical 
nature of the choicist and anti-brute luck arguments, their 
respective core theses can only be captured via hypothetical 
thought experiments.
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the matter. For example according to Nozick, voluntary exchange is 
the only valid criterion of distributive justice, indeed there is 
nothing unfair about the state of affairs whereby the only thing 
preventing Anna from starving to death is the generosity of 
Ottavio. On the other hand, according to Marx need is the only 
valid criterion of distribution, where need is directly 
proportional to brute luck. Yet between these two extremes there is 
a whole range of positions which allows for some degree of 
amalgamation between the choicist and anti-brute luck arguments.
In what follows I want to reject the two extreme positions of 
Nozick and Marx as non-starters, and concentrate on the various 
degrees in which the choicist and anti-brute luck arguments can 
overlap. For simplicity's sake, these positions can be depicted as 
points on a continuum line:
A <------ B ------ C ------------- D -------E ------- > F
choicist anti-brute luck
Figure 6.1
Positions A, B and C belong to the choicist camp, while 
positions D, E and F belong to the anti-brute luck camp. We have 
already met positions A and F, they are advocated respectively by 
Nozick and Marx. The other four positions (B, C, D and E) belong to 
either the choicist or anti-brute luck camp, although they all
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recognize to some degree the validity of the opposing camp. In 
other words we are not facing an either/or question, instead the 
question here is one of proportion or degree of overlap.
Following Brian Barry's (1991) argument, although not always 
his terminology, I will refer to these four intermediate positions 
as follows:
B - Extreme choicism 
C - Moderate choicism 
D - Moderate anti-brute luck 
E - Extreme anti-brute luck.
I have said before that choicism is an umbrella-category which 
embraces a number of positions. Thus while a choicist is someone 
"who wants to show that it is consistent with justice to give the 
principle of personal responsibility a lot of scope at the expense 
of the principle of compensation, while acknowledging the validity 
of both principles" (Barry 1991, p.144), we can distinguish between 
two separate positions, which I will call extreme choicism and 
moderate choicism.
Extreme and moderate choicism are distinguishable by the fact 
that the former is closer to Nozick's position while the latter is 
closer to the anti-brute luck argument. This means that extreme 
choicism believes that as long as everyone has access to the same 
resources, all subsequent inequalities can be defended as arising 
from voluntary choices; thus we find for example that extreme
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choicists appeal to the institution of insurance as a justification 
for their approach^". On the other hand moderate choicism believes 
that although choice and responsibility are fundamental, the 
significance of choice in justifying unequal outcomes has been 
overstated; for example we are not always responsible for our 
choices, or alternatively, even if everyone has equal access to the 
same resources, these may in fact prove to be more favourable to 
one person rather than another. For these reasons moderate choicism 
renounces the insurance argument so dear to extreme choicism.
The same distinction that applies to the choicist camp, also 
applies to the anti-brute luck camp between extreme and moderate 
anti-brute luck arguments. Extreme anti-brute luck takes a strong 
deterministic line, arguing that no tastes, aspirations, or beliefs 
can ever be chosen or changed as a result of choice; since people 
cannot be held responsible for their tastes, aspirations, or 
beliefs, they cannot be held responsible for the outcomes of 
actions that flow from them. Moderate anti-brute luck abandons the 
deterministic stand, and instead settles for a case-by-case 
approach: some preferences, it is supposed, will give rise to
personal responsibility, hence justifying subsequent inequalities, 
although many others will not.
So far I have argued that the two opposing camps of choicism 
and anti-brute luck hold a number of positions from extreme to 
moderate. I have also argued that a theory of justice must find a
- "Someone who loses everything in a fire can justly be left 
destitute because the option of insuring against the loss was 
available and not taken" (Barry 1991, p.145).
234
way of reconciling these two camps, since each camp is motivated by 
a valid intuition. In what follows, I will attempt to reconcile the 
principles of responsibility and compensation by accommodating 
choicism and anti-brute luck under one criterion of distribution, 
namely, the semi-choicist solution.
6.III. The Semi-Choicist Solution.
Of course managing the reconciliation between choicism and 
anti-brute luck is not as simple as it may appear, since there is 
a strong risk that one of the two camps will collapse under the 
weight of the other camp. The difficulty for a theory of justice, 
as Barry rightly points out, is not only to reconcile these two 
criteria, but to do so in such a way that one criterion does not 
collapse into the other criterion. That is to say, anti-brute luck 
should not swallow up choice, nor choice swallow up anti-brute 
luck.
If we follow our intuition that a theory of justice must be 
capable of reconciling compensation with responsibility, then we 
must investigate the possibility of striking a comfortable 
compromise between anti-brute luck and choicism. It is surprising 
to find that not many philosophers since J.S. Mill have attempted 
to reconcile the principles of compensation and responsibility in 
a theory of justice. So far the best attempt to tread this middle 
road is Barry's account of the semi-choicist solution. In what
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follows I will first analyze Barry's semi-choicist solution. 
Subsequently, I will argue that in order to make the semi-choicist 
solution as strong as possible, it is necessary to supplement 
Barry's general argument with a supplementary criterion.
Barry's own solution to the problem of reconciling choicism 
with anti-brute luck is what he calls the semi-choicist position. 
His starting point is to accept the anti-brute luck premise that it 
is legitimate to look behind choices to preferences before 
establishing personal responsibility for outcomes: "People are,
indeed, responsible for the outcomes of actions only if they are 
also responsible for the preferences from which those actions flow" 
(Barry 1991, p.156). Yet beyond this point Barry's takes a 
different line from the anti-brute luck position. While the anti­
brute luck criterion makes responsibility for preference depend 
upon their being subject to choice, Barry suggests an original 
account of what it means to be responsible for one's own 
preferences :
The alternative I propose is that people are responsible for 
their preferences whenever they are content with them. How 
these preferences originated is irrelevant, and the ease with 
which they could be changed is relevant only in this way: that 
we would have to question the sincerity of your claim not to 
want to have the preferences you actually do have if it were 
easy for you to change them.
I shall call this view 'semi-choicism', since it abandons
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the choicist resistance to any inquiry into responsibility for 
preferences, but rejects the anti-choicist criterion for 
responsibility for preferences. (Barry 1991, p.156; emphasis 
added)
According to Barry, the whole idea of choosing preferences is 
misguided. Thus instead of making responsibility for preference 
depend upon their being subject to choice, the semi-choicist 
solution suggests that one is responsible for one's own preferences 
if one is content with one's preferences.
In order to appreciate the strength of Barry's solution, I 
suggest we consider the following example. Leporello and Giovanni 
are two junior lecturers in tenure track positions. At the end of 
their three-year temporary appointment, we find that Leporello has 
published a number of articles in important journals, and thus is 
given tenure. On the other hand Giovanni has not published a single 
article and is not given the tenure position. Is this fair?
We know that Giovanni is a keen bridge player, and everyday 
after his teaching is over he goes to his bridge club. Considering 
this, the anti-brute luck criterion would tell us that there is 
nothing unfair about the awarding of tenure to Leporello but not to 
Giovanni, since Leporello has chosen to pursue his academic career 
during his free time, while Giovanni has chosen to perfect his 
bridge playing. To the extent that they have chosen their 
preferences, Leporello and Giovanni are responsible for their 
actions.
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It would appear that this first solution works, certainly in 
the case of the two lecturers it intuitively seems to give the 
right answer. Yet this idea of choices of preferences has a major 
fallacy, namely, it assumes that we have complete control over our 
preferences, while in fact it has been argued that that is not the 
case.
Of course one of the problem we face is that the concept of 
preferences defies a precise definition, therefore it is difficult 
to say anything conclusive about preferences. Yet if we assume that 
preferences refer to our tastes, aspirations and beliefs, it is not 
always the case that we have control over our preferences. For 
example, to what extent do 1 have control over the fact that 1 like 
strawberries more than apples, or that 1 have a certain sexual 
inclination, or that 1 hold certain religious beliefs"^?
If we question our ability to modify our preferences, then we 
must allow for cases where a person is not responsible even if that 
person has certain preferences. This leads us to the second 
possible solution, namely, the semi-choicist solution. Consider the 
following example. A person may suffer from certain preferences, 
such as smoking, drinking, drug abuse or eating disorders. Although 
these are the result of certain preferences, we can argue that to 
the extent that this person genuinely wants to change these 
preferences, he or she should not be considered responsible.
- Religious beliefs are usually the result of a certain 
upbringing, which implies that a person has very little control 
over his or her religious beliefs.
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The problem of dealing with eating disorders is particularly 
revealing. As Naomi Wolf (1990) argues, the beauty myth may drive 
a woman (say Zerlina) to become bulimic or anorexic. Yes, it is her 
preference to become 'beautiful', furthermore it was her choice to 
follow a diet, but she is certainly not content with the state she 
is in now. Hence we could argue that Zerlina should be offered 
psychotherapy on the NHS.
Barry's semi-choicist solution does a better job of dealing 
with Zerlina's case. Barry suggests that people are responsible for 
their preferences whenever they are content with them, and not if 
the preferences are the subject of choice. Thus in the case of 
Zerlina, we have to ask ourselves if Giovanni is content with the 
choice of her preferences. I think it is fair to assume that she 
would rather not have been anorexic or bulimic, even if it was her 
choice to follow a diet. Zerlina's case shows that one is not 
always responsible for the outcome of one's actions even if those 
follow from chose preferences.
I believe Zerlina's example shows the limits of the anti-brute 
luck argument, and the advantages of the semi-choicist solution. 
Both theories would agree that Giovanni should not be given tenure, 
although they give different reasons; according to the anti-brute 
luck argument, the problem is that Giovanni chose his preference to 
play bridge, while according to the semi-choicist argument, the 
problem is that he was content to play bridge. It follows that in 
cases such as Zerlina, the two theories give different responses. 
According to the anti-brute luck argument, Zerlina has chosen her
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preference of following a diet, hence she should not claim for 
compensation, while according to the semi-choicist solution Zerlina 
should be compensated. In cases such as Zerlina's, the solution 
given by the semi-choicist argument appears to be considerably more 
convincing than the anti-brute luck argument.
While Barry's semi-choicist solution, based on the criterion 
of content for one's preferences, is the best attempt to reconcile 
compensation with responsibility, it can be argued that there is 
still room for improvement.
First of all, although in the case of Zerlina's eating 
disorder Barry's criterion of content seems to give the right 
response, there appears to be a complication with Barry's semi- 
choicist solution, namely, it is not clear whether the criterion of 
content applies to the preferences as such, or to the consequences 
of acting on one's preferences. Let's assume that I go to a party 
with a group of vodka-loving Russian friends: does content refer to 
my preference to drink vodka rather than orange juice, or does it 
refer to the consequences of my actions (the fact that I am not 
content with the hangover resulting from drinking two bottles of 
vodka in one night).
Secondly, it seems to me that Barry's criterion of being 
content with one's preferences is not sufficiently robust to stand 
as the sole foundation for the semi-choicist solution“ .^ In fact
- At the end of his article on "Chance, Choice, and 
Justice", Barry points out that his analysis of chance and choice 
is only a brief venture in this subject area, and that "More works 
needs to be done to refine the analysis and to apply it" (Barry 
1991, p.158), indeed Barry has promised his readers a more thorough
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while in most cases we can identify responsibility by equating 
one's preferences with one's contentment, there are some cases when 
one is not responsible for one's preferences even if one is content 
with them, as well as cases when one is responsible for one's 
preferences even if one is not content with them.
I am referring to cases when one acts upon a preference in 
ignorance of the possible repercussions it may have, hence one is 
content of one's preference only because one did not know better. 
In order for the semi-choicist solution to take these cases into 
account, it is necessary to expand the criteria of responsibility 
for one's preferences. Thus I believe that in order to establish 
one's responsibility one must (a) look at the preferences and ask 
whether one is content with them, and (b) establish whether one is 
accountable for the consequences of one's preferences. I will refer 
to the latter condition as the criterion of liability.
The limits of Barry's semi-choicist solution can be exposed by 
considering another type of example. There are two patients in a 
NHS hospital, where (needless to say) resources are scarce. Both 
patients suffer from smoking-related illnesses, and require a lung 
transplant. Patient A is 56 years old, and started smoking in 1954 
when he was 16. Patient B is 2 6 and started smoking in 1984 when 
she was 16. If the hospital has the opportunity of carrying out one 
transplant immediately, who should be the lucky recipient? We know
examination in a forthcoming volume of his Treatise on Social 
Justice. What follows is not meant to be a critique of Barry's 
theory, but simply a contribution to the analysis of chance and 
choice.
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that the cause of their illness is smoking, and we must assume that 
smoking is a preference. Furthermore if we examine the preferences 
of the two patients, we find that they are both content to be 
smokers. Should we deduce from this that there is nothing 
distinguishing patients A and B, and therefore some form of lottery 
is the best form of resource allocation?
I want to argue that there is a major difference between 
patient A and patient B that is not detected by Barry's criterion 
of content. The difference is that when patient A started smoking 
in 1954, he could not have known of the health hazard associated 
with the habit, while patient B, who started smoking in the 1980s, 
must have been particularly stubborn to neglect the anti-smoking 
campaigns (not to mention the Government's health warnings against 
smoking printed in bold letters on every packet of cigarettes), 
hence patient B should have known better than to become a smoker. 
The case of the two patients illustrates what can be called the 
liability question, since the evaluation of the responsibility of 
the two patients over their preferences takes into account whether 
they could-have-known-better.
The example of the two NHS patients shows that Barry's 
criterion of content is not sufficiently comprehensive to take into 
account all possible cases. In particular, the criterion of content 
is incapable of identifying cases where someone is not-responsible 
even if the person is content with his/her preferences. This is why 
I feel that Barry's criterion of content should be supplemented by 
the criterion of liability, in other words when assessing people's
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preferences we should consider both the question of content and the 
question of not-knowing-better.
The idea that responsibility is related to the fact that "one 
should have known better" is highlighted by Scanlon (1988b) in his 
account of justice and choice. Scanlon considers the example of the 
removal and disposing of some hazardous waste. Although the 
authorities did all they could to warn and protect them (by 
building a high fence around the excavation site, placing large 
signs warning of the danger, arranging for the removal and 
transportation to take place at night, etc.), some chemicals were 
released into the air. Sometime later, two persons suffered from 
lung damage. Person A was unfortunate to be particularly sensitive 
or even genetically predisposed, and suffered as a result of the 
chemicals released into the air. Person B heard the warnings but 
did not take them seriously, and her curiosity led her to climb the 
fence and inspect the site herself. According to Scanlon, Person B
"bears the responsibility of her own injury ....  By choosing, in
the face of all warnings, to go to the excavation site, she laid 
down her right to complain of the harm she suffered as a result" 
(Scanlon 1988b, p.192).
Let's recapitulate the argument so far. The primary objective 
of this chapter is to show that the principles of compensation and 
responsibility are both equally valid, hence the problem liberal 
political philosophy faces is not choosing one or the other, but 
instead reconciling these two principles. By looking at the problem 
of establishing the best criterion of distribution, I have argued
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in favour of a solution which successfully reconciles the criteria 
of distribution implied by the principles of compensation and 
responsibility.
Having established a criterion of distribution that appears to 
successfully reconcile the principles of responsibility and 
compensation, it is now necessary to situate this criterion within 
the wider scope of a theory of justice. Fortunately this project is 
less daunting than it may appear, since there is already a theory 
of justice that portrays the characteristics of compatibility 
between the principles of responsibility and compensation. In what 
follows, I will argue that the semi-choicist solution is not 
adverse to Rawls's theory of justice, indeed I believe that Rawls's 
second principles of justice exemplifies aspects of compensation as 
well as responsibility.
6.IV. The Principle of Responsibilitv and Justice as Fairness.
The proposed attempt to reconciling the compatibilist theory 
of justice presented in parts 6.II and 6.Ill, with Rawls's theory 
of justice as fairness, may appear (to say the least) extravagant. 
Indeed this is not surprising. Considering Rawls's well publicised 
severe rejection of desert“ ,^ it may be argued that there is no 
place for the principle of responsibility in Rawls's theory of
- See Rawls (1971), pp.103-4. For a critical account of 
Rawls's anti-desert line, see Sher (1987), Ch.2.
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justice.
Considering this, before proceeding any further I feel I ought 
to spell out as clearly as possible how I intend to utilize Rawls's 
theory of justice, and what I mean by claiming that the 
reconciliation between the principles of compensation and 
responsibility can be accommodated in the framework of Rawls's two 
principles of justice.
I will start by stating what I am not advocating in this part 
of the chapter. First of all, I am not making the claim that it was 
Rawls's ambition to reconcile the two opposing principles within 
one theory. Clearly that is not the case, and we must accept it. It 
follows that I am not presenting a new interpretation of Rawls's 
theory of justice that pretends to do a better job of explaining 
the intentions of the author.
My more modest claim is simply the following. Starting from 
the fact that Rawls's failure to find room for the principle of 
desert in his theory of justice is arguably one of the biggest 
weakness with Rawls's theory"^, I believe it is necessary to work 
on the basis of Rawls's theory in order to redress this lacuna. 
Since the idea of desert is grounded on the concept of 
responsibility (I will return to this claim later), by showing that 
there is evidence of both responsibility and compensation in 
Rawls's second principle of justice I will argue that Rawls's
- Brian Barry points out that the response to Rawls's strong 
anti-desert line since 1971 has been overwhelmingly negative; "I 
cannot as a matter of fact think of anything that has been written 
defending Rawls on desert..." Barry (1990c), p.lvii.
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theory of justice need not be as radically anti-desert as Rawls 
claims. Another way of expressing this point is by saying that the 
reconciliation between responsibility and compensation is not alien 
to Rawls's project, even though such reconciliation was not Rawls's 
intention.
I should also add that my attempt to squeeze the semi-choicist 
solution within the general framework of Rawls's theory of justice 
is not a violation of Rawls's theory. Indeed Rawls would be the 
first to admit that the two principles of justice are not meant to 
be exact rules but only general indications for institutions. It is 
important to recall that after giving the final statement of the 
two principles of justice, Rawls makes the following claim:
By way of comment, these principles and priority rules are no 
doubt incomplete. Other modifications will surely have to be 
made, but I shall not further complicate the statement of the 
principles. (Rawls 1971, p.303)
The detailed argument presented in the first part of this 
chapter concerning the semi-choicist solution is nothing more than 
an attempt to modify and specify (although perhaps also complicate) 
Rawls's two principles of justice as fairness.
Let's recall Rawls's two principles of justice as fairness:
First Principle - Each person is to have an equal right to the most 
extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a
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similar system of liberty for all.
Second Principle - Social and economic inequalities are to be 
arranged so that they are both;
(a) To the greatest benefit of the least advantaged (difference 
principle)
(b) Attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions 
of fair equality of opportunity (fair opportunity)
Of the two principles of fairness, the difference principle 
has attracted the greatest interest over the years. While it cannot 
be denied that the difference principle is the heart and soul of 
Rawls's theory of justice”*, it is also important to remember that 
the difference principle is only one part of the second principles 
of justice, that the two principles of justice follow a 
lexicographical ordering, and that the difference principle is 
preceded by the other principles”*.
On the basis of the role and place of the difference principle 
in Rawls's account of the two principles of fairness, I want to put 
forward the following suggestion: the principles of responsibility 
and compensation can be reconciled with Rawls's theory of justice
”* - As Barry point out, the difference principle is not a 
second-best principle of justice, instead the difference principle 
is "what justice really demands" (Barry 1989b, p.398). It is also 
important to emphasize that the difference principle constitutes 
the core aspect of what Rawls calls the general conception of 
justice.
”* - Not only the first principle comes prior to the second 
principle, but within the second principle "fair opportunity is 
prior to the difference principle" Rawls (1971), p.303.
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to the extent that the principle of responsibility is enshrined in 
the principle of fair opportunity, while the principle of 
compensation is enshrined in the difference principle.
The equation between the principle of responsibility and the 
principle of fair opportunity becomes clearer if we ask ourselves 
why Rawls incorporates a principle of fair opportunity in his 
theory of justice, and why this principle has priority over the 
difference principle. If Rawls was exclusively interested in the 
principle of compensation^^, he could have either neglected the 
principle of fair opportunity, or at least have given lexical 
priority to the difference principle over the principle of fair 
opportunity. But as we have seen that is not the case. The 
principle of fair opportunity is an important part of Rawls's 
theory of justice, even if it has been generally neglected by 
commentators who have been more keen to defend or accuse the 
difference principle. I believe the principle of fair opportunity 
has important similarities with the principle of responsibility.
In order to see the affinity between responsibility and 
opportunity, it is necessary to analyze the concept of opportunity 
in more detail. First of all, it is important to stress that there 
is more to opportunity than the instrumental value, or in other 
words opportunity is not valued simply for its potential
- In Rawls's terminology, this would be compensation for the 
unfortunate lack of bargaining advantages resulting from the social 
and natural lottery.
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consequences. Scanlon (1988b) argues that the value of choice^^ 
can be appreciated from three angles; instrumental (we want future 
events to conform to our preferences), demonstrative (the act of 
choosing has a special meaning, for example choosing a gift for a 
person we love) , or symbolic (choosing may be a way of 
demonstrating competence, for example I may choose a wine at a 
restaurant in order to avoid the embarrassment of admitting my 
ignorance of wines).
Yet whether a choice or opportunity is regarded for its 
instrumental, demonstrative or symbolic value, in all three cases 
the choice or opportunity necessarily assumes a sense of 
responsibility over one's action. It follows that equality of 
opportunity over offices and positions is important because of the 
value persons attach to opportunities. Equality of opportunity is 
to be valued because of what we can achieve once we have been given 
an opportunity, and we are at least partially responsible for what 
we achieve. In other words, equality of opportunity is important if 
and only if we are also responsible (to some extent) for our 
actions. If the principle of responsibility plays no part in the 
proceedings, then equality of opportunity is redundant.
It is also interesting to note that fair opportunity comes 
prior to the difference principle. I believe this can be explained 
by the fact that if it was the other way around, and the difference 
principle came prior to fair opportunity, the latter could not be
- Scanlon uses the term 'choice' to mean both voluntary 
action and opportunity.
249
implemented. Indeed this would be a classic case of the principle 
of compensation swallowing the principle of responsibility. The 
difference principle is a principle of inequality, while fair 
opportunity is a principle of equality. It is more difficult (if 
not impossible) to justify a shift from acceptable inequality to 
equality than vice-versa, hence if the difference principle was 
prior to fair opportunity, the latter would disappear.
Before turning to the difference principle and the principle 
of compensation, I want to consider two issues concerning the 
question of desert in Rawls's theory of justice. In fact by arguing 
that the principle of responsibility has room in Rawls's theory of 
justice, it may seem that I am re-introducing desert in a theory 
which was explicitly meant to be anti-desert.
First of all, I believe that Rawls's theory of justice has 
more to lose than gain from refuting the principle of 
responsibility. Indeed denying responsibility implies endorsing a 
form of determinism that is irreconcilable with other aspects of 
Rawls's theory, for example the fact that the persons in the 
original position are rational maximisers (Rawls 1971, pp.142-150), 
that the principles of justice apply to primary goods or basic 
resources rather than welfare (Rawls 1971, pp.92-95), and that we
have the moral powers to formulate, pursue and revise our
conceptions of the good (Rawls 1980).
Secondly, I want to come back to my claim that the idea of
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desert is grounded on the concept of responsibility^^. The concept 
of desert is very complex, and my comments on desert and 
responsibility do not pretend to be original or in any way 
revealing. Indeed my comments on desert do not even pertain to all 
the meanings of desert or to all instances where this concept may 
apply. By desert here I mean the idea of desert as merit, that is 
to say, the idea that a person deserves something by virtue of some 
standard of excellence. In the words of Sher:
Merit spans both the moral and the nonmoral realms....The 
morally meritorious include both people who perform single 
transcendent acts of heroism or sacrifice and persons whose 
generosity or compassion is woven through their lives. The 
nonmorally meritorious include athletes who run faster than 
others, scientists who discover cures for deadly diseases, and 
jobs applicants who score highest on qualifying exams. (Sher 
1987, p.109)
The reason why I feel justified to concentrate exclusively on 
desert as merit is because I feel that this is what Rawls was 
thinking when he rejected desert. In other words, Rawls's theory of 
justice is anti-merit rather than anti-desert.
Although the idea of desert as merit does not necessarily
122 _ Recently there has been renewed interest on the question 
of desert and responsibility in contemporary liberal philosophy. 
See Scheffler (1992) and Ripstein (1994).
251
require a rejection of determinism^^ I believe desert does imply 
a minimal level of responsibility. That is because unless the 
concept of responsibility is part of desert, it becomes impossible 
to distinguish the idea of desert from the idea of luck^^. 
Generally, claims of desert have a common structure, being 
constructed by three elements: Person A deserves B in virtue of C. 
This implies that Person A must do something in order to deserve B, 
that is to say, something must change before Person A deserves B, 
and that change must be brought about by A. Luck cannot be the 
requirement that makes person A deserve B, since by being lucky 
person A has not changed anything. If I find a twenty-pounds note 
in the street, I cannot claim to deserve it any more than any other 
Londoner, instead I am simply lucky to be at the right place at the 
right time. Luck does not require effort, hence it cannot be the 
basis for desert.
If my claim that there is an affinity between Rawls's second 
principle of justice and the principle of responsibility is right, 
and that the principle of responsibility is an important assumption 
for any argument of desert, then it becomes possible to placate the 
familiar critique of Rawls's violent rejection of desert without 
abandoning Rawls's two principles of justice as fairness.
123 - See Barry (1990c), p.lxi.
2^4 _ For an interesting discussion on responsibility and luck, 
see Nagel's "Moral Luck" in Nagel (1979).
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6.V. Cohen's Critique of the Difference Principle.
Although the equation between the principle of responsibility 
and Rawls's principle of fair opportunity may be a controversial 
claim, the equation between the principle of compensation and the 
difference principle would appear to be unquestionably sound. The 
principle of compensation claims that the victims of ill luck 
should as far as possible be made as well off as others who have 
not suffered this piece of bad luck, and the difference principle 
states that social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so 
that they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged. To 
the extent that the victims of bad luck are the least advantaged, 
the difference principle acts as a principle of compensation.
Yet recently the validity of the difference principle as a 
principle of compensation has been questioned. In his Tanner 
Lecture "Incentives, Inequality and Community", G.A. Cohen gives a 
critical evaluation of Rawls's difference principle, arguing that 
as a principle of social justice the difference principle is 
impaired by some serious limitations. In what follows I will 
evaluate and reject Cohen's critique.
Cohen's major critique of Rawls's difference principle is that 
inequalities associated with incentives satisfy the difference 
principle. The incentives argument claims that because of the 
trickle-down effect, the worse off are better off if the well off 
are even better off:
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high levels of income cause unusually productive people to 
produce more than they otherwise would; and, as a result of 
the incentives enjoyed by those at the top, the people who end 
up at the bottom are better off than they would be in a more 
equal society. (Cohen 1992, p.265)
The reason why Cohen rejects the incentive argument is because 
it fails what he calls the interpersonal test, indeed Cohen claims 
that a policy argument provides a comprehensive justification only 
if it passes the interpersonal test. Cohen's interpersonal test 
checks for variations with respect to who is speaking and/or who is 
listening when the argument is presented. Thus a policy argument 
passes the interpersonal test if it can be shown that it could be 
uttered by any member of society to any other member. Clearly this 
is not the case of the incentive argument; the incentive argument 
is an argument made by the rich to fit their interests, although it 
is disguised under the impartial cloth of sociology and economics.
It should be pointed out that there are interesting and 
important similarities between Cohen's interpersonal test, and 
Scanlon's impartiality-based contractualism. The importance of this 
similitude lies in the fact that it uncovers a contradiction in 
Rawls's argument for the difference principle. In fact if the 
interpersonal test checks for impartiality, and the incentive 
argument fails the interpersonal test, then it follows that by 
endorsing the incentive argument Rawls's difference principle fails 
the impartiality test.
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In Chapter 3 it was shown that according to Scanlon's 
understanding of impartiality, we are moved by a desire to justify 
one's actions to others on grounds they could not reasonably 
reject. Cohen's interpersonal test seems to follow from the same 
idea, indeed any policy argument that passes Cohen's interpersonal 
test would also pass Scanlon's impartiality test. Nevertheless 
there is a small but significant difference between Cohen and 
Scanlon, indeed following Scanlon's terminology we could rephrase 
Cohen's interpersonal test in terms of justifying one's actions to 
others on grounds oneself could not reject. That is to say, it is 
not sufficient to justify my actions to you on grounds you could 
not reject, but I should also justify my actions to you on grounds 
I could not reject. An example should make this clear.
Cohen points out that the incentive argument does not serve as 
a justification of inequality on the lips of the talented rich 
because it would not pass the interpersonal test, indeed the 
incentive argument is uttered by the rich as part of an impersonal 
discourse of sociology or economics, although in fact this argument 
takes the form of a discourse grounded on willing choices. For 
example Cohen argues that in the case of top executives, they are 
willing to work hard only if they pay smaller taxes. The key word 
here is 'willingness'; top executives ''could not justify the 
behaviour the argument ascribes to them" (Cohen 1992, p.282; 
emphasis in original), since willingness does not suffice as a 
justification.
If we return to Cohen's critique of Rawls, we can see now that
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Rawls's difference principle endorses the incentive argument, 
although the idea of incentives fails the interpersonal test, hence 
the difference principle is accused of lacking impartiality. The 
core argument in Cohen's article is that, when true to itself, 
Rawlsian justice condemns incentives to people of talent, "and that 
no society whose members are themselves unambivalently committed to 
the difference principle need use special incentives to motivate 
talented producers" (Cohen 1992, p.310; emphasis in original).
Although Cohen is critical of the difference principle, it is 
not his intention to undermine this principle tout court, indeed at 
the beginning of the lecture Cohen reveals his acceptance of the 
principle: "For my part, I accept the difference principle .... but 
I question its application in defense of special money incentives 
to talented people" (Cohen 1992, p.268). The aim of Cohen's 
argument is to defend the following claim: the difference principle 
is either valid as a principle of public policy, although not as a 
fundamental principle of justice; or it applies to a society where 
people are themselves moved by an ethos or culture of justice, in 
which case the difference principle cannot be implemented by a 
government.
In order to support his claim, Cohen maintains that there are 
two readings of the difference principle: a strict and a lax
reading:
in its strict reading, it counts inequalities as necessary
only when they are, strictly, necessary, necessary, that is.
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apart from people's chosen intentions. In its lax reading, it 
countenances intention-relative necessities as well. So, for 
example, if an inequality is needed to make the badly off 
better off but only given that talented producers operate as 
self-interested market maximizers, then that inequality is 
endorsed by the lax, but not by the strict, reading of the 
difference principle. (Cohen 1992, p.311; emphasis in 
original)
According to Cohen, both readings of the difference principle 
are present in Rawls's theory. The first is 'intention- 
independent', and it refers to Rawls's account of a well-ordered 
society. The second is 'intention-sensitive', and it reflects 
Rawls's endorsement of incentives'^.
Cohen argues that if we defend the lax difference principle 
along the lines of a reasonable compromise between self-interest 
and service, it follows that the lax difference principle "is at 
best an imperfect proxy for a just balance, and not, what it is 
supposed to be, a fundamental principle of justice" (Cohen 1992, 
p.315). Cohen concludes: "I have not rejected the difference
principle in its lax reading as a principle of public policy: I do
125 _ These two readings of the difference principle reflect an 
underlying tension between opposing conceptions of social 
relationships. Thus the intention-sensitive reading of the 
difference principle reflects a bargaining conception of social 
relationships, while an intention-independent reading reflects a 
community conception of social relationships. Cohen's analysis here 
seems to be heavily influenced by Barry's (1989b) argument that 
Rawls embraces two opposing theories of justice.
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not doubt that there are contexts where it is right to apply it. 
What I have questioned is its description as a principle of (basic) 
justice...” (Cohen 1992, p.328).
It follows that we are left with the strict difference 
principle, although Cohen claims that government by itself cannot 
implement it:
For the strict difference principle to prevail, there needs to 
be an ethos informed by the principle in society at large. 
Therefore, a society (as opposed to its government) does not 
qualify as committed to the difference principle unless it is 
indeed informed by a certain ethos, or culture of justice. 
Ethos are, of course, beyond the immediate control of 
legislation, but I believe that a just society is normally 
impossible without one, and Rawls himself requires that there 
be a nurturance and cultivation of appropriate attitude in the 
just society that he describes. (Cohen 1992, pp. 315-6)
I want to argue, contra Cohen, that Rawls's difference 
principle can act as a fundamental principle of justice. In order 
to justify this claim, I will argue that Cohen's attempt to 
diminish the importance of the difference principle, in its strict 
interpretation, by appealing to a society's ethos or culture, is 
both misleading and potentially harmful.
To state the point briefly, Cohen's appeal to a society's 
ethos is misleading because it treats a society's culture or ethos
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as preceding the fundamental principles of justice, while I believe 
it would be more accurate to portray the relationship between these 
two as symbiotic.
It is interesting, and indicative, that Cohen never addresses 
the question of where a society's ethos or culture come from. Of 
course an adequate answer to this question moves us on to 
metaphysical grounds, and I for one don't have a satisfactory 
answer to my own question. Nevertheless it seems to me to be 
intuitively plausible that principles of justice have some effect 
on our ethos or culture, if not immediately at least in the long 
run. I am sure G.A. Cohen would agree with me that a society's 
ethos and culture is not static, but progressive, or at any rate 
open to mutation and change. Accepting this premise is only a small 
step away from the assertion that the choice of a fundamental 
principle of justice can have an impact in the shaping of a 
society's ethos or culture. I believe that Rawls has in mind 
something along these lines when he refers to the educational role 
of constitutionalism in general and justice as fairness in 
particular:
Some have thought that if a people is truly democratic in 
spirit, a constitution with a bill of rights is unnecessary; 
while if a people is not democratic, such a constitution 
cannot make it so. But this view overlooks the possibility 
that certain features of a political conception importantly 
affect the political sociology of the basic institutions that
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realize it. More exactly, we must consider how that sociology 
may be affected by the educational role of a political 
conception of justice such as justice as fairness with its
fundamental ideas of person and society. (John Rawls MS,
p.107; emphasis added)
I can't see any reason why the educational argument presented 
by Rawls concerning constitutionalism and justice as fairness 
cannot also apply to the strict interpretation of the difference 
principle. In conclusion, although I am not denying that there is 
a close affinity between a society's ethos or culture, and its 
fundamental principle of justice, I don't see why we should assume, 
as Cohen does, that the former necessarily precedes the latter.
Apart from being misleading, I believe Cohen's argument based 
on a society's ethos and culture can also be potentially harmful. 
This is so for two separate reasons. First, because it opens a door
to communitarianism, and secondly because it comes dangerously
close to (unfairly) dismissing some societies as doomed.
This is not the place to discuss in any depth the question of 
communitarianism. What I intend to do instead is to focus on one 
specific weakness of communitarianism, namely, the arbitrariness of 
the concept of community from an ethical standpoint. By claiming 
that a society's ethos or culture precedes the difference principle 
as a fundamental principle of justice, Cohen is in fact arguing 
that a society has an independent ethos. It seems to me that Cohen 
is making an ontological assertion analogous to the communitarian
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claim that the key to ethics lies in the practice of the community. 
Yet apart from the fact that there does not seems to be a 
common and coherent communitarian position on the meaning of the 
term 'community'"*, communitarians always assume the superiority 
of the community over its composing parts, or assert the moral 
superiority of holism over individualism, without questioning the 
fact that its republican motivation can easily collapse into an 
apology for conservatism"? or communism, both of which abhor 
conflict, diversity and pluralism"*. I believe the same criticism 
applies to Cohen's notion of a society's ethos or culture. While I 
am not denying that it is difficult to question the practice of a 
society's ethos and culture, it can be done. As Kymlicka rightly 
points out:
It may not be easy to question deeply held beliefs about the 
good, but the history of the women's movement, for example, 
shows that people can question and reject even the most deeply 
entrenched sexual, economic and family roles. We are not
- As Gardbaum (1992) rightly points out, there are three 
separate debates involving three separate claims of community, 
namely: antiatomism, metaethical communitarianism; and strong 
communitarianism.
- Roger Scruton claims that "conservatism presupposes the 
existence of a social organism. Its politics is concerned with 
sustaining the life of that organism, through sickness and health, 
change and decay" Scruton (2nd.ed.1984), p.25, quoted in Gardbaum 
(1992), p.722.
128 _ For the desirability of endorsing conflict as the key 
moment in a moral theory, see Hampshire (1983). See also Chapter 1 
above.
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trapped by our present attachments, incapable of judging the
worth of the goals we inherited or ourselves chose earlier.
(Kymlicka 1993, p.371)
All I am suggesting is that a society's ethos or culture does 
not prevent us from adopting the difference principle as a 
fundamental principle of justice, even if the former is opposed to 
the latter.
Another problem with Cohen's approach is that there seems to 
be no hope for all those societies that don't hold the ethos or 
culture recommended by Cohen to grow to accept the difference 
principle as a basic principle of justice. In other words, if a 
society does not embrace an egalitarian ethos, does it mean that it 
will never embrace an egalitarian principle of justice? Take for 
example South Africa. The state of South Africa was until recently 
unquestionably unjust, and if the ruling class held any ethos or 
culture it is certainly not one compatible to Rawls's difference 
principle. Does it mean that South Africa had no hope of ever 
changing its ethos? After all, if Germany could go from national 
socialism to social democracy in the space of fifty years, why 
can't South Africa, Rowanda etc.?
Determining whether a society's ethos comes prior to its 
fundamental principles of justice, or vice-versa, may appear to be 
like solving the chicken-and-the-egg dilemma, but in fact this is 
not so. The question is whether changes are the result of internal 
or external pressures. Contrary to the view of Cohen, I believe
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that we should not shut the door to the former solution, hence the 
difference principle should be given at least the benefit of the 
doubt as a motivating force for changing a society's ethos.
To recapitulate, in this part of the chapter I have argued 
that it is both misleading and potentially harmful to diminish the 
importance of the difference principle, in its strict 
interpretation, by appealing to a society's ethos or culture as a 
preliminary assumption. Therefore it seems to me that as a 
principle of compensation Rawls's difference principle (in its 
strict interpretation) is a valid and strong candidate. In what 
follows, I want to argue that the idea of reconciling the 
principles of compensation and responsibility under a theory of 
justice is warranted by the contractualist theory of reasonable 
agreement.
6.VI. Justice and Reasonable Agreement.
There are two key aspects to the theory of reasonable 
agreement. First, the moral motivation at the root of this theory 
is derived from the idea of agreement, not the concept of 
reasonableness. Second, the concept of reasonableness, defined by 
the maxim 'not asking for too much', provides the rationale that 
illuminates our intuitions. In what follows, I will show that these 
two aspects point to the necessity to endorse a compatibilist 
theory of justice.
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Let's start with the Idea of agreement. Agreements are the 
stuff of which social contracts are made. A contractarian political 
theory is, by definition, grounded on the notion of agreement. The 
agreements do not refer simply to the mechanics of accord between 
rational and consenting adults, although this is an important 
aspect of contractualism, instead it is the idea of an agreement 
that is fundamental to a social contract. By the idea of agreement, 
I mean that the parties seeking agreement are willing to compromise 
or revise their conception of the good in order to make room for 
others. The idea of agreement is important for a contractualist 
political theory since it enables us to distinguish legitimate from 
illegitimate interests or preferences; one's preference is 
acceptable if one is willing to compromise it, or in some way 
revise it, in order to seek agreement with others.
It seems to me that the idea of agreement justifies a 
commitment to both the principles of responsibility and 
compensation. First of all, the idea of agreement necessarily 
assumes that the parties are responsible for their actions, hence 
the principle of responsibility must be a component of a theory of 
justice grounded on reasonable agreement.
As I argued in Chapter 3, the idea of an agreement requires 
the conditions of critical reflection and rational se If-governance. 
These two conditions are indispensable if the idea that someone is 
motivated by a desire to justify one's actions to others on grounds 
they could not reasonably reject is at all intelligible. In fact 
the concept of justification is significant if we are responsible
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or accountable for our intentions and decisions. As Scanlon points 
out:
insofar as these intentions and decisions are ours, it is
appropriate to ask us to justify or explain them ....  Moral
criticisms and moral arguments, on the contractualist view, 
consist in the exchange of such requests and justifications. 
(Scanlon 1988b, p.171; emphasis in original)
While the idea of agreement justifies a commitment to 
responsibility and choicism, the principle of responsibility is not 
endorsed at the expense of the principle of compensation. In other 
words acknowledging that the principle of responsibility plays a 
part in the compatibilist theory of justice does not mean that 
choicism is the only criterion of distribution. Instead, it would 
be more accurate to say that the theory of reasonable agreement 
subscribes to the principle of responsibility only after the 
conditions for compensation have been fulfilled.
This can be shown if we recall that what is important about 
responsibility is the fact that people attach a value to 
opportunity and choice, whether this value is intrinsic or 
instrumental. It follows that a contractualist theory of reasonable 
agreement is keen to ensure that someone's value of choice will not 
undermine the value of choice of others (Scanlon 1988b, pp.186-7).
This is why a compatibilist theory of justice does not make an 
appeal to a preinstitutional notion of desert. Instead, as Scanlon
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points out:
The only notions of desert which it recognizes are internal to 
institutions and dependent upon a prior notion of justice; if 
institutions are just then people deserve the rewards and 
punishments which those institutions assign them. (Scanlon 
1988b, p.188)
In other words, unless desert is constrained within an 
institutional framework there is a risk of some people being 
deprived of their value of choice. This would be unjust. It is 
because people attach great importance on having outcomes depend on 
their choices that desert is not a preinstitutional notion.
The appeal of the principle of compensation is that it makes 
it possible for people to be responsible for their actions, and 
therefore to value their choices and opportunities. One can only be 
responsible for one's choices if the choices are made on the basis 
of appropriate conditions of equality of opportunity, and 
compensation ensures that such conditions are met.
Clearly the moral motivation defined by the idea of agreement 
is closely related to the concept of impartiality. Seeking an 
agreement with others and being willing to revise one's conception 
of the good captures the intuition, integral to the concept of 
impartiality, that the well-being of all matters intrinsically, or 
that all interests ought to be given equal weight. By respecting 
the idea of agreement, a theory of justice that reconciles the
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principles of compensation and responsibility is congenial to the 
moral sanction of impartiality.
Having argued that the Idea of agreement supports a 
reconciliation between the principles of compensation and 
responsibility, I now want to show the advantage for a 
compatibilist theory of justice of conceiving the idea of agreement 
in terms of a reasonable agreement.
In Chapter 3, I argued that in the theory of reasonable
agreement, the concept of reasonableness should not replace the 
moment of agreement as the fulcrum of the contractarian moment, 
instead its role is to supplement our moral motivations. In other 
words, the concept of reasonableness is the rationale which 
qualifies our moral motivations, where the idea of agreement is the 
basis of our moral motivation.
I have also argued that the concept of reasonableness can be 
defined by the maxim 'not asking for too much'. Starting from the 
assumption that all demands are demands for something that is in 
limited supply, we can conclude that a demand is considered
reasonable if it does not ask for too much of scarce resources 
compared to other demands for the same resource. The fact that 
everyone (including those who are not yet born) has an equal right 
to make a claim for these resources in an indication of the
affinity between the concepts of reasonableness and impartiality. 
From the definition of reasonableness as 'not asking for too much', 
we can infer the significance of the notion of reasonable
agreement, namely, an agreement is reasonable when no-one seeking
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agreement is asking for too much of scarce resources.
The relation between reasonable agreement, the concept of 
reasonableness, and the compatibilist theory of justice is the 
following. The maxim 'not asking for too much' sets up a test for 
the contracting parties. This test will tell us if the parties are 
indeed seeking an impartial agreement^^^, hence if their demands 
are legitimate. In other words, in order to establish whether the 
contracting parties are making reasonable demands, the parties 
involved must ask themselves if their demands are 'asking for too 
much' compared to the other parties.
To appreciate how this relates to the compatibilist theory of 
justice, we must start from the assumption that the principles of 
compensation and responsibility represent respectively the 
interests of those in need and those who merit. It follows that a 
theory of justice that is grounded exclusively on either the 
principle of compensation, or the principle of responsibility, is 
inevitably asking for too much from one of those two groups of 
people. Those who stand to gain most from the endorsement of one 
principle must ask themselves if they are asking for too much from 
others who are set to be net losers if that principle is adopted. 
For example if a theory of justice endorses only the principle of 
compensation, this is asking for too much from those who merit 
more, while if it endorses only the principle of responsibility, it 
is asking for too much from those who are in need.
To say that group A is asking for too much from group B
129 - An agreement that reflects the criterion of impartiality.
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implies that the interests of group B are not given equal 
treatment, hence asking for too much is an infringement of the 
conditions of impartiality. In order to embrace the requirement of 
impartiality, a theory of justice based on the idea of a reasonable 
agreement must necessarily aspire to reconcile the principles of 
compensation and responsibility. In this chapter, I have attempted 
to show how this reconciliation may be achieved.
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7. ON LIBERAL NEUTRALITY
Contemporary liberalism has long been fascinated with the idea 
of neutrality. Many contemporary advocates of liberalism assume 
that the neutrality of the liberal state respect individual 
conceptions of the good is one element distinguishing liberalism 
from all other political traditions^°. Yet lately things have 
started to changed, and doubt has finally penetrated this seemingly 
indisputable liberal postulate. Indeed over the last few years a 
growing number of scholars, both liberal and non-liberal, have 
started questioning the validity of this assumption. Is neutrality 
a red herring in the lexicon of liberal political theory? Should 
liberalism abandon any claim for neutrality? This chapter will 
consider these questions.
In 7.1, by exploring the close affinity between neutrality and 
impartiality, I will argue that neutrality is indeed one of the 
fundamental pillars of the liberal project. Yet it is also 
important to emphasize that the concept of neutrality is only one
- Although the term 'neutrality' is a fairly recent addition 
to the lexicon of liberal concepts, I believe the suggestion by 
Goodin & Reeve that "similar notions have long figured largely in 
recognizably liberal political discourses" is fundamentally 
correct; see Goodin and Reeve (1989), p.l.
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of the key liberal concept, therefore it is wrong to assume that 
the condition of neutrality is sufficient to define liberalism.
In 7.II, I will consider some of the criticisms that have been 
made to the concept of liberal neutrality. In particular I will 
argue that commentators have wrongly assumed that neutrality is 
consequential neutrality, and therefore impossible to put in 
practice. I believe that liberals sympathetic to neutrality do not 
endorse consequential neutrality, hence the charge that neutrality 
is quixotic or illogical is misplaced.
In 7.Ill, I will put forward a conception of neutrality based 
on the contractualist theory of reasonable agreement. I will argue 
that neutrality refers to a system of rules which reflects as a 
whole a set of values that everyone could accept. This account of 
neutrality is contractarian to the extent that such system of rules 
must be compatible with the idea of an agreement that no one could 
reasonably reject.
In 7.IV, I will test this contractualist account of neutrality 
on what is arguably the most delicate question faced by a neutral 
state, namely, how to deal with illiberal conceptions of the good. 
Do illiberal conceptions of the good deserve the same treatment as 
liberal conceptions of the good? I will argue that within the 
boundaries of a neutral state, illiberal conceptions of the good 
can be dealt with adequately by the contractualist theory of 
neutrality as reasonable agreement.
In 7.V, I will switch the above question concerning illiberal 
conceptions of the good to the international context. That is to
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say, how should a liberal state committed to neutrality react when 
it is faced by threats from illiberal political cultures? I will 
argue that in these cases, the liberal state is best advised to 
leave neutrality behind and dogmatically uphold a liberal 
conception of the good. Part 7.VI will provide a brief summary of 
the main arguments put forward in this chapter.
7.1. Neutralitv and Impartiality.
In Patterns of Moral Complexity Larmore defines the concept of 
neutrality in the following terms:
The state should not seek to promote any particular conception 
of the good because of its presumed intrinsic superiority - 
that is, because it is supposedly a truer conception. (Larmore 
1987, p.43; emphasis in original)
I suggest we adopt this definition as the primary sense of 
neutrality, partly because this definition has proved to be rather 
successful, being adopted by a number of scholars over the last few 
years^i, and partly because other definitions of neutrality, as we 
shall see, portray a conception of liberal neutrality that no 
liberal would in fact endorse.
It is interesting to note that the above conception of
- See Rawls (1993a), pp.190-195; Lehning (1991).
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neutrality has strong similarities with the concept of 
impartiality. Throughout this thesis I have assumed a specific 
definition of impartiality, where impartiality refers to the belief 
that the well-being of all moral beings matters intrinsically, 
therefore to be impartial implies giving all interests equal 
weight, or in other words impartiality is about taking equal 
account of the interests of all the parties.
It is rather obvious that this condition of impartiality would 
not be respected if the state was not neutral. In other words if a 
state promotes a particular conception of the good because of its 
presumed intrinsic superiority, then the conditions of impartiality 
would be infringed, since the interests of those with different 
conceptions of the good would not be given equal weight. I believe 
that it is precisely because of the close affinity between 
neutrality and impartiality that the former concept is an important 
qualifying assumption of liberalism in general, and of the liberal 
state in particular.
Although the concepts of neutrality and impartiality are 
closely associated (in common usage these two terms are often use 
synonymously), I believe that it is possible to draw a distinction 
between these two terms. Indeed, for reasons we shall see later, a 
distinction between neutrality and impartiality at the analytical 
level is critically important. The fundamental difference between 
impartiality and neutrality is the following; while neutrality 
applies to the sphere of politics, in particular to political 
procedures, impartiality refers to the moral sphere, to the Kantian
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claim of inter-subjectivity. Impartiality is, in a sense, the 
essence of the categorical imperative.
In political theory, the concept of neutrality is something of 
a term-of-art: it is a political term that applies exclusively to 
the state, while impartiality applies to the more general idea of 
non-favouritism. Being concerned with the impact of political 
institutions on individual citizens, liberals are only interested 
in the way neutrality applies to the sphere of the state. For a 
liberal neutrality is political neutrality; neutrality concerns the 
procedures that establish the relationship between the state and 
its citizens. As Larmore points out:
neutrality as a political ideal governs the public relations 
between persons and the state, and not the private relations 
between persons and other institutions. (Larmore 1987, p.45; 
emphasis in original)
For a liberal, neutrality is a political, not a general social 
ideal. (Larmore 1987, p.46)
The political characteristic of neutrality contradicts the 
views of some commentators who wrongly assume that neutrality 
applies to any circumstance "in so far as one is in a position to 
exercise some form of influence" (Montefiore 1975, p.5), whether it 
applies to the state and the citizen, or to parents and their
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children^^^.
If neutrality is a political concept, impartiality is a moral 
motivation. Indeed this is the way the concept of impartiality has 
been used recently by advocates of justice as impartiality, from 
Scanlon who defines impartiality in terms of "the desire to be able 
to justify one's actions to others on grounds they could not 
reasonably reject" (Scanlon 1982, p.116), to Kymlicka's idea that 
"all human beings have a good, and their well-being matters 
intrinsically" (Kymlicka 1990b, p.Ill), to Barry's idea that 
impartiality implies "tak[ing] an equal account of the interests of 
all the parties" (Barry 1989b, p.269).
The reason why it is important to distinguish the concept of 
neutrality from that of impartiality is because it is not always 
practical to endorse neutrality: for example when a liberal state 
is threatened by other illiberal states it is better to give up on 
neutrality altogether^\. Yet neglecting neutrality does not mean 
that a liberal must give up on impartiality, since impartiality and 
neutrality appertain to different spheres. Indeed in some extreme 
cases it is necessary to sacrifice neutrality in order to preserve 
impartiality.
The place of neutrality in the liberal tradition has come 
under serious scrutiny in the last few years, and although Rawls 
(1988 & 1989) and Ackerman (1980) argue that neutrality is at the
- Raz adopts Montefiore's definition of neutrality, as well 
as the example of a father intervening in some dispute between two 
children. See Montefiore (1975, p.7) and Raz (1986), p.114.
133 - I will deal with this question in 7.V below.
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heart of contemporary liberalism, other liberal theorists deny 
neutrality any place in the liberal tradition, although they claim 
to be liberals; in this fast growing family we find Alexander & 
Schwarzschild (1987), Bellamy (1989) and Raz (1986).
The critiques of neutrality stemming from sympathizers of the 
liberal project all share a common characteristic, namely, they 
think that neutrality is consequential and therefore illogical. 
That is to say, the concept of neutrality is rejected to the extent 
that it contradicts other fundamental liberal assumptions. In what 
follows, I want to reject this critique of neutrality.
7.II. The Impossibility of Neutrality.
The impossibility of neutrality refers to the charge that the 
concept of liberal neutrality is infested by internal 
contradictions. These contradictions can take different forms: the 
universalistic and objective nature of neutrality are either seen 
as detrimental to liberalism, or alternatively it is claimed that 
the ends of neutrality cannot be put into practice.
I suggest we start by looking at the tendency of equating 
neutrality with universalistic claims. Both Alexander & 
Schwarzschild, and Bellamy, seem to equate the concept of 
neutrality with universalistic claims reflecting an objective 
nature; neutrality is universal since it is believed to take 
everyone's position into account, furthermore it is seen as
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objective to the extent that it is not contaminated by any kind of 
preferences.
To the extent that liberalism rests on an abstract principle 
of neutrality, Alexander & Schwarzschild claim that neutrality is 
detrimental to liberalism. In order to expose the inherent 
contradictions of neutrality, and its detrimental influence on 
liberalism, Alexander & Schwarzschild undertake a critical analysis 
of Dworkin's neutrality-based liberalism.
In striving to distinguish expensive tastes from basic needs, 
Dworkin is charged with attempting to overcome a fundamental 
contradiction inherent in the concept of neutrality;
Dworkin cannot rely on such distinctions as that between 
'objective needs' and 'subjective wants'; or that between 
'normal' physical limitations and 'abnormal' physical 
disabilities. These distinctions rely on value judgments; 
hence Dworkin cannot rely on them without violating his own 
constraint of neutrality. (Alexander & Schwarzschild 1987,
p.101)
For anyone who takes neutrality seriously, handicaps, 
cravings, and expensive tastes are on a par with one another. 
(Alexander & Schwarzschild 1987, p.101)
Following the logic of their argument, Alexander & 
Schwarzschild are led to the conclusion that there is no neutral
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way of measuring resource holdings, hence liberalism is advised to 
renounce to neutrality for its theoretical grounding.
In an argument reminiscent of Alexander & Schwarzschild, 
Bellamy claims that neutrality is characterised by an intrinsic 
paradox, since it is impossible to separate the right from the 
good. As in the case of Alexander & Schwarzschild, Dworkin's 
neutrality is the target of Bellamy's critique, indeed Bellamy 
detects a contradiction between Dworkin's claim for neutrality and 
the necessity for liberalism to exclude some conceptions of the 
good:
Once Dworkin acknowledges that non-neutral outcomes can have 
repugnant consequences, how can he devise methods to avoid 
only some of them without himself infringing neutrality[?]. 
(Bellamy 1989, p.29)
It cannot be denied that there are some problems with 
Dworkin's account of neutrality^\. Yet all this tells us is that 
there is a problem with Dworkin's account of neutrality and 
liberalism, rather than with the concept of neutrality per se. In 
other words by criticising Dworkin's account of neutrality 
Alexander & Schwarzschild and Bellamy are not defeating the concept 
of neutrality, instead they are only defeating Dworkin's definition 
of neutrality.
- In his recent Tanner lecture Dworkin recognises that there 
are some serious flaws with his previous account of liberalism and 
neutrality. See Dworkin (1990) p.lOn.
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Neutrality does not mean that no form of inequality can ever 
be justified. If we adopt this conception of neutrality, then the 
state should for example distribute wheel chairs to anyone who asks 
for one, whether they are paraplegic or simply lazy people who want 
to move from their TV couch to the kitchen without getting up on 
their feet. Intuitively this cannot be what neutrality is about. To 
most liberals neutrality means that all conceptions of the good 
should be treated according to the same rules, and that decisions 
concerning similar demands must follow similar procedures, although 
these procedures can lead to inegalitarian results. In other words 
neutrality refers to the decision procedures, and not the outcomes.
If we return for a moment on Bellamy's critique of Dworkin, it 
is interesting to point out that Bellamy assumes that neutrality 
ought to be judged from a consequentialist perspective. Indeed most 
criticisms of neutrality are based on the assumption that 
neutrality refers to the consequences of actions. Clearly this is 
the view of Raz, who is happy to endorse Montefiore's claim that 
"To be neutral in any conflict is to do one's best to help or 
hinder the various parties concerned in an equal degree" 
(Montefiore 1975, p.5). Raz's consequentialist view of neutrality 
has since been adopted by other liberal perfectionists, who argue 
that liberalism ought to abandon neutrality and embrace 
perfectionism^^. In what follows I want to consider and reject 
Raz's views on consequentialist neutrality.
According to Raz the problem with neutrality lies in the idea
- See Caney (1991) .
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of allocating influence "in an equal degree", in fact he argues 
that providing help or hindrance in any degree will never secure 
that the outcome will influence the receiving social actors to an 
equal degree. Furthermore Raz argues that even by abstaining to 
help, a neutral party may in fact hinder the weaker of the 
conflicting parties; in other words if we assume an unequal balance 
of powers, not altering the status quo is like favouring the 
stronger party. The conclusion Raz draws from all this is that we 
are better off abandoning the dream of neutrality since its 
theoretical appeal cannot be translated to practice.
While Raz's critique of Montefiore's conception of neutrality 
cannot be refuted, it would be erroneous to assume that Raz's 
analysis constitutes the definitive critique of neutrality; 
paradoxically, I feel the concept of neutrality comes out stronger 
than it was before it feel under the analytical microscope of Raz. 
In fact contrary to what Raz seems to think, his critique of 
neutrality does not undermine the validity of the concept per se, 
but at most it undermines the validity of Montefiore's principle of 
neutrality.
By adopting Montefiore's dictum on neutrality as a primary 
sense of neutrality, Raz manages to discredit what is a weak and 
unpersuasive account of neutrality: consequentialist neutrality. It 
follows that to the extent that Raz has practically obliterated 
Montefiore's account, the concept of neutrality is in many ways 
stronger now that it is finally free of Montefiore's heavy mantle. 
In other words there is no reason why we have to stick with
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Montefiore's dictum as the primary sense of neutrality. 
Montefiore's dictum is consequentialist, yet there is more to 
neutrality than consequentialist neutrality.
As Kymlicka points out, Raz is simply wrong to assume that 
liberals who defend neutrality endorse consequentialist neutrality. 
Instead according to Kymlicka, liberals like Rawls endorse 
justificatory neutrality, or the view that "the state does not take 
a stand on which ways of life are most worth living, and the desire 
to help one way of life over another is precluded as a 
justification of government action" (Kymlicka 1989b, pp.883-884).
In his most extensive exposition on the subject of neutrality, 
John Rawls (1988) spells out the difference between neutrality of 
aim and neutrality of effect or influence, and clearly takes side 
with the former view. Neutrality of aim claims that "that the state 
is not to do anything intended to favour or promote any particular 
comprehensive doctrine rather than another, or to give greater 
assistance to those who pursue it" (Rawls 1988, p.262), while 
neutrality of effect or influence claims that "the state is not to 
do anything that makes it more likely that individuals will accept 
any particular conception rather than another unless steps are 
taken to cancel, or to compensate for, the effects of policies that 
do this" (Rawls 1988, p.262).
As Rawls rightly points out, political liberalism abandons 
neutrality of effect or influence for being 'impracticable', 
endorsing in its place neutrality of aim. This is important because 
it shows that Rawls would have no problem accepting the critiques
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aimed at the concept of neutrality by Alexander & Schwarzschild, 
Bellamy or Raz, since Rawls is the first to admit that political 
liberalism cannot treat all conceptions of the good equally (what
Montefiore referred to as helping or hindering "in an equal
degree"), hence neutrality of effect or influence is both
impracticable and undesirable.
So far I have argued that neutrality cannot be rejected for 
being illogical, since neutrality does not imply consequential
neutrality. In what follows, I want to give a different account of 
neutrality, namely an account which is based on the contractualist 
theory of reasonable agreement.
7.III. Neutralitv and Reasonable Agreement.
Liberal neutrality is not about consequences. When a liberal 
invokes the neutrality of the state, equality of effects or 
influence is not what is being defended. Instead liberals endorse 
justificatory neutrality rather than consequential neutrality. But 
what exactly does justificatory neutrality mean?
It seems to me to be irrefutable that justificatory neutrality 
refers in the first place to the procedures that establish how 
conflicts between conceptions of the good are to be resolved^ *^*.
- Although proceduralism is part of neutrality, later in 
this chapter I will argue that in fact proceduralism has a dark 
side, indeed as we shall see it is best to divorce the concept of 
neutrality from all references to proceduralism.
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Thus neutrality is about equality of treatment. As Jones points 
out:
A neutral state is one that deals impartially with its 
citizens and which remains neutral on the issue of what sort 
of lives they should lead. Those who endorse the idea of the 
neutral state hold that it is not the function of the state to 
impose the pursuit of any particular set of ends upon its 
citizens. Rather the state should leave its citizens to set 
their own goals, to shape their own lives, and should confine 
itself to establishing arrangements which allow each citizen 
to pursue his own goals as he sees fit - consistent with every 
other citizen's being able to do the same. (Jones 1989b, p.9; 
emphasis added)
It seems to me that the key aspect of Jones's account of 
neutrality is the emphasis on proceduralism. Jones refers to such 
procedures in terms of "establishing arrangements" which allow 
everyone to pursue their conception of the good on the condition 
that others are not harmed in the process. The procedural dimension 
of neutrality has also been emphasized by others, in particular by 
Larmore who claims that:
[the neutrality of the liberal state] is not meant to be one 
of outcome, but rather one of procedure. That is, political 
neutrality consists in a constraint on what factors can be
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invoked to justify a political decision. Such a decision can 
count as neutral only if it can be justified without appealing 
to the presumed intrinsic superiority of any particular 
conception of the good life. (Larmore 1987, p.44; emphasis in 
original)
There are two reasons why proceduralism has been emphasized as 
a central aspect of neutrality. First of all, because fair 
proceduralism reflects the conditions of impartiality. Although 
earlier on I argued for a conceptual separation between the 
concepts of neutrality and impartiality, there is an important 
sense in which treating everyone as equals is confirmation that the 
interests of all are given equal account, hence that the well-being 
of all human beings matters intrinsically. Although Jones does not 
tell us what he means by impartiality, his claim that "a neutral 
state is one that deals impartially with its citizens” is 
essentially correct.
Secondly, by equating neutrality with fair procedures, the
limits of the claim that neutrality is the core concept in the
liberal tradition become apparent. In other words, if neutrality is 
a characteristic of liberal procedures, then neutrality cannot be 
the only or main foundation of the liberal project: just as
proceduralism is a necessary but insufficient condition for social 
justice, neutrality is a necessary but insufficient condition for 
liberalism.
Although proceduralism is important for an account of
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neutrality, the idea of proceduralism is extremely vague and it can 
easily lead to a misinterpretation of neutrality. For example Peter 
de Marneffe points out that neutrality can be understood in two 
different ways: as constitutional neutrality or as legislative
neutrality. Constitutional neutrality means that "a system of laws 
is neutral if, as a whole, it can be justified solely in terms of 
neutral values", while legislative neutrality means that "a system 
of laws is neutral when there is no law which cannot itself be 
justified in terms of neutral values (or: for every law, there is 
a neutral reason which warrants it)
Both constitutional and legislative neutrality endorse a form 
of proceduralism, although most liberal sympathizers of neutrality 
would only endorse constitutional neutrality^*. The problem with 
legislative neutrality is that it does not guarantee that the 
conditions of impartiality will be respected, in fact if every law 
is justified in terms of neutral values, it is very likely that the 
interests of some groups will suffer. The distinction between 
constitutional and legislative neutrality is important because, as 
de Marneffe points out "violations of legislative neutrality may be 
fully compatible with constitutional neutrality" (de Marneffe 1990, 
p.259) .
Furthermore, pure procedural notions are insensitive to the
137 _ These definitions of constitutional and legislative 
neutrality are taken from de Marneffe's unpublished doctoral thesis 
Liberalism and Education, quoted in Lehning (1991). For a similar 
account of constitutional and legislative neutrality, see de 
Marneffe (1990), p.259.
138 _ with the possible exception of Dworkin.
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distinction between personal and external preferences. If by pure 
proceduralism we understand a mechanism whereby the preferences of 
everyone are treated with equal concern and respect, then 
neutrality adds up to nothing more than legislative neutrality. The 
problem with legislative neutrality is that it precludes the 
possibility to make a principled or substantive judgement, which is 
why constitutional neutrality is preferred^^^.
The ambiguity with the concept of proceduralism probably 
explains why Rawls made some subtle but important changes in 
rewriting his 1988 article "The Priority of Right and Ideas of the 
Good" as Lecture V of his Political Liberalism. In fact we find 
that in the latter exposition all references to proceduralism are 
eliminated. Compare the following passages:
As a political conception for the basic structure justice as 
fairness as a whole can be seen as exemplifying a kind of 
procedural neutrality, and it also hopes to satisfy neutrality 
of aim in the sense that the basic institutions and public 
policy are not to be designed to favor any particular 
comprehensive doctrine. (Rawls 1988, p.2 63)
As a political conception for the basic structure justice as
- On the question of pure proceduralism and the 
personal/external preference approach, see de Marneffe (1990), 
pp.262-264. I will return to the principled or substantive approach 
to neutrality in part 7.VI below.
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fairness as a whole tries to provide common ground as the 
focus of an overlapping consensus. It also hopes to satisfy 
neutrality of aim in the sense that basic institutions and 
public policy are not to be designed to favor any particular 
comprehensive doctrine. (Rawls 1993a, pp.193-194).
Clearly in 1993 Rawls excludes all references between justice 
as fairness and procedural neutrality which he made in 1988. 
Another indicative example is the following: in 1988 Rawls writes 
that "Justice as fairness is not, without important qualifications, 
procedurally neutral" (Rawls 1988, p.261), although in 1993 he 
simply writes that "Justice as fairness is not procedurally 
neutral" (Rawls 1993a, p.192).
The point Rawls wants to make in both the 1988 article and in 
Political Liberalism is that the principles of justice as fairness 
are substantive and express far more than procedural values, and so 
do its political conceptions of person and society (Rawls 1988, 
p. 261; 1993a, p. 192) It seems to me that de Marneffe's
distinction between constitutional and legislative neutrality 
captures in important ways Rawls's distinction between the 
substantive element of justice as fairness and simple 
proceduralism, hence in what follows I suggest we consider 
neutrality in terms of constitutional neutrality.
I believe that by reading neutrality in terms of
- In Political Liberalism Rawls adds that the political 
conceptions of society and persons "are represented in the original 
position" (Rawls 1993a, p.192).
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constitutional neutrality enables us to capture the way in which 
the account of neutrality can be based on the contractualist theory 
of reasonable agreement. We saw earlier that according to Jones, 
the state should confine itself to establishing arrangements which 
allow each citizen to pursue his or her own goals as he or she sees 
fit, yet Jones fails to tell us how such arrangements are to be 
established. The answer lies in the contractualist theory of 
reasonable agreement. Indeed I believe we can go as far as saying 
that de Marneffe's definition of constitutional neutrality can be 
rephrased in the following terms: a system of laws is neutral if, 
as a whole, it can be justified in terms of a reasonable agreement 
(an agreement on terms that no one could reasonably reject).
In Chapter 3 we saw that according to Scanlon, contractualism 
is about establishing a system of rules for the general regulation 
of behaviour which no one could reasonably reject as a basis for 
informed, unforced general agreement^'^*. It follows that neutrality 
refers to the procedure or set of rules that is based on values 
that no-one could reject. In order to establish the set of rules 
based on values that no-one could reject, I believe it is necessary 
to refer to the two key notions of reasonable agreement: the idea 
of agreement and the concept of reasonableness as 'not asking for 
too much'.
Thus according to the contractualist theory of reasonable 
agreement, the system of rules which determines the neutrality of 
the state must not reflect the condition of bargaining advantages
141 - See Scanlon (1982), p.110.
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or mutual advantage, instead the system of rules must be one that 
is accepted by those who are moved by the idea of agreement, or in 
other words by those who are prepared to revise their conception of 
the good in order to make room for others.
Furthermore, the role of reasonableness, defined by the maxim 
'not asking for too much', acts as the rationale that illuminates 
our moral intuitions. Thus the system of rules is determined by an 
agreement characterised by the fact that the parties in pursuing 
their conceptions of the good will not be asking for too much.
To recapitulate the argument so far, the account of neutrality 
given by the contractualist theory of reasonable agreement focuses 
on the procedures established by a set of rules based on values 
that no one could reject, where this set of rules depends upon a 
prior notion of justice.
In order to test the validity of neutrality based on the 
contractualist theory of reasonable agreement, I suggest we 
consider how this account of neutrality deals with arguably the 
most difficult question for any theory of neutrality, namely, how 
it deals with illiberal conceptions of the good. It is to this 
question that I want to move to next.
7.IV. Neutralitv and Illiberal Conceptions of the Good.
In what follows, I will consider how the account of neutrality 
based on the contractualist theory of reasonable agreement responds
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to the well known case of the American Nazis staging a 
demonstration in the town of Skokie, Illinois. In January 1978, the 
Illinois Supreme Court (in a 7 to 1 decision) ruled in favour of 
Frank Collins, the leader of the National Socialist Party of 
America (NSPA) , who had announced that his Nazi party was going to 
stage a demonstration in the town of Skokie, Illinois. Skokie is 
characterised by that fact that it has the highest number of 
holocaust survivors of any city in the United States outside of New 
York city.
The case of the NSPA and Skokie is particularly interesting 
because it raises the question of whether a liberal, neutral state 
ought to defend the rights of freedom of speech of the NSPA, or 
whether in this case liberalism can justify the curbing of free 
speech without contradicting its neutrality. What is interesting to 
note is that the main argument behind the Illinois Supreme Court 
decision was the so-called 'content neutrality rule' according to 
which political speech shall not be abridged because of its 
content. Furthermore at the time the American Civil Rights Union 
felt that adherents of the NSPA had rights as any other American 
citizen, hence liberalism had a duty to defend their right.
In a recent article, Raphael Cohen-Almagor (1993) argues that 
the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court was wrong, indeed that 
curbing the rights of the NSPA in that occasion can be justified in 
liberal terms. In what follows I will argue that although Cohen- 
Algamor's conclusion is generally correct, his reasoning is not 
totally convincing. In fact I believe that applying the analysis of
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liberal neutrality and reasonable agreement to the case of Skokie 
leads to a different appraisal.
According to Cohen-Almagor, the constraints on the rights of 
speech can be justified on two accounts: by the Harm Principle and 
the Offence Principle. Under the Harm Principle, restrictions on 
liberty may be prescribed when there are sheer threats of immediate 
violence against some individuals or groups. Under the Offence 
Principle, psychological offence is morally on a par with physical 
harm, hence any form of expression that is designed to inflict 
psychological harm can be curbed. In the case of Skokie, Cohen- 
Almagor argues that the Offence Principle can be invoked to 
constraint the freedom of speech of the NSPA.
Of course Cohen-Almagor does not say that offence is 
sufficient to curb freedom of speech, in fact applying this 
principle rigidly could back-fire. For example. Southern whites 
could ban civil rights marches, especially those that are held by 
blacks, on the grounds that they find the offensive:
The fact that some individuals are offended by a speech which 
advocates equal rights is not sufficient reason for its 
restriction. The [Offence] Principle affects freedom of 
expression when the speech in question contradicts fundamental 
background rights to human dignity and equality of concern and 
respect. (Cohen-Almagor 1993, p.469-470)
While I agree with the general line of Cohen-Almagor's
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argument, I find some of his supporting claims confusing. For
example, according to Cohen-Almagor the case of Skokie is
particularly interesting because the Jews living in the area did 
not have a choice to avoid the offense, hence the choice of
location undermines the legitimacy of the march. In other words
Cohen-Almagor claims that if it was organized in any other part of 
the country, on ethical grounds the march could not (and should not 
I presume) have been prevented from taking place. But choosing 
Skokie as the location of the march underlines specific intentions 
and motives, hence according to Cohen-Almagor we can appeal to the 
Offence Principle to curb the NSPA's freedom of speech.
It seems to me intuitively wrong to make a moral argument 
against a Nazi group revolve in the last analysis around a 
geographical question. Ethics does not have geographical 
boundaries, hence the fact that the NSPA's march was organized in 
Skokie should not make any substantive differences.
By grounding his argument on the issue of the geographical 
location of the march, Cohen-Almagor is contradicting his previous 
claim that the speech in question must not refute fundamental 
background rights to human dignity and equality of concern and 
respect. Such background rights are refuted whether the march is 
held in Skokie (Illinois) or Tuscaloosa (Alabama) It is not the 
location that determines whether the march is offensive or not, 
instead it is the very content of the Nazi conception of the good
- I don't know much about this town, but I assume that it 
does not have a concentration of Jews or survivors of the holocaust 
above the average of any other American city.
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that is problematic. The question we must ask ourselves is whether 
banning Nazi propaganda or preventing the NSPA from staging their 
demonstration is compatible with the endorsement of neutrality. I 
believe it is, for the following reason.
Clearly, if the Nazi demonstration is banned on the assumption 
that it is an inferior conception of the good, or alternatively 
because the state favour a non-Nazi conception of the good that it 
believes to be intrinsically superior, than the very essence of 
neutrality would be infringed. Yet endorsing neutrality does not 
mean that Nazi propaganda cannot be stopped. I argued earlier that 
neutrality refers to a system of rules that no one could reject, 
where this system of rules depends upon a prior notion of justice. 
It follows that under neutrality, Nazi propaganda would be banned 
by a set of rules that no one could reject as a basis for informed, 
unforced general agreement.
The contractualist account of neutrality indicates that the 
problem with the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court lies with 
the 'content neutrality rule'. To use de Marneffe's terminology, it 
would appear that the Illinois Supreme Court endorsed legislative 
neutrality, in fact the 'content neutrality rule' (that political 
speech shall not be abridged because of its content) reflects the 
idea behind legislative neutrality that every rule, in this case 
the rule concerning freedom of speech, 
must itself be justified in terms of neutral values.
By following a reasoning similar to that of the Illinois 
Supreme Court, the ACRU (American Civil Rights Union) was culpable
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of making the same confusion between constitutional and legislative 
neutrality. According to the ACRU, everyone has a right to equal 
treatment, even a Nazi, hence a liberal state cannot prevent the 
Nazi group from enjoying the same rights as any other American 
citizen.
The type of reasoning exemplified by the ACRU's reflects a 
concern for legislative neutrality (what I referred to earlier as 
simple or pure proceduralism) that is not endorsed by the 
contractualist account of neutrality based on reasonable agreement. 
According to the latter, if the system of rules reflects the 
condition of reasonable agreement, then forms of illiberal 
propaganda can be repressed. The reason why the system of rules as 
a whole would curb the rights of the NSPA is because, as Waldron 
(1989) points out, in their content and tendency the Nazi's 
speeches are incompatible with the very idea of the right to 
freedom of expression they are asserting^^.
7.V. Neutralitv and Illiberal States.
So far I have considered neutrality as applying to the 
internal arrangements of the state, or in other words I have 
assumed that neutrality concerns the political relationship between 
the state and the citizen. Yet there is another instance in which
- For an illuminating treatment of the argument that Nazis 
do not have a right to freedom of expression, see Jeremy Waldron 
(1989) .
294
the phrase 'neutral state' applies, namely, in the relationship 
between states. Thus for example, when in 1992 Yeltsin proclaimed 
the Commonwealth of Independent States, dismissing the Soviet Union 
and Gorbachov to the dustbin of history. President Bush declared 
that the United States of America would take a 'neutral' stance on 
this matter.
Some commentators have used analogies concerning the 
international context in order to highlight what they see as 
neutrality's contradictory nature. Thus one of the examples Raz 
utilizes is that of a country (say White) maintaining commercial 
ties with another country (Red) who is engaged in a war with yet 
another country (Blue) . Raz uses this example to show the 
impossibility of applying the principle of neutrality, since 
according to Raz failure to help is hindering, and it is impossible 
to help or hinder to an equal degree.
It is indisputable that if, as a result of the war between 
Reds and Blues, Whites refuses to maintain commercial ties with 
Reds (since Whites clearly favors Blue), then Whites is violating 
the idea of neutrality. Yet it seems to me that the interesting 
question is not whether Whites can help or hinder the other 
countries to an equal degree^*, but if Whites has a moral 
obligation to endorse neutrality in the international context. If 
for example we assume that Blues are under the leadership of a 
dictator who is waging a war against the Reds as a first step
- I have already argued that this account is based on 
Montefiore's erroneous definition of neutrality.
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towards world domination, should Whites adopt a position of 
neutrality? In other words, how should a liberal state respond to 
the threat of non-liberal states? Does neutrality between states 
follow the same reasoning as between the liberal state and 
conceptions of the good of its citizens?
In what follows, I want to set the foundations for the 
following argument: questions of neutrality of the state only apply 
to internal considerations, while in the case of international 
relations, the liberal state is best advised to drop neutrality, 
and to defend liberal values as dogmatically as non-liberals defend 
their positions. Needless to say that a detailed and satisfying 
defence of the above claim would deserve a thesis of its own, 
indeed I do not even claim to have the expertise or competence to 
deal adequately with the ethical issues of international relations. 
My intention here is simply to lay out possible avenues that may be 
followed if the argument I have made thus far concerning 
contractualism and neutrality is to be applied to the international 
context. In particular, I want to emphasize the following two 
considerations.
First, taking a neutral stance on all international issues may 
contradict one of the fundamental pillars of liberal state, namely, 
providing security to its citizens. If the liberal state refuses to 
intervene against illiberal states (for example against Serbian 
atrocities in their conflict against the Muslims, or against 
Algeria's Muslim fundamentalists), liberal nations may find 
themselves outnumbered by their foes, with the risk of endangering
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its own citizens.
Secondly, it seems to me that the very conditions for adopting 
a neutralist stand are missing from the international context, 
hence it would be foolish for a liberal state to take a neutral 
stance on principle. As I said before, by neutrality we must 
understand constitutional neutrality, whereby a system of laws as 
a whole can be justified in terms of neutral values. Yet for the 
moment the system of rules governing the relations between states 
is not adequate, especially as international rules can be broken 
with little fear of retribution, hence from an ethical perspective 
neutrality cannot apply. As a result, there is no reason for a 
liberal state to feel under an obligation to endorse neutrality.
To summarize, it seems to me that when confronted with other 
hierarchical societies, the liberal state is best advised to leave 
neutrality at home. As Barry (1990b) rightly points out, belief in 
neutrality is not going to cut much ice with a non-liberal, since 
a non-liberal "is not simply someone who adheres to a dogma, but 
someone who adheres to it dogmatically" (Barry 1990b, p.13). It 
follows that in the international arena the liberal state should 
defend its liberal values dogmatically, while reserving neutrality 
for internal disputes.
7.VI. Conclusion.
In the remaining pages of this chapter, I want to summarize
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the central concepts of the contractualist account of neutrality I 
have defended. First of all, the contractualist account of 
neutrality expresses far more than procedural values, in fact like 
in case of Rawls, contractualism gives a substantive account of 
neutrality.
Although Rawls's liberalism embraces neutrality, he does not 
want to treat all conceptions of the good equally, in fact he 
points out that political liberalism:
must impose restrictions on permissible comprehensive views, 
and the basic institutions . . . [must] inevitably encourage 
some ways of life and discourage others, or even exclude them 
altogether. (Rawls 1988, p.264)
The core intuition behind Rawls's idea is that neutrality 
"sets limits to permissible ways of life" (Rawls 1988, p.251). 
According to Rawls, neutrality performs the crucial function of 
"impos[ing] restrictions on permissible comprehensive views" (Rawls 
1988, p.264), which implies that "the basic institutions 
inevitably encourage some ways of life and discourage others, or 
even exclude them altogether" (Rawls 1988, p.264).
In order to distinguish between permissible and non- 
permissible conceptions of the good, it is necessary to distinguish 
neutrality from pure proceduralism, and search for the moral 
grounds of neutrality in the principles of justice that regulate 
the basic social and political institutions. Thus echoing Rawls,
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according to de Marneffe neutrality is when:
the principles of justice that regulate basic social and 
political institutions .... [are] justifiable in terms of 
moral and political values that any reasonable person would 
accept as the basis of moral claims regardless of his or her 
particular conception of the good. (de Marneffe 1990,
p.253)"s
The contractualist theory of neutrality follows the same 
approach as Rawls and de Marneffe. The difference is that in the 
contractualist theory of reasonable agreement, the substantive 
element (moral and political values) in the account of neutrality 
are explicitly determined by the idea of agreement and the 
condition of reasonableness. That is to say, the contractualist 
framework of a reasonable agreement is needed in order to formulate 
the values that everyone would find acceptable.
Although the concept of neutrality is, in important ways, 
related to the principles of justice, neutrality has also important 
links with the ideal of political legitimacy. That there is an 
affinity between the concepts of neutrality and legitimacy is a 
view endorsed by Kymlicka and de Marneffe. Although Kymlicka 
explicitly writes that "there is no inherent connection between
- de Marneffe calls this neutrality of grounds, which is 
different from concrete neutrality, or the principle that the state 
may not limit individual liberty in ways that advance one 
particular conception of the good.
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neutrality and state legitimacy” (Kymlicka 1990a, p.237n.l3), he 
nevertheless feels that neutrality plays a role in a theory of 
political legitimacy, in fact he claims that: "I believe that
liberal neutrality is the most likely principle to secure public 
assent in societies like ours, which are diverse and historically 
exclusionary" (Kymlicka 1990a, p.229).
Similarly de Marneffe argues that the significance for 
liberalism of neutrality is best understood in light of the liberal 
ideal of political legitimacy, in fact "the liberal ideal of 
legitimacy requires that principles of justice be justifiable in 
terms of neutral values" (de Marneffe 1990, p.256).
I believe it is of fundamental importance to understand the 
concept of neutrality as acting between the principles of social 
justice and the idea of political legitimacy; neutrality is the go- 
between connecting the legitimacy of the state with principles of 
social justice. The reason why this is an important question is 
because it shows that the function of neutrality in the liberal 
project is not to bring about better consequences, instead 
neutrality has the function of giving liberalism the coherence and 
solidity it may appear to lack compared to fundamentalist or 
dogmatic moral and political theories.
I believe that a full understanding of neutrality must take 
account of the function of neutrality in the liberal project. In 
what follows I will argue that the function of neutrality in the 
liberal project is not primarily that of bringing about better 
consequences, as perfectionist theorists as Raz have argued.
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Instead the function of neutrality is that of bridging the gap 
between the concepts of social justice and legitimacy of the state.
Defined in its most general sense, legitimacy concerns the 
relationship between state and subject, a relationship 
characterized by a belief on the part of both the state (i.e. 
participants in the institutions of government) and the subjects 
(i.e. individual citizen) that the political regime is justified 
and justifiable^*. This relationship between state and subject is 
grounded on consent, in fact it is generally accepted that consent 
is the source of political legitimacy^^.
What determines the consent of the state by the citizens, or 
in other words what makes a political regime justifiable, is 
ultimately settled by the theory of justice the state subscribes 
to. As Rawls argues in his more recent articles, a theory of 
justice can act as the foundation for a theory of political 
legitimacy;
we must stay within the limits of justice as fairness as a 
political conception of justice that can serve as the focus of 
an overlapping consensus. (Rawls 1988, p.258)
While there is a strong bind between the legitimacy of the
- See Barker (1990) .
- As Waldron claims: "The thesis that I want to say is
fundamentally liberal in this: a social and political order is
illegitimate unless it is rooted in the consent of all those who 
have to live under it" Waldron (1987), p.140.
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state and conceptions of social justice, there is a need for a 
filter between these two key concepts. In other words, it is 
necessary for conceptions of social justice to be translated into 
terms that form the basis of political legitimacy.
In order to bridge the gap between social justice and 
political legitimacy, it is important to narrow the range over 
which consent is sought. As Waldron (1987) rightly argues, there 
are two ways of interpreting the idea of an hypothetical consent. 
Either we look for some underlying interests and beliefs shared in 
common^ '^ * (as in the case of Rawls's overlapping consensus) , or we 
concede that the liberal state and its neutrality will only be 
appealing to those who are moved by liberal intuitions. Waldron 
rejects the former idea in favour of the latter.
It follows that before establishing whether state institutions 
have the consent of the people, we must first restrict the arena of 
actors whose consent the state institutions must seek: in the last 
analysis, only those who are moved by liberal intuitions are 
invited to legitimize the liberal state. In other words, those who 
by giving their consent legitimise the liberal state, must espouse 
conceptions of the good worthy of consideration for claims of 
social justice.
It is here that the function of neutrality, acting as the 
intermediate stage between legitimacy and social justice, takes 
full shape. Neutrality weeds out all those conceptions of the good
- "a conception of the good life that all people, even those 
with the most diverse commitments, can be said to be engaged in". 
Waldron (1987), p.145.
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that should not figure in liberal considerations of legitimacy or 
social justice. In fulfilling this function the concept of 
neutrality acts as the filter between social justice and 
legitimacy, as shown in Figure 7.1 below.
political legitimacy <------> neutrality <------> social justice
Fig. 7.1
If we accept the view that the function of neutrality is that 
of bridging the gap between the concepts of social justice and 
legitimacy of the state, and not that of bringing about better 
consequences, then the inadequacy of Raz's critique of neutrality 
becomes clear to see.
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8. CONCLUSION
8.1. A Short Summary.
Twenty years after the resuscitation of the idea of 
contractualism at the hands of John Rawls, contractualism seems 
once again to be out of favour with liberal political philosophers. 
It cannot be denied that it is partly Rawls's own fault if 
contemporary liberalism is ambiguous about contractualism. After 
all, Rawls's attempt to justify a theory of justice on 
contractualist foundations proved to be more attractive in theory 
than it was in its application.
In A Theorv of Justice Rawls re-invents the contractualist 
approach in terms of the original position, a hypothetical 
condition that Rawls compares to the state of nature in classical 
accounts of the social contract. Unfortunately, Rawls's use of 
contractualism in general and his account of original position in 
particular have proved to be the most discussed, arguably the most 
fascinating, but surely the least convincing aspect of his theory 
of justice.
In Chapter 2 I argued that there are two key notions in the 
contractarian discourse, namely 'agreement' and 'cooperation'. I
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also argued that Rawls's treatment of these two key notions is not 
convincing, in fact it appears that Rawls is appealing to two 
opposing and irreconcilable interpretations of the social contract: 
the Kantian strategy, where a morally loaded conception of 
agreement as impartiality is the crucial moment in a contractarian 
approach, and the Hobbesian strategy, where the idea of social 
cooperation for mutual advantage is the determining factor in the 
drafting of a social contract. The argument presented in this 
thesis revealing Rawls's two social contract theories is further 
confirmation of Barry's (1989b) claim that there are two theories 
of justice in Rawls's work.
Notwithstanding all these complications relating to Rawls's 
attempt to breathe new life in the neglected tradition of the 
social contract, I believe that contractualism is still the right 
answer to contemporary ethical and political problems afflicting 
liberalism. Indeed the aim of this thesis was to defend the role of 
contractualism in contemporary liberal political theory.
It seems to me that the problem with Rawls's political theory 
(indeed with liberal political theory in general) does not lie with 
contractualism, instead it is the limited use liberalism makes of 
contractualism that is most problematic. Rawls considered 
contractualism as an approach valid at the ethical level, that is, 
as a device that can help us to determine right actions from wrong 
actions. Here lies the problem with Rawls's treatment of the social 
contract. It seems to me that what Rawls should have done is to 
raise contractualism from the ethical level to the meta-ethical
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level. At the meta-ethical level, contractualism can help us with 
our inquiries concerning the nature of morality, by facilitating 
the process by which we come to terms with out moral judgments and 
our moral intuitions.
The idea of pitching contractualism at the meta-ethical level 
is denoted by the theory of 'reasonable agreement'. This theory 
finds its first and best account in Thomas Scanlon's 
"Contractualism and Utilitarianism", arguably one of the most 
widely read and influential articles in political philosophy of the 
last decade. Chapter 3 comprised of a critical assessment of 
Scanlon's contractualism. Following in the footsteps of Scanlon, in 
this thesis I have attempted to consolidate Scanlon's project of 
raising contractualism at the meta-ethical level by emphasizing 
(and hopefully clarifying) two central aspects in the notion of 
'reasonable agreement': the idea of agreement and the concept of 
reasonableness.
Endorsing the idea of agreement implies that a person is 
seeking an agreement with others on grounds they could not reject. 
In other words, it means that in seeking an agreement with others 
this person is willing to compromise or revise his or her 
conception of the good in order to find an agreement. The idea of 
agreement is important because it reminds us that a social contract 
is not exclusively or primarily about the advantageous consequences 
associated with reaching the agreement. Instead, what is important 
in a social contract is that the conditions of impartiality are 
respected. The idea of seeking a reasonable agreement is grounded
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on the motivation of impartiality, since the willingness to 
compromise or in some way revise one's conception of the good in 
order to make room for others reflects our moral duty to respect 
the equal claim to consideration of all human beings.
In the theory of reasonable agreement, the agreement is 
qualified by the concept of reasonableness. It is surprising to 
find that although many political philosophers have appealed to the 
idea of a reasonable agreement in their writings, the concept of 
reasonableness has never been adequately discussed or defined, with 
the result that the concept of reasonableness is surrounded by a 
cloud of ambiguity, equivocation and much confusion. Starting from 
the assumption that there is a need to define the concept of 
reasonableness, in Chapter 4 I argued that the concept of 
reasonableness ought to be defined by the maxim 'not asking for too 
much'.
To recapitulate, the contractualist theory of reasonable 
agreement I have defended in this thesis is an attempt to combine 
the idea of agreement and the concept of reasonableness in order to 
illuminate and strengthen the moral motivation of impartiality. Of 
course it ought to be remembered that the intention behind this 
thesis is not confined to the scholastic exercise of analysing key 
concepts in moral and political philosophy. Instead this thesis is 
moved by the more general endeavour of justifying the foundations 
of the liberal project, and to fortify the liberal tradition from 
possible threats.
In order to show that the theory of reasonable agreement can
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serve as a foundation for liberalism, it must be shown that the 
theory of reasonable agreement is equipped to respond to the 
challenge facing liberalism"*, it is to this question that I want 
to turn now.
8 .II. Reasonable Agreement and the Challenge Facing Liberalism.
In Chapter 1 I argued that the ethical challenge facing 
liberalism concerns providing the conditions for the peaceful 
coexistence of diverse and sometimes conflicting conceptions of the 
good, ranging from religious beliefs to economic self-interest. It 
is important to emphasize that diversity and conflict are the 
essence of liberalism, hence the solution to the challenge facing 
liberalism cannot be to establish a hierarchical society^° which 
eradicates diversity and suppresses conflict; the challenge facing 
liberalism can only be met by an ethical argument that reconciles 
diversity with peaceful coexistence.
There are two aspects to the relationship between the liberal 
tradition, and the acceptance of diversity and conflict. On one 
side, the very essence of liberalism is the toleration of diversity
149 _ ipj^e challenge facing liberalism is fully discussed in 
Chapter 1.
- I am using the expression 'hierarchical society' in the 
same way Rawls does in his Oxford Amnesty Lecture. According to 
Rawls, hierarchical societies are the alternative to liberal 
societies, in fact hierarchical societies "are well-ordered and 
just, often religious in nature and not characterized by the 
separation of church and state" (Rawls 1993b, p.52).
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and the capacity to withstand internal conflict and prosper or 
improve as a result of it. After all, in the liberal tradition the 
idea of democracy is defined in terms of pluralism, and you cannot 
have pluralism without diversity and conflict. To the extent that 
pluralism is an integral part of the liberal philosophy, diversity 
and conflict will always be characteristic features of a liberal 
society.
While diversity and conflict are requisite to liberalism, it 
is also true that under liberalism the concepts of diversity and 
conflict acquire specific meanings. Thus we find that diversity 
must not rule out compatibility, while conflict must be confined to 
legally recognized and acceptable channels of expression^*. 
Another way of approaching the same conclusion is to observe that 
in order for a liberal theory to confront the challenge facing 
liberalism, it must be able to show that diversity and conflict are 
being tolerated and regulated by a fair system of rules.
In the liberal tradition, theories of the social contract 
vindicate the attempt to reconcile diversity with peaceful 
coexistence. In fact the very idea of an agreement is to bring 
together and reconcile people with different views, that is to say, 
people whose conceptions of the good are in potential conflict. At 
the same time, contractualism has also the political function of
151 _ These are usually institutional or constitutional
channels.
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fostering peace and harmony^^^, hence while diversity is desired 
certain types of conflicts must be mitigated.
I think that of all forms of contractualism, the theory of 
reasonable agreement is best equipped to carry out this double 
function of seeking the resolution of conflict without crushing the 
conditions for the development of diversity.
What makes the contractualist theory of reasonable agreement 
unique respect to other contractualist and liberal theories is the 
fact that reasonable agreement is imbued in the spirit of 
scepticism. It is by endorsing the philosophy of scepticism that 
reasonable agreement is able to responde to the challenge facing 
liberalism, in fact scepticism encourages agreement between diverse 
freedoms, while at the same time helping to determine the 
acceptable limits of diversity and conflict.
I have said before that one of the key notions in the theory 
of reasonable agreement is the idea of agreement, which implies 
that a person must be seeking an agreement with others on grounds 
they could not reject. If by scepticism we understand that frame of 
mind which challenges us to justify or give reasons for our 
beliefs, as I have argued in Chapter 1, it follows that endorsing 
scepticism is a necessary (although not sufficient) condition for
152 _ most clear exponent of this view is obviously Hobbes, 
although we find a similar opinion being endorsed by Rawls in the 
Oxford Amnesty Lecture. According to Rawls, both liberal and 
hierarchical societies "have a common interest in changing the way 
in which politics among peoples - war and threats of war - has 
hitherto been carried out" (Rawls 1993b, p.67), hence Rawls 
believes that there are the conditions for an agreement between 
these two types of society.
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seeking an agreement on terms that respect the conditions of 
impartiality. Just as reasonable agreement is about justifying
actions to others, scepticism is about justifying one's own beliefs 
to others.
At the same time, I believe the endorsement of scepticism can 
help us to establish acceptable limits of diversity and conflict. 
That is because there is a fundamental difference between the sort 
of scepticism I am defending (namely, the desire to justify or give 
reasons for one's beliefs), and the more familiar concept of
fallibilism. Basically, the difference is that scepticism applies 
to our primary or higher conceptions of the good, while 
f a l l i b i l i s m ^ ^  applies to our simple conceptions of the good. In 
other words scepticism deals with the conceptualization of 
conceptions of the good, hence diversity and conflict between 
conceptions of the good are tolerated if they are permitted by a 
system of rules grounded on reasonable agreement, or in other words 
by the desire to justify or give reasons to others.
So far I have argued that the theory of reasonable agreement,
by pitching contractualism at the meta-ethical level, is capable of 
confronting the challenge facing liberalism. Of course, in order to 
argue that the contractualist theory of reasonable agreement can be 
the foundation for a liberal political theory capable of responding 
to the challenge facing liberalism, it is not sufficient to show
- I am adopting this term in the way J.S. Mill uses it in 
On Libertv, namely, fallibilism is the claim that we cannot know 
everything or alternatively that we cannot be sure that what we 
believe is the truth.
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that at the meta-ethical level reasonable agreement prescribes a 
different set of moral motivations.
What also needs to be shown is that reasonable agreement can 
shed some light on some of the key issues at the heart of liberal 
debates. I have dealt with this question in Part II of the thesis. 
In these chapters, I have thrust the contractualist theory of 
reasonable agreement on the mine field of three key concepts in 
liberal political philosophy: political obligation, social justice 
and neutrality.
As a theory of political obligation, the idea of reasonable 
agreement fares better than other approaches, in fact it can 
justify a state that provides both discretionary goods and 
presumptive goods, as well as be able to distinguish between a 
general obligation towards a just state while preserving a 
prerogative to manifest civil disobedience.
First of all, the idea of agreement, combined with the concept 
of reasonableness, justifies a duty towards a state that supports 
the provision of discretionary goods; it is because we are seeking 
an agreement with others on grounds they could not reject that we 
are not going to take advantage of our bargaining power, instead we 
support the provision of discretionary goods. Furthermore, the 
theory of reasonable agreement respects the right to civil 
disobedience. This is an important feature of the theory as it is 
a clear indication of the weight it places on diversity and 
conflict. After all, civil disobedience is nothing more that a 
political channel denoting diversity of opinion and reasonable
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conflict; if the conflict is not reasonable, we would be dealing 
with terrorism rather than civil disobedience. Reasonable agreement 
responds to the challenge facing liberalism by providing a theory 
of political obligation that recognizes diversity (discretionary 
goods) and conflict (civil disobedience), hence legitimizing both 
the state and the boundaries of the political arena.
In terms of social justice, the attempt of reasonable 
agreement to reconcile the principles of responsibility and 
compensation is once again a recognition that there are a diversity 
of people, holding a diversity of legitimate interests and needs, 
hence only a political theory that aims to reconcile these two 
principles is attentive to diversity and conflict. The idea of 
agreement implies that we are not going to support principles of 
justice simply because they are in our best interest, instead we 
are seeking an agreement with others. Since those who stand to gain 
from the principle of responsibility are not those who will gain 
from the principle of compensation, seeking an agreement 
necessarily means reconciling these two principles. Furthermore, I 
believe that the criterion of distribution that reconciles the 
principles of responsibility and compensation is compatible with 
Rawls's principles of justice as fairness, in fact the idea of 
responsibility is reflected in the principle of fair opportunity, 
while the idea of compensation is reflected in the difference 
principle.
Finally, contrary to other liberal theories, the concept of 
neutrality is not refuted by the contractualist theory of
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reasonable agreement. Reasonable agreement acknowledges that 
neutrality and impartiality are closely related. Endorsing 
neutrality is a recognition that there are a variety of conceptions 
of the good, hence denying neutrality would be like denying 
impartiality.
Yet reasonable agreement defends a substantive rather than 
purely procedural conception of neutrality. In fact neutrality does 
not apply to every single rules, instead neutrality concerns a 
system of rules that as a whole is justified by a set of values 
that no one could reasonably reject. Contractualism in general and 
reasonable agreement in particular provides the framework in which 
such values are formulated.
Needless to say, much more work needs to be done before the 
theory of reasonable agreement can be recognised as providing the 
moral foundations for the liberal project. My only aim in this 
thesis was to argue that contractualism is a valid and rewarding 
approach, which should not be discarded too hastily. Furthermore I 
have tried to argue that there is more to contractualism than the 
idea of rational bargaining and mutual advantage, indeed the theory 
of reasonable agreement is directly antithetical to Gauthier's 
contractualism.
314
APPENDIX 'A':
UTILITARIANISM, EGALITARIANISM, AND IMPARTIALITY
Rawls's major critique of utilitarianism, as everyone must 
know by now, is that utilitarianism does not take seriously the 
distinction between persons. The force of this argument rests on 
Rawls's distinction between deontological and teleological 
theories. According to Rawls, utilitarianism is primarily concerned 
not with persons, but with their states of affairs, in fact the 
right act is defined in terms of maximising the good, rather than 
in terms of equal consideration. Starting from this teleological 
interpretation of utilitarianism, Rawls concludes that 
utilitarianism as a moral theory is undesirable because 
insufficiently egalitarian^*.
In fact Rawls's critique of utilitarianism is not exact. As 
Kymlicka (1988, 1989a & 1990a) has shown, although Rawls's
dissatisfaction with utilitarianism is grounded on the right 
intuition, he failed to centre the target. Contrary to what Rawls 
seems to think, utilitarianism does not give priority to the good 
(maximizing utility) over the right (treating everyone with equal
154 - See Rawls (1971), p.24.
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concern and respect), instead in its more compelling form 
utilitarianism is a deontological theory, giving priority to the 
right over the good. As Kymlicka points out, it is the concern with 
equal consideration that underlies the arguments of Bentham, 
Sidgwick, and many modern utilitarians like Harsanyi, Griffin, 
Singer and Hare. According to Kymlicka, utilitarianism has to be 
examined for what it is, namely, an egalitarian moral theory, 
working from the same 'egalitarian plateau' as Rawls and Dworkin.
The attractiveness of utilitarianism is that it combines two 
separate standards; maximising the good and respecting the claim of 
individuals to equal consideration. Yet, as Kymlicka argues, this 
is utilitarianism's best asset and worse liability:
Unfortunately, it is incoherent to employ both standards in 
the same theory. One cannot say that morality is fundamentally 
about maximizing the good, while also saying that it is 
fundamentally about respecting the claim of individuals to 
equal consideration. (Kymlicka 1990a, p.35)
To treat utilitarianism as a purely teleological theory, as 
Rawls seems to be doing, is to defeat a straw man; the strength of 
utilitarianism is that its consequentialist character is combined 
with the core egalitarian intuition of treating people with equal 
concern and respect. A successful critique of utilitarianism must 
therefore move away from unfounded teleological charges, and focus 
on its inadequate conception of equality. In this respect
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Kymlicka's views on utilitarianism are an important improvement on 
Rawls's theory:
while utilitarianism seeks to treat people as equals, it 
violates many of our intuitions about what it genuinely means 
to treat people with equal consideration .... utilitarianism 
has misinterpreted the ideal of equal consideration for each 
person's interests, and, as a result, it allows some people to 
be treated as less than equal, as means to other people's 
ends. (Kymlicka 1990a, p.36)
The problem with utilitarianism's conception of equality lies 
in the formula "everyone counting for one, no one for more than 
one". According to Kymlicka, this is an inadequate account of 
equality because it assumes that every kind of preference, as long 
as it yields equal utility, should be given the same weight.
The inadequacy of utilitarian conception of equality 
originates from its inability to distinguish between different 
kinds of preferences. External preferences (i.e. prejudice) and 
selfish preferences (i.e. subsidising expensive tastes on other 
people's resources) fail to reflect equal consideration, yet these 
preferences are not ruled out from the utilitarian calculus since 
doing so would contradict the creed of 'everyone counting for one, 
no one for more than one'*^ .^ In other words, it is the inability 
to consider certain preferences as intrinsically unfair that makes
- See Kymlicka (1990a), pp.36-44.
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utilitarianism's conception of equality inadequate. An adequate 
account of equal consideration must distinguish different kinds of 
preferences, only some of which have legitimate moral weight.
Kymlicka's account of egalitarianism and utilitarianism shows 
that Rawls's condemnation of utilitarianism is inexact. Considering 
that Rawls's critique of utilitarianism is the origin of reasonable 
agreement as a school of political philosophy, it is important to 
consider the repercussions of Kymlicka's critique of Rawls's views 
on utilitarianism on the contractualist theory of reasonable 
agreement. If Rawls's critique of utilitarianism is fallacious, 
does this undermine the foundations of reasonable agreement? I 
believe not.
In what follows, I will argue that Rawls's critique of 
utilitarianism, although inaccurate, played the important role of 
detaching utilitarianism from the moral perspective of 
impartiality. In other words, Rawls's critique of utilitarian 
egalitarianism emancipated the concept of impartiality from the 
utilitarian clutch. The contractualist theory of reasonable 
agreement is, first and foremost, a theory of impartiality. Yet 
before the theory of reasonable agreement could take off, it was 
necessary to reconceptualize the concept of impartiality in non­
utilitarian terms. Rawls's critique of utilitarianism made all this 
possible.
For the best part of the last twenty years critics of Rawls's 
theory of justice have been overwhelmingly concerned with his 
original position, with the unfortunate result that his views on
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impartiality have been neglected. It is only recently that this 
tendency is turning^ *^^ . Overlooking Rawls's views on impartiality 
could have potentially disastrous consequences; it would mean that 
Rawls's theory of justice amounts to little more than a very 
sophisticated defence of justice as mutual-advantage.
Of course this is not the case, and Rawls is very explicit 
about it. At the core of Rawls's theory of justice as fairness is 
not a desire to come up with a pure procedure grounded on rational- 
choice theory, but the moral intuition that "moral judgments are, 
or should be, impartial" (Rawls 1971, p.190). It follows that 
justice as fairness is not about mutual-advantage, instead it is 
Rawls's attempt to formalise impartial moral judgments. Similarly 
Rawls's two principles of justice (the difference principle in 
particular), are not the result of rational-choice procedure, but 
the embodiment of a sense of justice grounded on the moral 
intuition of impartiality^?.
Impartiality is the conceptual key to a correct interpretation 
of Rawls's theory of justice. Yet, as Rawls was well aware, justice 
as fairness does not have exclusive rights on impartiality. In 1971 
Rawls acknowledged that the utilitarian tradition, especially the 
classical utilitarian principle of maximizing total utility, also 
aspires to an impartial moral judgment. Does this mean that justice
- Apart from Scanlon's seminal work in 1982, the works that 
did most to turn the tide are by Barry (1989b) , Beitz (1989) and 
Nagel (1988).
- For a thorough and compelling interpretation of Rawls's 
theory of justice along these lines, see Barry (1989b), esp. Parts 
II and III.
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as fairness is a utilitarian doctrine? Obviously not. Rawls 
explicitly indicates the differences between his theory and 
utilitarianism, focusing in particular on the different ways in 
which the concept of impartiality can be interpreted.
In Section 3 0 of A Theorv of Justice^^ ,^ Rawls explains the 
relationship between impartiality, utilitarianism and justice as 
fairness. He points out that although both utilitarianism and 
justice as fairness wish to be portrayed as patrons of 
impartiality, proclaiming their respective principles of justice to 
be the best interpretation of impartiality, only justice as 
fairness deserves to be associated with impartiality, since 
utilitarianism mistakes impartiality with impersonality.
Rawls's aim in Section 3 0 is to undermine the claim made by 
utilitarians that the idea of an 'impartial sympathetic spectator' 
is the correct interpretation of impartiality. According to Rawls 
this is only one interpretation, and certainly not the correct 
interpretation of impartiality. The problem with the 'impartial 
sympathetic spectator' formula is that it relies on the feeling of 
'sympathy', and it requires a third party (the 'observer' or 
'spectator'). Rawls's idea of impartiality is construed by the veil 
of ignorance in the original position, whereby sympathy is replaced 
by mutual-disinterest, and the ideal spectator or observer with the 
'litigants' themselves^*.
158 _ 'Classical Utilitarianism, Impartiality and Benevolence'; 
Rawls (1971), pp.183-192.
159 See Rawls (1971), p.190.
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In order to understand Rawls's critique of impartiality as 
sympathetic spectator, it is necessary to recall Rawls's charge 
that utilitarianism is not sufficiently egalitarian. Earlier I 
considered some of the problems with Rawls's claim that 
utilitarianism fails to take seriously the distinction between 
persons. Notwithstanding these problems, there is an aspect of this 
critique which must not be neglected - that at the root of Rawls's 
views is a critique of (classical) utilitarian conception of 
impartiality; Rawls critique of utilitarian impartiality ought to 
be read as the core part of his general critique that 
utilitarianism is insufficiently egalitarian. The central place of 
impartiality in Rawls's critical analysis of utilitarianism is 
further evidence of the prominent bearing of impartiality in 
Rawls's model.
The link between utilitarian conception of impartiality and 
Rawls's claim that utilitarianism is insufficiently egalitarian is 
revealed by Rawls with the help of a simple but often over-looked 
manoeuvre. Rawls blames utilitarianism's insufficient 
egalitarianism on the logical fallacy of deducing social 
implications generalizing from single, individual cases. This 
logical fallacy originates from the endorsement of impartiality as 
sympathetic spectator. By defining impartiality from the stand­
point of a sympathetic observer who responds to the conflicting 
interests of others as if they were his own, utilitarians mistake 
impersonality for impartiality, where impersonality implies "the 
conflation of all desires into one system of desire" (Rawls 1971,
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p.188).
According to Rawls, the idea of grounding impartiality on a 
sympathetic spectator is utilitarianism's major weakness. Rawls's 
critique of utilitarianism consists in the following line of 
reasoning: impartiality as sympathetic observer implies
impartiality as impersonality, and impartiality as impersonality 
neglect of separateness of persons, hence the egalitarianism 
advocated by utilitarianism is inadequate. Having refuted the 
utilitarian concept of impartiality, Rawls concludes that we ought 
to abandon utilitarianism and endorse a more egalitarian theory 
with a different conception of impartiality. Providing a more 
egalitarianism theory of justice gives justice as fairness the edge 
over utilitarianism. Justice as fairness is more egalitarian than 
utilitarianism to the extent that it replaces impartiality as 
mutual-disinterest for impartiality as sympathetic-spectator.
To the extent that it is also grounded on the concept of 
impartiality, the theory of reasonable agreement is a direct heir 
of Rawls's theory of justice. The difference between reasonable 
agreement and Rawls's theory of justice is that according to the 
former, impartiality cannot be captured by Rawls's original 
position, instead impartiality is about the desire to find an 
agreement on terms that others could not reasonable reject.
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